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Chapter 1: A Common Necessary Condition for Attributional-
Responsibility 
 
1. Introduction 
Imagine that your friend Corey has promised to come over and support 
you after the death of your pet. You sit waiting for him to appear at the 
time he said he’d be there, but time continues to tick by and he does not 
show up. As it becomes clear that he’s not going to show up, you might 
blame Corey. In response to the perceived slight, you might start to feel 
angry with him, come to judge him as being insensitive, or even begin to 
question your friendship. But now, suppose you find out that Corey suf-
fers from OCD and his absence is explained by the fact that while he des-
perately wanted to come support you, he felt the need to instead act on a 
compulsive desire to stay at home repeatedly performing rituals, turning 
the lights in each room of his house on and off several times. 
It seems that you have reason to suspend your reactions to your friend 
in light of finding out this information. You shouldn’t blame Corey be-
cause it seems he wasn’t, after all, being insensitive about your situation, 
since his absence was caused by his compulsive behavior. But why do 
conditions like Corey’s OCD exempt agents from moral responsibility in 
these sorts of situations?  
Philosophers often ask questions like this in the context of a skeptical 
worry about how it could be the case that anyone is ever responsible for 
what they do at all. One commonplace thought is that when agents’ be-
haviors are due to compulsion their “brains make them do it.” But, in a 
literal sense, it might seem that our brains make all of us do everything 
that we do. 
 Given a commitment to the veridicality of this important intuitive dis-
tinction between ordinary responsible action and compulsive behaviors, 
there are two central kinds of approaches to these worries in the moral re-
 -11- 
sponsibility literature. One approach is to hold that what we really mean 
is that agents like Corey don’t have sufficient control over their compul-
sive actions; being morally responsible is largely a matter of control. An-
other approach is that what we really mean is that when agents like Corey 
act compulsively they don’t act in accordance with what they really want 
to be doing; moral responsibility is a matter of agents having a certain pro-
file of mental states that contribute to their actions.  
 In this dissertation I advance an account of moral responsibility that 
aims to solve several of the biggest problems facing current accounts that 
take this latter approach, which are often known as Deep Self accounts. In 
the first part of this chapter I explain and motivate several key aspects of 
Deep Self accounts. While the view I advance diverges in crucial ways 
from traditional Deep Self views, it nevertheless shares many of their 
broad theoretical commitments. My discussion here serves both to shed 
light on the general theoretical orientation that underpins my project and 
to highlight the specific contribution that my view makes to the dialectic. 
Each traditional Deep Self view relies on identifying a type of mental 
state that is invariably internal. In the second part of this chapter I argue 
that internality is best understood on each view in terms of the agent ap-
proving of being motivated in the way that she is to some degree. This 
helps locate a commonality among Deep Self views: they all seem to hold 
that approving of one’s action is a necessary condition for attributional-
responsibility. In Chapter 2, I build on this foundation to develop a new 
view of attributional-responsibility. 
2. Actual Sequence Compatibilism 
2.1 Dialectical Motivation for Actual Sequence Compatibilism 
How can we justify our system of moral responsibility practices given a 
scientific picture of our world in which it seems likely that our choices are 
explicable by means of causal chains that stretch back to events that hap-
pened before we were even born? Against a backdrop of scientific under-
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standing according to which we recognize that our brains make us do eve-
rything that we do, and that these events are reducible to neurochemical 
reactions, how can we preserve the distinctions we want to make between 
agents who are blameworthy for their actions and those who are not due 
to conditions like Tourette syndrome or OCD? 
One response to these initial concerns is to claim that, in fact, we can-
not justify our practices and intuitive distinctions. The most popular ar-
gument for this conclusion runs as follows:  
 
1. It’s only appropriate to blame agents who act freely. 
2. Acting freely requires the presence of alternative possibilities for ac-
tion. 
3. Having alternative possibilities involves having metaphysically ro-
bust options available at the moment of choice. 
4. Our scientific picture of the world is correct, and it crowds out the 
space for metaphysically robust options to ever exist at the moment of 
choice.2 
5.Therefore, it is never appropriate to blame anyone. 3 
 
																																																								
2 Another route to Moral Responsibility Skepticism is to take no stand on whether or not 
we live in a deterministic world, and instead show that the kind of free will that could 
ground moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism. 
See, for example, Pereboom (2005). 
3 While this argument is very popular, it is possible to be an Incompatibilist about moral 
responsibility and determinism without thinking that alternative possibilities are re-
quired for free will. For example, some Incompatibilists think that the kind of free will 
required for moral responsibility requires that an agent herself be the ultimate source of 
the chain of events leading to her actions in a way that is not possible given the truth of 
determinism. For an overview of several different views in this family, see Tognazzini 
(2011). 
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While Moral Responsibility Skeptics are happy to accept this conclu-
sion, each of the premises of this argument has been disputed somewhere 
in the literature. 
Libertarians generally dispute Premise 4. They believe that for an 
agent to have the requisite kind of alternative possibilities when she acts 
her action must be non-deterministically caused such that at the moment 
of action there is another action she could have undertaken (and that af-
terwards it will be true to say of her that she “could have done other-
wise”). While this sounds like a mysterious sort of power to ascribe to 
agents, Libertarians have advanced several different pictures of the pro-
duction of action that attempt to mitigate these worries.4 Libertarian views 
are also subject to luck objections.5 If an agent’s prior plans, values, com-
mitments, etc. cannot fully determine her course of action since, according 
to the Libertarian, the choice must remain open at the very moment of ac-
tion, there can be nothing about the agent’s mental states that determines 
whether she will undertake one action or the other. This agent actually 
seems to lack an important form of control over what she does, and so, it 
is often argued, this cannot be the sense of alternative possibilities re-
quired for the kind of free will required for moral responsibility.  
For a long time the most popular strategy for those who wanted to 
preserve both the scientific picture of action production and justification 
of our practices of responsibility was to target Premise 3. Classical Com-
patibilists accepted that moral responsibility requires free will and that 
free will requires the ability to do otherwise, but rejected that this is in-
compatible with determinism. Instead, they attempted to posit less meta-
physically robust senses of the ability to do otherwise that were both 
compatible with causal determinism and convincingly able to ground as-
criptions of free will and moral responsibility. Initially, these compatibil-																																																								
4 See Clarke (2003) for an overview. 
5 See Mele (1999, 2006). 
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ists put forth conditional analyses of the ability to do otherwise that took 
the following form: If the agent had chosen/wanted to/decided to do oth-
erwise, she would have done otherwise. In this way, they hoped to secure 
the conditions for free will while retaining the understanding that our ac-
tions are controlled by fixed chains of mental events. 
These analyses are thought to have definitively failed, however, since 
they appear to predict that agents have the ability to do otherwise in cases 
in which we think they clearly don’t. For example, imagine a girl who has 
such a psychological aversion to picking up blonde puppies such that she 
could never become such that she would pick up a blonde puppy. Now 
suppose that when offered a choice of a blonde or black puppy, she picks 
up the black puppy. The conditional analysis says of this case that if she 
had wanted to pick up the blonde puppy she would have picked up the 
blonde puppy and so it returns the verdict that she does have alternative 
possibilities in the Classical Compatibilist sense. But since she is unable to 
become psychologically such that she would ever pick up the blonde 
puppy, this seems clearly incorrect. In what sense does she have the abil-
ity to pick up the blonde puppy if she could never be or become such that 
she would actually do so?6 
More recently, some Compatibilists, sometimes called New Disposi-
tionalists, have tried to revive the spirit of this project by positing that the 
ability to do otherwise is grounded in more complex agential dispositions, 
or bundles of dispositions.7 For example, following David Lewis, Kadri 
Vihvelin suggests that rather than simple conditionals, the dispositions at 
issue should be taken to involve intrinsic properties that are the causal ba-																																																								
6 For more on this example, see McKenna and Coates (2015). This problem is, arguably, 
just an application of a more general problem for analyzing dispositions in terms of sim-
ple conditionals, known as the problem of finked dispositions. See Vihvelin (2004) for 
discussion. 
7 This label first appears in Clarke (2009). Prominent defenses include Smith (2003); Fara 
(2008); and Vihvelin (2004, 2013). 
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ses of those dispositions. She thinks that in order to assess claims about 
whether an agent has alternative possibilities, we must consider various 
counterfactual scenarios in which the causal base of the pertinent disposi-
tion operates unimpaired. In the spirit of Classical Compatibilism, Vihve-
lin argues that the relevant sorts of abilities are dispositions to make 
choices on the basis of reasons.8 While these sorts of accounts solve some 
of the problems of the more simplistic conditional analyses, they continue 
to face a less resolvable challenge from defenders of Premise 3. 
Defenders of Premise 3 argue that the New Dispositionalists’ accounts 
do not get us to the kind of alternative possibilities required for free will, 
since what’s valuable about us having alternative possibilities at the mo-
ment of choice is that they make it so that our choices are “up to us.” And, 
as they argue, it’s just not clear that the New Dispositionalists’ notion of 
ability to do otherwise captures this sense. Randolph Clarke puts the point 
as follows:  
 
An agent with an interesting bundle of dispositions and in friendly 
surroundings might have a rich array of narrow and wide abilities to 
do things that she doesn’t in fact do. That an agent might have such 
abilities even if determinism is true is an important fact. But it will take 
further argument to show that having such dispositions and being in 
such surroundings suffices for its being up to you, on some occasions, 
whether one or another of these dispositions is manifested, and hence 
whether you do this or that.9 																																																								
8 Vihvelin (2004) suggests that the collection of dispositions might include, among others, 
dispositions to form and revise beliefs in response to evidence and argument, to form in-
tentions in response to desires and form beliefs about how to achieve those desires, to 
engage in practical reasoning in response to one’s intention to make a rational decision 
about what to do, and to believe that by engaging in practical reasoning one will succeed 
in making such a decision. 
9 Clarke (Forthcoming): 26-27. 
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Here, New Dispositionalists find themselves in a battle of intuitions; they 
allege that having the sorts of dispositions they put forth as an analysis of 
the ability to do otherwise just is what it means for our actions to be “up to 
us.”10 It is unclear how the clash of this particular set of intuitions could be 
resolved, and this leaves the debate at a standstill. Some have even taken 
this clash of intuitions as reason to conclude that our notions of free will 
and moral responsibility are confused concepts we should try to do with-
out in order to make progress.11 
I adopt what I take to be a more promising strategy for those who 
want to preserve both our moral responsibility practices as we know them 
and the scientific picture of action: Actual Sequence Compatibilism. Actu-
al Sequence Compatibilism gives up on the Classical Compatibilist at-
tempt to redefine the sense of alternative possibilities that is required for 
freedom and responsibility and instead resists the notion that the condi-
tions for moral responsibility have anything to do with control or alterna-
tive possibilities at all, thus targeting Premise 2 (and sometimes also 
Premise 1 in the process).12 The idea is that the criterion for an agent to 																																																								
10 It is sometimes alleged that the incompatibilist intuition about the relevance of alterna-
tive possibilities is a common sense intuition, while others argue that compatibilist no-
tions of alternative possibilities are the more predominant common sense intuition. There 
is an extensive but inconclusive experimental philosophy literature on this topic. See 
Björnsson and Pereboom (Forthcoming) for an overview. 
11 See Vargas (2011) for an overview of Revisionist approaches to free will and moral re-
sponsibility. 
12 In this dissertation I reject premise 2 explicitly and remain agnostic about premise 1. I 
propose conditions for one form of moral responsibility, and say relatively little about 
free will.  I leave the question of whether or not my account is best thought of as a non-
freedom-requiring account of responsibility (“Semicompatibilism”), or as an account of 
the kind of freedom required for responsibility to the reader (as the answer seems to me 
to be determined in large part by what one wants their conception of “free will” to do), 
although I suspect the former may be the better way of understanding the project. 
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count as having acted (freely and) responsibly can be found within the ac-
tual sequence that leads to her action. In arguing that exemptions from 
moral responsibility can be explained without reference to alternative pos-
sibilities, the Actual Sequence Compatibilist boldly forges past the stale-
mate and frees up the opportunity to propose quite different kinds of cri-
teria for responsibility. This gives the Actual Sequence Compatibilist a 
significant dialectical advantage in the debate. 
2.2 Support for Actual Sequence Compatibilism 
Dialectical advantages aside though, are there any reasons to believe in 
the truth of Actual Sequence Compatibilism? There is, admittedly, at least 
something initially strange about the thought that whether or not an agent 
could have done otherwise has no bearing on whether or not she acts 
freely and responsibly. 
This strangeness, though, is mitigated by the fact that there is some-
thing equally strange about views that do not focus on the actual causal 
sequence that leads to the agent’s action. As Carolina Sartorio emphasizes, 
it would seem quite inappropriate for an agent to attempt to absolve her-
self of responsibility for some action by pointing to factors that were not in 
any way explanatory of why she acted in such a way. Sartorio puts this 
point succinctly: “if a factor is completely irrelevant to why you acted, it 
seems that it cannot be used to excuse your behavior.”13 Since there are in-
tuitions that tell against the relevance of alternative possibilities and the 
irrelevance of alternative possibilities, it’s clear the debate cannot be set-
tled by appeal to initial intuition alone. 
In various places throughout the body of his work, Harry Frankfurt 
provides support for the view that alternative possibilities are irrelevant to 
moral responsibility. Most famously, Frankfurt offers the case of Jones and 
Black.14 He has us imagine that Jones is an agent who is going to perform 																																																								
13 Sartorio (2016): 2. See also Mele (2006). 
14 Frankfurt (1969). 
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an action, ϕ-ing, for which we would all agree he would intuitively be 
clearly morally responsible, were he to go through with it. Unbeknownst 
to him, however, Black is waiting in the wings and has placed a chip in 
Jones’ brain that will not activate unless Jones is not independently going 
to go through with ϕ-ing, in which case it will cause him to ϕ anyway. As 
it happens, Jones decides to go through with ϕ-ing on the basis of his own 
deliberation and Black never needs to, and so does not, interfere. Jones 
lacks alternative possibilities in any reasonable sense; no matter what, he 
was going to ϕ at t. And yet he still appears to be just as morally responsi-
ble for his action as he would have been if Black had never been waiting in 
the wings at all. 
Cases that follow this general format have been termed “Frankfurt cas-
es,” and a very large literature has emerged over the years that questions 
the adequacy of the thought experiment for proving that the presence of 
alternative possibilities is not required for moral responsibility.15 For ex-
ample, some question whether or not it is methodologically appropriate to 
make the assumption that Black knows what Jones will do before he does 
it, and others question whether or not the action Black would cause would 
be identical to Jones’ actual act. 
Whether or not any particular Frankfurt case is successful at decisively 
establishing a foolproof example of an agent who has no alternative pos-
sibilities but is nevertheless responsible for her action, there is a broader 
lesson that these cases do help to illustrate: alternative possibilities appear 
to play no explanatory role in action.16 In Frankfurt’s words: 
 
The fact that a person could not have avoided doing something is a 
sufficient condition of his having done it. But…this fact may play no 																																																								
15 See Fischer (2010) for an overview in which he compares the state of the literature here 
to the state of the literature surrounding Gettier cases. 
16 See also McKenna (2008) for a similar take on the relevance of Frankfurt-cases. 
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role whatsoever in the explanation of why he did it. It may not figure 
at all among the circumstances that actually brought it about that he 
did what he did, so that his action is to be accounted for on another ba-
sis entirely. Even though the person was unable to do otherwise, that is 
to say, it may not be the case that he acted as he did because he could 
not have done otherwise.17 
 
Frankfurt cases remind us that it seems much less important to figure out 
whether or not there are possible worlds in which Jones does not ϕ than it 
does to figure out why he actually ϕs.  
This lesson can also be drawn from Frankfurt’s cases of volitional ne-
cessity. Frankfurt draws attention to cases in which people feel that their 
actions are necessitated by constraints on their wills in positive ways. For 
example, agents committing acts of extreme love or loyalty may have this 
feature, like a woman jumping in front of a bullet to save a friend or a man 
running back into a house on fire to save his child. Doing otherwise in 
these cases appears to be simply unthinkable for such agents, yet they cer-
tainly seem to be morally responsible. As Frankfurt remarks, when Martin 
Luther made his famous declaration “Here I stand; I can do no other,” we 
do not usually take Luther’s seeming lack of control over his course of ac-
tion to undercut his claim over his action, but rather, if anything, to inten-
sify it.18 Whether or not Luther’s claim is taken literally, the rhetorical 
force comes from the natural thought that feeling yourself to have no oth-
er option often serves to intensify your sense of ownership of your action, 
not to undercut it. As with Frankfurt cases, the larger point is not that the 
exact sense of alternative possibilities targeted by Classical Compatibilists, 
Libertarians, or Skeptics is the exact same as what agents lack in volitional 
necessity cases, but rather that the degree to which someone is able to do 																																																								
17 Frankfurt (1988): 8. 
18 Frankfurt (1988): 87. 
 -20- 
otherwise has no simple correlation to how free they are to act in any 
sense that we seem to care about when we make judgments of moral re-
sponsibility.  
A final set of cases offered by Frankfurt helps to get to the heart of the 
debate: his willing and unwilling addict cases. The unwilling addict des-
perately wishes not to be compelled to take drugs but continues taking 
them, despite himself, due to his addiction. The willing addict, on the oth-
er hand, absolutely loves taking drugs, and though he would not be able 
to resist if he ever tried to, he would never want to resist in the first place 
since he fully endorses what he does. Those who are focused on alterna-
tive possibilities and control will not differentiate between the responsibil-
ity of willing and unwilling addicts; so long as an addict cannot sufficient-
ly control her action, she is not responsible, they’ll allege. But Frankfurt 
thinks the willing addict is responsible for taking drugs, despite his lack of 
control. This intuition can be strengthened by supposing that the willing 
addict has no awareness of his addiction and wholeheartedly chooses to 
take drugs for reasons that have nothing to do with their irresistibility. 
Chandra Sripada adds further support by offering a structurally anal-
ogous case that abstracts away from the particularities of addiction. His 
example is of a “willing exploiter” who strongly desires to watch exploita-
tive kinds of pornography.  
 
… suppose [his] desires and the actions they issue in are deeply ex-
pressive of his self. This man has a narcissistic kind of self-love at his 
core. He is attracted to the idea that he is in a position of dominance 
over others and the exploitiveness of the pornographic material is thus 
exactly what he finds so deeply gratifying. The person thus stands 
strongly in favor of his desires to view exploitive images and wouldn’t 
change a thing. In envisioning this case, we are to keep all other rele-
vant aspects of the Willing Addict case the same. In particular, 
the attitudes of this person’s self, via their role in deliberation and the 
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formation of practical judgments, provide motivational support in fa-
vor of his viewing the images. Additionally, the desires to view the 
images are sufficiently powerful in their own right that, though he 
doesn’t and wouldn’t ever try to resist these desires, were he to try, he 
would fail.19  
 
The willing exploiter certainly seems to be morally responsible for his 
viewing of the pornographic images despite the fact that he wouldn’t ever 
be able to resist his desires to do so if he were to try to, and so control, 
again, seems to be fairly irrelevant to our willingness to ascribe responsi-
bility. 
3. Deep Self Theory 
These cases also point towards a new kind of criterion that has nothing to 
do with alternative possibilities or control. The willing exploiter seems re-
sponsible for what he does because it’s something he embraces, and he 
does so precisely because he embraces it. This insight is key to the devel-
opment of a new kind of criterion for morally responsible agency.  
Recall that the Actual Sequence model claims that alternative possibili-
ties are not relevant to moral responsibility and that we should instead fo-
cus on the actual sequence of events that leads up to the agent’s action. 
But this falls short of a substantive theory of moral responsibility, since it 
does not yet tell us which aspects of the action’s causal sequence are rele-
vant to determining whether or not the agent is responsible. As the willing 
exploiter case illustrates, one natural way of filling in the story is by look-
ing towards whether an agent does what she in fact “stands in favor of” 
doing. When agents stand in favor of the action they undertake, it seems 
reasonable to hold that they express something about what those agents 
are like. 																																																								
19 Sripada (2017): 802-803. 
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Views that feature these sorts of criteria for moral responsibility are 
variously referred to as “Self-Disclosure,” “True Self,” “Real Self,” or 
“Deep Self” views. The most common title currently at use in the litera-
ture is “Deep Self,” and Deep Self views easily represent the most influen-
tial strand of Actual Sequence Compatibilism.20 On a Deep Self view, what 
matters for moral responsibility is that the agent acts in accordance with 
what she really wants to do, where “really wanting” always involves 
some further mental state beyond merely having a first-order desire. The 
necessity of locating some further mental state comes from the fact that an 
agent can act on one of her first-order desires without thereby standing 
behind it.  
Cases of compulsion illustrate this point well. Compulsion seems best 
described as involving an agent being moved to ϕ against her will by a 
rogue first-order desire or urge to ϕ that overpowers her identification 
with some other course of action. Insofar as agents should not be held 
morally responsible for their compulsive actions, there is reason to locate 
the criterion for moral responsibility in the presence of some further kind 
of mental state. And so Deep Self theorists each make some sort of demar-
cation within agential psychology that explains how only some subset of 
an agent’s motivational states can produce actions for which an agent can, 
in principle, be praiseworthy or blameworthy. An agent can only be held 																																																								
20 One source of potential confusion here is that views that posit that control over self-
disclosing agential capacities as a condition on moral responsibility are occasionally re-
ferred to as Deep Self views despite not being Actual Sequence Views. Agnieszka Ja-
worska refers to these views as “Broad Identificationist Views” and Actual Sequence 
Deep Self Views as “Narrow Identificationist Views” (Jaworska [2017]). It is unclear, 
however, what precisely demarcates these Broad Identificationist Views from Classical 
Compatibilist views that posit that the relevant sense of alternative possibilities to 
ground moral responsibility has to do with counterfactual conditionals like “if one had 
chosen/valued/endorsed acting differently she would have acted differently” (or their 
New Dispositionalist equivalents).  Here I will instead adopt the more popular taxonomy 
that considers Deep Self views to be a proper subset of Actual Sequence Views. 
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morally responsible when her action is motivated in the right sort of way 
because only then is her action is produced in such a way that it can 
“speak for” her as an agent.  
Deep Self theorists generally proceed by proposing a special kind of 
mental state that motivational states must align with in order for an agent 
to be morally responsible. Many different Deep Self views have been put 
forward, but the views that have been most prominent in the literature are 
those that privilege either valuing, planning, caring, endorsing, or some 
combination of these states. I will refer to these as “deep self mental 
states.”21 These special mental states are said to “mesh” or “align” with the 
agent’s motivational states such that the motivational states “flow from” 
the values, plans, cares, or endorsements.  
While overly metaphorical language is often used to describe this rela-
tionship, there has been recent interest amongst Deep Self theorists in get-
ting clearer about what the relationship of “meshing” might amount to. 
Many theorists seem to think about the relation as being causal: an agent 
is attributionally responsible for ϕ-ing if the motivational state that causes 
the agent to ϕ is itself caused in part by the agent’s deep self mental states. 
It’s worth noting that the deep self mental state need not make the differ-																																																								
21 Views that put forth other candidate deep self mental states include Susan Wolf’s “sane 
Deep Self view” on which deep self mental states must meet further “sanity” require-
ments (Wolf [1987]); David Velleman’s view, on which deep self mental states are desires 
to act in accordance with reasons (Velleman [1992]); and coherentist views on which deep 
self mental states are those that bear special relationships to the agent’s other mental 
states either by being relatively unopposed by other states (Arpaly and Schroeder[1999]) 
or by being narratively coherent (Matheson [2018]). While departing from traditional 
Deep Self views in significant ways, other views sometimes said to “strike deep self 
themes,” appear in Scanlon (1998), Arpaly (2003), Smith (2005, 2008), Sher (2009), and 
Buss (2012). (Sripada [2016] offers the latter list with the caveat that these views may fail 
to count as “Deep Self” views on many uses of the phrase. In Chapter 5 I follow Talbert 
[2016] in referring to the views of Scanlon, Smith, and Sher as “New Attributionist” 
views.) 
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ence between the agent acting as she does and her refraining, since deep 
self mental states might also function by causally overdetermining the 
agent’s course of action. One problem with broadly causal views, first not-
ed by Neil Levy, is that it seems possible that an effective first-order desire 
and resultant action could be caused by a deep self mental state while in-
tuitively the deep self mental state is not expressed through the action.22 
Chandra Sripada gives the following example, which uses the proposed 
deep self mental state of caring: 
 
Suppose Jimmy’s son has gone missing in Afghanistan. He cares for 
his son so much that he ruminates continuously, and this in turn gives 
him a severe headache for which he must take an aspirin. Standard 
theories of causation would say that Jimmy’s caring for his son causes 
his taking an aspirin— very roughly there is a chain of causal depend-
ence that links the two. Jimmy’s taking the aspirin, however, does not 
express his caring for his son.23 
 
An alternate understanding of the expression relation is what Sripada 
and Shoemaker call a “content harmony” relation.24 On this view, an agent 
is attributionally-responsible for her action only if the motivational state 
that she acts on is congruent with the content of the deep self mental state 
in some sense. On Sripada’s understanding, the congruence amounts to 
the motivational state’s being characteristically disposed to be produced 
by the deep self mental state. For example, if I judge my mother’s health to 
be of value to me, I might be characteristically disposed to be motivated to 
take her to the doctor. A content harmony requirement might be added to 
a causal requirement, or it may be thought to be a competing explanation 																																																								
22 Levy (2011). 
23 Sripada (2006): 1216. 
24 See Sripada (2006), Shoemaker (2012, 2015b). 
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for what the expression relation is. For example, one possible view is that 
an agent is attributionally-responsible for ϕ-ing iff she endorses her desire 
to ϕ, whether or not that endorsement itself has any causal bearing on her 
ϕ-ing. 
3.1 The “Deep” in “Deep Self” 
Given this description of the commitments of Deep Self views I have out-
lined, one might wonder what cause there is for adopting the language of 
“deep self.” For all I have said, these views merely target some special sub-
set of mental states and propose that these states, rather than others, due 
to the fact that they ensure agential identification, grant an agent’s actions 
the ability to speak for that agent. But what sort of additional commit-
ments are taken on by adopting the language of the “deep self” and what 
role do they play in the view?  
Answers to this question by leading Deep Self theorists are extremely 
varied. For example, David Shoemaker writes that 
 
the ‘deep’ in ‘deep self’ simply refers to the psychic element’s place in 
an agential structure as the ultimate psychological source of various 
‘surface’ attitudes subject to its governance.25 
 
So, for example, cares are deeper than ordinary first-order desires since, 
for example, caring about your family is the source of a desire to take your 
daughter to soccer practice. The meaning of “deep” here does not imply 
any sort of strong metaphysical commitment to the Self. On the other end 
of the spectrum, Chandra Sripada thinks talk of deep selves commits him 
to the existence of “fundamental conative states that robustly and globally 
shape action,” the existence of which he takes to be a substantive claim 
about actual human psychology.26 27 Deep selves, for Sripada, are presum-																																																								
25 Shoemaker (2015b): 43. 
26 Sripada (Unpublished Manuscript): 15. 
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ably ‘deep’ because on his view they play a crucial role in helping to ex-
plain a wide variety of agential phenomena including but not limited to: 
moral responsibility, normative reasons for action, happiness, 
and weakness of will. A similar but, in theory, distinct idea is the thought 
that all of an agent’s mental states of the kind that are proposed to play 
the role of deep self mental states together form some sort of whole which 
either constitutes or provides us with some particularly important insight 
into the agent’s Self. 
I take these latter two conceptions to be contingent features of the set 
of views generally recognized to belong to the Deep Self family of views. 
Each view does need some story to tell about what privileges actions that 
relate to deep self mental states such that they are the ones on the basis of 
which we are permitted to hold an agent responsible. However, the ver-
sions of this story on which the deep self mental states together play a 
foundational role in the core of an agent’s conative personality or are to-
gether constitutive of the agent’s Self only represent a couple of the op-
tions for fleshing out this story, among many other possibilities. 
Further complicating these issues, as Lippert-Rasmussen points out, 
people tend to conflate two different connotations of the phrase “deep 
self.” On one conception, deep self mental states have special authority for 
the agent, and on another, deep self mental states have more to do with 
authenticity. As he puts it, on authenticity conceptions of the Deep Self, a 
person’s Deep Self  																																																																																																																																																							
27 While it does not seem to me that any such broad sweeping claims about human psy-
chology are required for proponents of Deep Self, Sripada thinks there is much less cause 
for empirically-driven skepticism about the existence of such deep selves than what 
many philosophers have been led to believe. According to Sripada, while certain seg-
ments of social psychology have been very influential as a source of data for philoso-
phers, data from neuroscience, human behavioral genetics, and personality psychology is 
all fairly friendly to the idea of robust deep self psychology. 
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… is the person’s deepest and most genuine commitments and de-
sires…deep, idiosyncratic longings and repressed desires are strong 
candidates [for deep self states] on [this] account.28 (20). 
 
This conception of the deep self is, to my mind, not relevant to ques-
tions of moral responsibility. Confusion in the literature between the two 
senses of “Deep Self” is presumably part of what leads Nomy Arpaly to 
her particularly damning accusation of Deep Self views. She has us imag-
ine a woman, Lynn, who discovers she is a lesbian but would much rather 
have not come to such a discovery and does not want to be motivated by 
such desires. Arpaly continues, 
 
If Lynn were to go to her favorite college professor for help, she would 
likely be told that she should try to accept herself for who she is, re-
frain from attempts to suppress her true self, and so on. If, on the other 
hand, she were to read the moral psychology literature and believe its 
claims, she would probably conclude that she was right and her homo-
sexual desires are not truly her own. For ‘Lynn’ and ‘homosexual de-
sires’, we could substitute ‘Victorian lady’ and ‘any sexual desire’, 
‘nice Jewish boy’ and ‘hostility toward parents’, ‘severe perfectionist’ 
and ‘desire to get some rest’, ‘the young E.T.A. Hoffman’ and ‘desire to 
be a writer’, or any of various characters from various novels and their 
adulterous loves. In all these cases, the agent who dismisses these de-
sires as reasons for action and treats them as “outlaw desires” is likely 
to feel that they are not really his.29 
 
																																																								
28 Lippert-Rasmussen (2003): 20. 
29 Arpaly (2003), 16. 
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But it need not be any part of a Deep Self view to hold that Lynne’s lesbi-
an desires are not an authentic part of who she is or that she should resist 
them. A Deep Self view should merely say that if she were to engage in a 
sexual act with a woman without in some sense valuing/ endorsing/ plan-
ning on/ caring about doing so, her action would be compulsive or lacking 
in agential authorization in such a way that would undermine her being 
an apt candidate for moral responsibility. It is perfectly consistent to addi-
tionally hold that Lynne ought to embrace her lesbian desires as being an 
authentic part of her identity. Deep Self theorists ought to be clearer in re-
jecting the relevance of the authenticity conception of the Deep Self and 
instead understand deep self mental states as those that have the authority 
to speak for the agent; the mesh of deep self mental states with effective 
motivation needn’t be understood to be anything over and above a condi-
tion for ownership over one’s action in the sense relevant for moral re-
sponsibility. 
It is, in a way, unfortunate that the “Deep Self” name is the one that 
has stuck, as it tends to evoke thoughts of a quite ambitious project to lo-
cate a central, fundamental, all-important seat of agency within the sea of 
an agent’s mental states. The aims of a Deep Self theorist in practice are 
generally a good deal more modest, (although as I’ve highlighted, they 
vary quite a bit). But because of these confusions, it is difficult to say of 
any particular view, including the one I advance in the rest of this disser-
tation, whether or not it ought to count as a Deep Self view. 
4. Attributional-Responsibility 
Deep Self theorists have historically been attracted to a particular kind of 
notion of moral responsibility: attributional-responsibility. In “Two Faces 
of Responsibility” Gary Watson first proposed that different parties to the 
responsibility debate seemed to be implicitly committed to different ideas 
about what sorts of responses were justified on the basis of the require-
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ments they proposed.30 He identified two aspects of responsibility: at-
tributability and accountability. The recent literature has expanded to 
count answerability as a potentially distinct face of responsibility. This 
chart very roughly explains the general differences in the concepts in a 
way that is meant to be broad and inclusive: 
 
There are few points of agreement in the literature about how we 
should understand the relationship between these notions of responsibil-
ity. Some see the three as competing accounts, some think they represent 
wholly distinct facets of responsibility, others call for their unification, and 
others see one or more facet as a necessary condition on another.31   
Rather than debate these points at this level of abstraction, my strategy 
instead will be to develop what I hope will be an attractive substantive 
theory of attributional-responsibility. On my view, attributional-
responsibility is its own full-fledged form of moral responsibility, and ac-
countability-responsibility is its own entirely distinct form. So one may be 
accountability-responsible without being attributionally-responsible and 																																																								
30 Watson (1996). 
31 See Watson (1996), Fischer and Tognazzini (2011), Strabbing (2011), Shoemaker (2011, 
2013, 2015), Smith (2012), Talbert (2012), King (2014), Wolf (2015), and Zheng (2016) for 
discussion. 
If an agent meets the responsibility requirements, then we can… 
Attributability  judge, perceive, or otherwise react to her wrongdoing  
as expressing a personal fault 
Answerability  demand justification of behavior that is prima facie 
wrong 
Accountability confront her on the basis of her wrongdoing, often 
with the aim of demanding recompense or sanctions of 
some form 
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vice versa. In this dissertation I gradually advance claims that narrow in 
on this particular picture, although the earlier parts of the dissertation are 
meant to be compatible with other views of the overall picture. In Chap-
ters 2 and 3, I defend my own picture of the requirements for attributabil-
ity, which is, in principle, compatible with other understandings of how 
these responsibility concepts work in relation to one another. This in-
cludes the view that attributability’s main purpose is to serve as a neces-
sary condition for accountability-responsibility. In Chapter 4, I advance an 
account of blame’s content that lays the foundation for understanding at-
tributional-responsibility as its own full-fledged form of responsibility. In 
Chapter 5, I argue for the adoption of accountability-responsibility as a 
wholly distinct form of responsibility. The structure is such that at any 
point, the reader may get off the boat while still being able to, in theory, 
accept the claims of the previous chapters. 
In this chapter, I consider various Deep Self views as views of attribut-
ability in order to consider them as contenders to the view of attributabil-
ity I develop. On a Deep Self view of attributional-responsibility, an ac-
tion’s being appropriately related to deep self mental states is what allows 
us to move from an evaluation of the moral quality of an action to an 
evaluation of the moral quality of the agent on its basis. The main goal, as 
I see it, is to find a filter that separates the sorts of acts that an agent can-
not truthfully claim come from ‘outside themselves’ from the ones that 
stem from mere neurological noise, because this is the class of acts for 
which agents may be blamed on the basis of what their actions say about 
them as agents, making them appropriate target of aretaic assessments.  
Even given an understanding of responsibility on which attributional-
responsibility constitutes its own full-fledged form of responsibility, there 
are still additional conditions beyond the agential requirements put forth 
in Deep Self theories that must hold for an agent to be blameworthy. Fur-
ther conditions, including the moral status of the act, and perhaps epis-
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temic conditions on the agent32, are needed in order to know what any giv-
en action says about the agent.  
When an agent stands in the proper agential relationship to her action 
such that it opens her up in principle to being morally responsible for the 
act (or what it reveals about her), I will describe such an agent as being 
“attributionally-responsible” for her action. It is consistent with my un-
derstanding of the term that an agent may be attributionally-responsible 
for a morally neutral action. So when I speak of a Deep Self view giving 
sufficient conditions for attributional-responsibility, I do not mean to say 
these are meant to be sufficient conditions for an agent being blamewor-
thy for any particular action.  
5. B-Tradition versus H-Tradition 
With this background in place, we are now in a position to examine the 
first central question that this dissertation aims to answer:  what are the 
deep self mental states that should be required for an agent to count as at-
tributionally-responsible, and how should we mediate disputes between 
alternative accounts?  
In advancing my positive view in this dissertation, I will make the 
methodological assumption that being responsible is metaphysically prior 
to holding responsible. That is, in order to find out when it is appropriate 
to hold someone morally responsible, we first need to know whether or 
not the person meets the specifiable metaphysical conditions for actually 
being responsible. David Shoemaker calls this the B-Tradition, which 
stands in contrast to the H-Tradition, according to which holding respon-
sible takes priority.33  
Adherents of the H-Tradition tend to hold the view, which has been 
quite pervasive in recent years, that moral responsibility ought to be ana-																																																								
32 I say more about just what I take these additional constraints to amount to in Chapter 
4, §2. 
33 Shoemaker (2015b): 20. 
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lyzed in terms of the responses (usually conceived of as reactive attitudes) 
that are fitting in holding each other responsible. Fittingness is often taken 
to be a sui generis primitive relation. Defenders of the B-Tradition rely on 
intuitions about whether or not certain responses are appropriate as well, 
but take these only to provide a defeasible epistemic guide to the condi-
tions of responsibility.34 Adherents of the B-Tradition take seriously the 
need to additionally locate some further explanation as to why the particu-
lar conditions that an agent must meet in order for it to be appropriate to 
respond in certain ways must hold rather than some other conditions. 
Providing an argument for the metaphysical priority of being respon-
sible over holding responsible is outside the scope of this dissertation, but 
I do think it makes methodological sense to proceed as though the B-
Tradition is true until we have exhausted its possibilities. Gideon Rosen 
provides a strongly worded defense of this method: 
 
The Fittingness view is a theory of last resort. We should adopt it only 
if we have tried and failed to analyze appropriateness or to assimilate 
it to a relation studied elsewhere under another name….A theory of 
responsibility aims to articulate the conditions under which blame is 
appropriate, and then to explain why those conditions are as they are. 
And the trouble is that the Fittingness View would furnish grounds for 
abject pessimism about this project.35  
 
Defenders of H-Theory might nevertheless echo P.F. Strawson’s influen-
tial decree that the project of finding metaphysical conditions of responsi-
bility has already failed or is bound to fail.36  I hope, however, to offer an 																																																								
34 See also McKenna (2012), which advances the view that neither being nor holding re-
sponsible is more fundamental than the other. 
35 Rosen (2015): 71. 
36 Strawson (1962). 
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attractive picture of the conditions for responsibility grounded in the met-
aphysics of agency that might be taken as evidence to the contrary. 
That said, while my arguments for my view will in some places as-
sume the B-Tradition, the view I advance is, with some modifications, it-
self compatible with the H-Tradition. 
6. Internality’s Role in Deep Self Views 
How do Deep Self theorists mediate disputes between alternative ac-
counts of the relevant deep self mental states? Although not every Deep 
Self theorist is explicit about how they answer this question, most argue 
that the tokens of only one particular type of mental state or another are 
invariably “internal.”37 A mental state is internal iff the agent is identified 
with the state in such a way that it cannot legitimately be taken to be a 
mere occurrence that does not belong to the agent since it is an “alien” 
force.38 I follow Agnieszka Jaworska here in distinguishing internality in 
this ontological sense from subjective active identification that is based on 
whether the agent perceives aspects of her psychology as being her own. 
These senses are perhaps not wholly unrelated, however, as non-self-
deceptive subjective identification might be able to provide us with defea-
sible evidence of internality. While there is a possible view on which the 
ontological category of internal mental states with which an agent can 
rightly be identified amounts to nothing more than the states with which 
the agent takes herself to be identified with, such a view would require an 
argument. 
The concept of an internal state is usually given a gloss as the kind of 
state from which an agent cannot be alienated. Whether explicitly or im-
plicitly, something like this idea seems to play some role in explaining the 
																																																								
37 Internality may play a less central role in how these disputes are mediated when the 
subject is approached from the H-Tradition.  
38 Jaworska (2007): 531. 
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proposed authority of the particular kind of deep self mental states on 
every major Deep Self view. 
On the endorsing view, as put forth by Harry Frankfurt, the relevant 
deep self mental states are higher-order volitions.39 On this view, agents 
have the ability to influence their actions via the formation of second-
order desires, which are desires about what the agent wants to desire to 
do. Second-order volitions are desires not just about which desires an 
agent endorses having but about which one of these desires the agent 
wants to actually act on at a given moment in time. So an agent’s action is 
attributable iff it is caused by a desire to ϕ that meshes with the agent’s 
further desire to act on the desire to ϕ. Frankfurt seems to understand the 
expression relationship that needs to hold between second-order volitions 
and first-order desires in semi-causal terms. Either the first-order desire is 
not by itself sufficient to motivate the agent and she needs the ‘push’ con-
ferred to it from her second-order volition, or her second-order volition to 
act on a desire to ϕ accompanies a desire to ϕ that is already sufficient to 
motivate her to action, and so her endorsement amounts to over-
determining or at least “okay-ing” the fact that she will be led to action by 
such a desire. 
An agent’s second-order volitions, for Frankfurt, have the authority to 
speak for the agent because they are the output of an endorsement pro-
cess, the goal of which is to confer the status of internality on first-order 
desires. In forming a desire to act on one of her first-order desires, an 
agent identifies herself with her first-order desire because, for Frankfurt, 
the process of endorsement is the process of identification and a state is in-
ternal iff the agent identifies with it.40   																																																								
39 Frankfurt (1971). 
40 One much-discussed serious problem for Frankfurt is that it seems arbitrary that se-
cond-order desires, rather than say third or fourth-order desires have special agential au-
thority. The way Frankfurt thinks of the role of internality in the theory is part of what 
generates the problem. If first-order states are granted the authority to speak for the 
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On the valuing view, the conception of agential architecture is quite 
different.41 On this model, agential psychology is divided between valuing 
and mere desiring parts, and each has its own ability to motivate the 
agent. The relevant deep self mental states are evaluative, although im-
portantly they do not consist merely in the pure cognitive judgment that 
some course of action is best, but rather in the agent’s setting ends for her-
self. An agent is attributionally-responsible for her action iff what she does 
is controlled by her evaluative system, which prescribes the overall best 
course of action. She is not attributionally-responsible when what she 
does is controlled by mere desires that do not flow from what she truly 
values. Supporters of the valuing view argue that valuing states are invar-
iably internal by explicitly pointing to the following evidence that no 
agent can truly be alienated from her values:  when an agent comes to re-
pudiate one of her values it is always from the perspective of some contra-
ry value, and so the initial valuing state will fails to exist for her as a value 
for her. In this way, an agent’s own values are guaranteed to always be in-
ternal since she cannot be alienated from them. 
																																																																																																																																																							
agent due to the fact that a second-order process can confer such authority, we might 
think that the second-order states involved in the process need to get their authority from 
a similar sort of even higher-order process. In order to solve this problem, Frankfurt later 
concluded that the sequence must terminate in some sort of special kind of state or pro-
cess of identification, like a decision, that is invariably internal. See Frankfurt (1987, 
1992). These views face a larger worry, however, in that guaranteeing internality through 
a special sort of identification process they fail to be reductionist naturalistic views. Since 
I take part of the motivation for identifying deep self mental states to be to give a reduc-
tionist story of the conditions for attributional-responsibility, in this dissertation I will 
largely draw on Frankfurt’s earlier second-order volition view. (While I do not address it 
head on, many of my comments on the commitmental aspects of caring views apply to 
Frankfurt’s even later view, on which identification amounts to passive commitment 
[Frankfurt (2006)]). 
41 See Watson (1975), Mitchell-Yellin (2014, 2015). 
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On the planning view, as proposed by Michael Bratman, the proposed 
deep self mental states are personal self-governing policies about how one 
will act in various circumstances.42 In many cases these plans are set by 
what the agent values, but in cases of normative silence in which agents 
take there to be no distinct best course, they commit to personal policies 
that apply also to similar situations in the future. An agent’s action is at-
tributable to her iff it is in line with her plans, and in this way plans confer 
internality on motivational states that are instrumental or realizer desires 
of these plans. Bratman proposes that plans are invariably internal for 
agents like us because they partially constitute our diachronic agency. We 
as agents cannot be alienated from our plans, not just because we set 
them, but because they tie us together as coherent agents over time. 
Proponents of the caring view offer a notably different picture on 
which “identification is, for the most part, a passive process, garnering its 
authority for self-determination from one’s nexus of cares.”43 For Shoe-
maker (2003) these caring states are conceptual frames for clusters of emo-
tional dispositions that respond to the whims and woes of one’s cared for 
object. For example, if an agent cares about the Phillies, she will experi-
ence anxiety over a potential loss, joy at a win, and despair if they don’t 
make it to the playoffs. Sripada goes one step further and proposes that 
cares are sui generis kinds of mental states with distinctive functionally 
specifiable motivational, commitmental, cognitive, and emotional pro-
files.44 In addition to a suite of emotional responses, if an agent cares about 
X she will be intrinsically motivated to perform actions that promote the 
achievement of X, be disposed to form judgments that cast X in a favora-
ble light, and will want to go on caring about X. An agent is attributional-
ly-responsible for her action iff, during the operation of the action-directed 																																																								
42 See Bratman (2003). 
43 Shoemaker (2003). 
44 Sripada (2016). 
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psychological mechanisms that are involved in the etiology of the action, 
her care exerts motivational influences (of sufficient strength) in favor of 
acting as she does. Like plans on the planning view, cares are proposed to 
play a crucial role in constituting diachronic agency via their commit-
mental aspect, which in turn helps to explain the fact that an agent cannot 
be alienated from her cares. Since the motivational strength of cares stems 
from the very thing that constitutes the agent as an agent over time, she 
cannot be alienated from cares: they make up who she is as an agent. 
One further option on offer for those who are worried that the other 
accounts fail to establish a necessary condition on moral responsibility is 
to hold an ecumenical, or disjunctive view. David Shoemaker currently 
defends a view on which an agent either has to act in accordance with her 
cares or with her values (or both) in order for her to be attributionally-
responsible for her action.45  If the fact that they are both thought to be in-
variably internal is what makes cares and values good candidates to act as 
deep self mental states, then the role of internality in an ecumenical view 
is clear.46 In principle, any combination of deep self mental state types 
could be combined to form an ecumenical view just as long as the ways in 
which the states are taken to confer internality on first-order motivational 
states are compatible sorts of explanations and both ways of conferring in-
ternality on resultant actions can coexist.  
7. Against Skepticism about Internality 
I have shown how every major Deep Self view either explicitly or implicit-
ly relies on a concept of internality to explain why the actions that appro-
priately mesh with deep self mental states have the authority to speak for 
agents that they do. But these views rely on support from intuitive under-																																																								
45 Shoemaker (2015a, 2015b). 
46 Although Shoemaker’s own theoretical orientation, especially his endorsement of the 
H-Tradition, on the face of it seems to de-emphasize the role of internality in Deep Self 
theory.  
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standings of internal states as basically those from which one cannot be al-
ienated. But what would it mean to be alienated in the relevant sense in-
voked by each of these views? 
If we understand internality in terms of alienation, and alienation in 
terms of the idea that one’s mental state does not belong to oneself in 
some way without further explication, this feeds directly into a skeptical 
worry. The skeptical worry goes something like this: one reason we have 
for thinking that it is possible for one’s desire to not belong to oneself in 
some sense is that people report experiencing a feeling that one’s desire 
somehow does not belong to oneself. But, if such reports are all we have to 
go on, this may be quite shaky grounding for a theory of attributional-
responsibility since we can easily provide error theories that explain why 
people report that their desires are alien. 
Terence Penelhum expresses this line of criticism particularly forceful-
ly. He says, regarding an agent’s expression of the fact that his motivating 
desire does not truly belong to him, that it is a 
 
form of moral trickery…[that] involves an extension of the notion of 
non-identification with one's own desires and behavior from the level 
of harmless and  even mildly illuminating metaphor to that of gross 
literal false-hood. To say harmlessly that one is governed by a desire 
that is not one's own is to utter a metaphor the literal translation of 
which is that one is governed by a desire that one does not want to be 
governed by. To say that the desire is not one's own and mean this lit-
erally is to say something obviously false: for the desire is operative 
and therefore exists, and is not someone else's. This obvious falsehood 
can be given the appearance of respectability with the aid of philo-
sophical theories about the division of the soul's faculties; and it is a 
falsehood we are sometimes willing to swallow about others as well as 
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about ourselves, as in the Gallic concept of the crime passionel. But we 
all know better.47 
 
Arpaly and Schroeder’s diagnosis is somewhat different: 
 
When people find that they have not been as rational, sane, prudent or 
moral as expected, they may experience…the cause of their misbehav-
ior as an alien intrusion48….In a culture such as our own, glorifying de-
cisiveness, self-control and ‘follow-through,’ and with a tendency to 
medicalize failures of such traits, many agents will instinctively reject 
evidence of themselves as straightforwardly akratic, as having simply 
chosen poorly when they knew better. Instead, in some (and, it seems, 
a growing number) of circumstances, they experience their failure as 
apparently incomprehensible, an ugly intrusion upon their lives, and 
the psychological cause of this failure seems an unpleasant intruder.49 
 
However, as both quoted passages suggest, internality skeptics have a 
shared concern that such feelings of alienation are illusory, fabricated, or 
the result of self-deception. Skeptics tend to base their accusations on two 
factors. First, this way of speaking could easily be used as a fancy way to 
excuse. Second, it seems obvious that all of a person’s desires are her own, 
since they don’t belong to anyone else. 
Frankfurt has a response to both of these worries, however.50  He starts 
by noticing that it is not obvious, except in a fairly trivial sense, that all of 																																																								
47 Penelhum (1971): 670. 
48 See also Buss (2012). Buss takes it that when some people speak of alienation, what they 
really mean is that they act with a lack of a willing attitude. But, as she puts it, “just as 
autonomous agency is compatible with stupidity and thoughtlessness, so too it is com-
patible with ambivalence, regret, disappointment, frustration, and self-criticism.” 
49 Arpaly and Schroeder (1999): 383. 
50 Frankfurt (1988): 61-62. 
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our desires belong to us since they do not belong to anyone else. We only 
attribute some of the events in the history of a person’s body to that per-
son in a strict sense; some of them are mere happenings, such as getting 
lurched forward on a bus or experiencing a bodily twitch. Just as it would 
be unfair to say that because such behavior is not attributable to anyone 
else, it must be attributable to the agent, so too is it unfair to make this in-
ference in regards to desires. Of course it does not decisively prove that 
one may be alienated from one’s own desire, but the evidence in favor of 
motivational alienation is not dissimilar to the kinds of evidence we have 
of bodily-alienation. Allowing that a person can disclaim certain motiva-
tions as external is only as much of an opportunity for moral evasion as al-
lowing that a person can disclaim certain movements of her body as ex-
ternal is. And yet, we do not regularly take this as reason to be skeptical of 
bodily twitches. 
The difference here could be explained by the fact that motivational ex-
ternality may be fairly rare, such that some people almost never experi-
ence their motivating desires to do things like drink a beer or check their 
ovens as being external.51 Noting this fact can help give us a good explana-
tion for why many feel that speaking of external desires would be tanta-
mount to making up an excuse for one’s action. If those people who do 
not experience externality were to speak about any of their desires in such 
a way, they would be merely making an excuse for their behavior. The 
tendency to extrapolate from personal experience in this regard is very 
common, and bears similarity to public reaction to many psychological 
conditions before (and sometimes even after) they are validated by sci-																																																								
51 This idea may not be particularly compatible with all Traditional Deep Self views, 
though, since failures to meet the high bars they set for self-governing action are seem-
ingly commonplace. I return to this point again in Chapter 2, §5, once the positive view I 
advance is on the table. The view I advance involves quite minimal conditions for non-
alienation and so is particularly well suited to give this response to the internality skep-
tic. 
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ence. Those with clinical depression are thought to be merely lazy, and 
non-verbal autistic people are thought to be simply being difficult by peo-
ple who do not experience similar psychologies themselves. The ways in 
which these accusations err seems only explicable by realizing that they 
come about in part because the accusers extrapolate from what would be 
going on in their own psychologies if they were to display similar behav-
ior. We should be wary to not let this kind of “intuition” color philosophi-
cal thinking about internality. 
While I think this shifts the burden of proof onto internality skeptics, it 
would be helpful for Deep Self theorists to have a more substantive, less 
metaphorical account of internality. In the rest of this chapter, I aim to 
provide one. 
8. Internality is Approval 
Consider the following case: 
 
Exhausted Elsie: Elsie is extremely tired, but is desperately trying to 
stay up to continue an important conversation with her friend. Despite 
maximal effort to remain awake, she lays down because she knows she 
is about to fall asleep. Elsie is not culpable for the cause of her exhaus-
tion, let’s suppose—it has just gotten very late. Is Elsie attributionally-
responsible for lying down to fall asleep, such that in principle it 
would be appropriate to blame her on the basis of traits displayed by 
her behavior? 
 
According to every Deep Self view, Elsie is not attributionally-responsible. 
What Deep Self views have in common in the way they intuitively explain 
why an agent like Elsie is not responsible is that they show how even 
though an agent like Elsie might be motivated to lay down, she does not 
approve of doing so. This lack of approval, I contend, is what licenses us to 
say that her motivation acts counter to her, or ‘alienates’ her from her ac-
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tion. In Chapter 2 I give an account of what I take approving to consist in, 
but for now I just mean to point to an intuitive sense of approving: when 
considering the options for what to do at t there is at some level some-
thing that the agent likes about or finds worthwhile about the prospect of 
ϕ-ing at t.52 
If this intuitive notion of approving to some extent of an action rather 
than merely being motivated to perform it is what makes the difference 
between cases in which we are willing to grant that an agent’s action is 
caused by an process that bears the mark of internality and ones in which 
we are not, then we have located a common feature of any plausible can-
didate deep self mental state. Whether the deep self mental states are pro-
posed to be endorsements, valuings, plans, or cares, or some disjunction 
of these, they succeed in guaranteeing agents’ resultant actions will be in-
ternal by guaranteeing that the agent will approve of her action. If I am 
right about this, this means we can locate a common necessary condition 
for attributional-responsibility shared by each major Deep Self theory. 
9. Approval as a Common Necessary Condition for Attributional-
Responsibility 
9.1 Approving is Necessary on the Endorsing View 
It is perhaps easiest to see how approving of one’s course of action is a 
necessary condition on attributional-responsibility on Frankfurt’s en-
dorsement view. Second-order volitions are meant to secure the fact that 
the agent is not only motivated to act in the way that she does but that she 
is personally invested in that particular course of action. This aspect of the 
endorsement view comes out particularly clearly in Frankfurt’s discussion 
of the contrast between wontons and full-fledged agents who form se-
cond-order volitions. 																																																								
52 This should not be taken to imply that the agent necessarily takes it to be the best or 
even a good course of action, just that she likes it.  
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A wanton, in Frankfurt’s sense, is someone who lacks second-order vo-
litions and so fails to take an interest in her will whatsoever.53 The wanton 
lets her strongest motivational states win out and move her to action irre-
spective of any opinion she might have about the matter. A wanton, ac-
cording to Frankfurt, lacks the capacity for self-reflective concern and thus 
acts out of “mindless indifference to the enterprise of evaluating their own 
desires and motives.”54 Why, on Frankfurt’s view, are we meant to think 
that the wanton’s actions aren’t attributable to her in the relevant sense? 
For the wanton, 
 
…it makes no difference to him whether his craving or his aversion 
gets the upper hand. He has no stake in the conflict between them and 
so…he can neither win nor lose the struggle in which he is engaged.55  
 
This means that when an agent is attributionally-responsible for her action 
it is at least partially because she “has a stake” in the outcome of the con-
flict among the economy of her desires. Having a stake in the conflict be-
tween first-order desires competing to become an effective desire seems to 
amount to having an opinion on the outcome. In other words, the agent 
needs to approve of being motivated to act in the way that she does. 
9.2 Approving is Necessary on the Valuing View 
Approving is necessary for attributional-responsibility on the valuing 
view as well, although a mistaken picture of the contrast between valuing 
and desiring (in terms of interpretation of valuing deep self views) may 
make this idea seem somewhat obscure. There is a picture of human agen-
cy that pits what an agent wants to do against what she thinks would be 
best to do, conceiving of the two things as wholly separate. On this view it 																																																								
53 Frankfurt (1988): 16. 
54 Frankfurt (1988): 19. 
55 Frankfurt (1988): 89. 
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is nice when an agent is motivated to do what she thinks is best, but this is 
either accidental or caused by the agent bringing her motivations in line 
with what is best; it is not that there is any motivational force to her judg-
ment that a certain course of action is best. Given this sort of picture, it 
would be hard to see how approving of one’s course of action would be a 
necessary condition on attributional-responsibility on the valuing view. 
Valuing, however, is often held to have some more intimate connection 
with motivation. And once this is granted, it is easier to see the connection 
with approval. 
This picture can be further specified in a number of different ways. For 
example, on one view put forth by David Lewis, valuing X consists in de-
siring to desire X. Value, for Lewis, just is what a person would be dis-
posed to desire to desire in certain ideal circumstances.56 If an agent acts in 
accordance with her values, and valuing is given Lewis’s analysis, the 
connection to the agent’s approving of her course of action is clear: the 
agent who values ϕ-ing has a stake in wanting to be moved to ϕ. It’s inter-
esting to note that Lewis seems to take the intuitive connection between 
valuing and approving to be strong enough to support an account where 
valuing essentially just is a certain kind of approving. 
While adherents of the valuing view need not be Lewisians about valu-
ing,57 in order to make the view that valuing is connected up in the right 
sort of way with agency in the sense that could reasonably ground attribu-
tional-responsibility, they do posit some sort of strong connection between 
valuing and motivation via the fact that an agent approves of doing what 
she takes to be the best thing to do. 
																																																								
56 Lewis (1989). 
57 Given that coupling the Lewisian account of valuing with the valuing Deep Self view 
would make the account of agency hierarchical, proponents of the view, like Gary Wat-
son, who criticize the hierarchical nature of the endorsing view might even have special 
reason not to adopt it. 
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To act on one’s valuing state in the sense that defenders of the valuing 
view conceive of it is never to merely act in accordance with what one co-
incidentally believes to be good. Rather, valuing is thought to have some-
thing to do with agency, and thus to have an essential connection to moti-
vation. Gary Watson’s characterization of valuing makes this connection 
clear: 
 
Now, to be sure, since to value is also to want, one’s valuational and 
motivational systems must to a large extent overlap. If, in appropriate 
circumstances, one were never inclined to action by some alleged eval-
uation, the claim that that was indeed one’s evaluation would be dis-
confirmed. Thus one’s valuational system must have some (considera-
ble) grip upon one’s motivational system. 
 
So the notion of evaluation here is in an important way personal; an 
agent’s values issue from a faculty that has a “grip” on her motivations. If 
the thought “it’s the right thing to do” is meant to have a grip on motiva-
tion, it must be because the second thought, “and I approve of doing the 
right thing,” is also present in some form. Whether the second thought is a 
matter of the meaning of rightness, a truth about human nature, or a 
standing disposition that happens to be present in agents like us (or some-
thing else), the fact that the agent approves of acting as she does because it 
is right seems baked into the story.  
Watson explains that the sort of motivational power exerted by valu-
ing is special because we are concerned to bring about the satisfaction of 
desired ends for some reason that goes beyond the fact that acting allevi-
ates the suffering of having the unsatisfied desire. For an agent to value ϕ-
ing is for her not just to desire to ϕ but to set ϕ-ing as an end for herself. 
And so an agent must not only be motivated to ϕ, but also actually ap-
prove of ϕ-ing for some reason. As Watson puts it, 
 
 -46- 
Now, it must be admitted, any desire may provide the basis for reason 
insofar as non-satisfaction of the desire causes suffering and hinders 
the pursuit of ends of the agent. But it is important to notice that the 
reason generated in this way by a desire is a reason for getting rid of the 
desire, and one may get rid of a desire either by satisfying it or by 
eliminating it in some other manner (by tranquilizers, or cold show-
ers). Hence this kind of reason differs importantly from the reasons 
based upon the evaluation of the activities or states of affairs in ques-
tion. For, in the former case, attaining the object of desire is simply a 
means of eliminating discomfort or agitation, whereas in the latter case 
that attainment is the end itself. Normally, in the pursuit of the objects 
of our wants we are not attempting chiefly to relieve ourselves. We 
aim to satisfy, not just eliminate, desire. 58 
 
And so, on the valuing view, valuing is necessary for attributional-
responsibility precisely because it guarantees that the agent’s effective de-
sire becomes effective because she approves of her course of action. And 
so, proponents of the valuing view, too, should hold that approving is a 
necessary condition on attributional-responsibility. 
9.3 Approving is Necessary on the Planning View 
According to the planning view, an agent is attributionally-responsible iff 
she acts in accordance with her policy about how to act in such a situa-
tion.59 Her policy-setting may be governed by her values in many cases, 																																																								
58 Watson (1975): 210-211. 
59 In the article I draw from here, Bratman specifically brackets off questions of responsi-
bility, focusing his discussion on identification alone: “…I want to see if we can, instead, 
describe without independent appeal to judgments of responsibility—a fairly unified 
phenomenon that is plausibly seen as the target of such talk of identification” (Bratman 
[1996]: 2) His picture might just as easily be considered as a contending deep self account 
of attributional-responsibility, however, and, with this caveat, I will proceed as though it 
were put forth as one. 
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and in those cases the same considerations I raised in the last section 
should lead to the conclusion that she must to some degree approve of her 
course of action. But in cases that are normatively underdetermined, she 
forms or acts on a previously determined policy that she just decides to 
treat as reason-giving. If agents in these cases just follow personal policies 
that are not governed by anything as strong as all-things-considered 
judgments about what would be best, it might be far from clear that 
agents who act in accordance with these policies need approve of their ac-
tions. 
However, following Velleman, Bratman acknowledges the possibility 
of a case in which an agent forms a plan in such a detached way that the 
action she takes when she fails to act in accordance with it would still be 
attributable to her. This provides a reason to supplement the story about 
what must obtain in these sorts of cases for the agent to be attributionally-
responsible. Bratman supplements his account by adding that the agent 
who ϕs must be satisfied with her decision to treat her desire to ϕ as rea-
son-giving. If an agent meets this condition, it seems to me that she would 
have to approve of at least something about it. 
Interestingly, for Bratman, the agent needs to be satisfied with the de-
cision to treat the desire as reason-giving not just at the time of the deci-
sion but also at the time of action. This is evident in the following passage:  
 
In “The Importance of What We Care About,” Frankfurt emphasizes 
that one can decide to care about something and yet “when the chips 
are down” fail to care about it. Perhaps, similarly, I might decide to 
treat my desire, say, to seek a reconciliation with an old acquaintance 
as reason-giving and yet, when the chips are down, find myself unable 
to treat it this way. I might find that, despite my decision, and despite 
the fact that I am satisfied with that decision, I do not care enough 
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about reconciliation. In such a case it seems that I have not fully suc-
ceeded in identifying with my desire for reconciliation.60 
 
This seems right, since the agent’s approval at the time of action seems to 
intuitively be what matters. 
Now, Bratman understands satisfaction with a policy not in terms of 
the presence of a particular attitude, but rather, in terms of the alignment 
and integration of the policy with the agent’s other policies: “One is satis-
fied with such a decision when one’s will is, in the relevant ways, not di-
vided: the decision to treat as reason-giving does not conflict with other 
standing decisions and policies about which desires to treat as reason-
giving.”  But notice that this analysis of satisfaction only makes sense as 
an analysis of satisfaction when we think of the sum of the agent’s other 
policies as providing a guide to what the agent generally approves of do-
ing. Again, here, agential approval of some form seems necessary on the 
view. 
9.4 Approving is Necessary on the Caring View 
Several aspects of the caring view might be thought to implicate approval. 
First, among “joy” and “elevation,” “approval” is explicitly listed by 
Sripada as one of the positively valenced emotions that agents are dis-
posed to experience when they act in ways that advance their cares.61 If 
the emotional aspects of caring states are meant to take center stage on the 
view, it seems plausible that there must be some element of an approving 
emotion toward one’s action in order for the agent to count as caring in 
the relevant sense. 62 There might be a sense of caring on which happiness 																																																								
60 Bratman (1999): 202. 
61 Sripada (2016): 8. 
62 Is approval an emotion? This may be more or less plausible depending on one’s ac-
count of what emotions are. As I will explain in more detail in Chapter 2, I take approval, 
instead, to be a function of an agent’s motivational profile.  
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towards acting in ways that advance the cared-for object without approval 
is sufficient for caring, as it seems possible in some sense to “care about 
something despite oneself.” For example, you might get a small twinge of 
pleasure from someone being called out on her bad grammar in an inter-
net comment thread, once you’ve already renounced that practice as being 
classist. In one sense, it might seem appropriate to say that you still care 
about grammar, despite yourself. But it seems implausible that cares in 
this sense would be good candidates for deep self mental states. Even a 
wholly unwilling addict might get some pleasure from drinking, but a 
theory that gives the result that an unwilling addict is responsible since 
she cares about drinking alcohol seems counter to the aims of a Deep Self 
view. 
In addition, the evaluative judgment aspect of the caring view further 
emphasizes the importance of the agent’s approval of her action. If an 
agent is attributionally-responsible for her action that furthers the end X, 
her action will be suitably related to the fact that she is disposed to form 
judgments that cast X in a favorable light. Recall again the earlier conclu-
sion, regarding the valuing view, that the relevant sorts of evaluative 
judgments that can ground an agent’s attributional-responsibility must be 
related to her agency via the fact that she approves of those actions on the 
basis of her values. These same considerations apply to the evaluative as-
pect of the caring view as well. Sripada writes that the valuing view 
“places all elements of the relevant class of evaluative judgments within 
one’s deep self.” In contrast, “the care-based view allows that many eval-
uative judgments don’t bear any connection to the deep self, namely those 
that don’t bear the right dispositional tie to one’s cares.” In this way, the 
caring view is even more explicit about the fact that acting in accordance 
with evaluative judgments usually implicates internality because agents 
act on their judgments because it matters to them to act in accordance with 
what’s right. This sense of mattering, it seems to me, is fundamentally tied 
to approving. 
 -50- 
Finally, the motivational and commitmental aspects of caring seem to 
implicate approval. For Sripada, if an agent cares about X she is intrinsi-
cally motivated to perform actions that promote the achievement of X. She 
also will want to continue caring about X. Together, this makes it the case 
that when ϕ-ing promotes the achievement of X, and X is something the 
agent cares about, the agent has an intrinsic desire with a positively va-
lenced higher-order attitude towards being motivated by it. Although the 
consideration of the promotion of the achievement of X may not outweigh 
other factors in a given case, the agent still would seem to have to approve 
of being motivated to ϕ in at least a minimal or pro tanto sense for this to 
be the case. 
It’s important that the desire to promote the achievement of X is intrin-
sic, because this rules out cases where the agent might only be motivated 
to ϕ due to wanting to quell an external urge to promote the achievement 
of X, as I discussed in the section on the valuing view. If an agent acts on a 
desire to promote the achievement of X to quell such a desire it would 
seem strange to describe the agent as caring about X, and it would equally 
seem strange to describe the agent as approving of her action. Shoemaker 
makes a related point in discussing how his caring view differentiates 
non-attributable actions of unwilling addicts from attributable weak-
willed actions: 
 
For the unwilling addict, it matters greatly that his desires for the drug 
are satisfied or eliminated—it may not matter how. For the merely 
weak willed, however, the primary object of one’s care-dependent de-
sire is not the mere satisfaction (or elimination) of some other non-
care-derived desire.63 
 
																																																								
63 Shoemaker (2003): 103. 
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Again here, the contrast seems best explained via the concept of approval. 
The weak-willed agent, unlike the unwilling addict, actually approves of 
something about acting as she does that goes above and beyond the alle-
viation of an urge.  
And so, given each major Deep Self view, it is a necessary condition on 
attributional-responsibility that the agent approves to some degree of her 
action. 
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Chapter 2: A Sufficient Condition for Attributional-Responsibility64 	
1. Introduction  
Chapter 1 surveyed some of the advantages of the Deep Self approach to 
attributional-responsibility. I showed that the appeal of each major kind of 
Deep Self view currently on offer lies in the fact that when an agent’s ac-
tion meshes with the proposed deep self mental states, her action is guar-
anteed to be caused by a process from which she is not alienated. I sug-
gested that this lack of alienation amounts to the agent’s approving of her 
action in some sense, and argued that proponents of each Deep Self view 
have reason to hold that approving of one’s action to some degree is a 
necessary condition on attributional-responsibility. 
In this chapter I argue that the notion of approval is not only necessary 
for attributional-responsibility, but also sufficient. First, I show that 
each major Deep Self view contains additional elements beyond securing 
the agent’s approval of her action that are unnecessary for attributional-
responsibility. None of the deep self mental states: valuing, caring, en-
dorsing, or planning, as conceived of by proponents of traditional Deep 
Self theories, are necessary for attributional-responsibility. Some argue 
that attributional-responsibility might be secured by more than one men-
tal state kind, and I carry this move to its logical conclusion. Instead of at-
tempting to identify a kind of mental state or process that is invariably in-
ternal, I suggest that the way to proceed is to give an analysis of internali-
ty itself and hold that agents are attributionally-responsible for any in-
stance of an action caused by an internal process. I analyze internality in 																																																								
64 This chapter greatly benefitted from comments on earlier drafts by Eugene Chislenko, 
Nathan Robert Howard, Renee Jorgensen Bolinger, as well as discussion by the partici-
pants of the fourth New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility, Temple Uni-
versity’s Freedom and Responsibility Fall 2017 Seminar, and USC’s Spring 2016 Disserta-
tion Seminar.   
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terms of minimal approval, so an agent is attributionally-responsible iff 
her action is caused by a process the presence of which ensures that she 
minimally approves of acting on the motivational state that she in fact 
does. 
To minimally approve of ϕ-ing, I suggest, is to have a hypothetical, 
partial desire to act on a motivation to ϕ for some further aim other than 
to get rid of the desire to ϕ. I motivate each aspect of this analysis in turn, 
and then turn to some advantages the view has over traditional Deep Self 
views. My view is comparatively agnostic regarding the processes in-
volved in the production of action, and as such, it is better able to stand up 
to some of the most deeply entrenched problems for the Deep Self ap-
proach.  
2. Unnecessary Components of Deep Self Views 
As I argued in Chapter 1, each major Deep Self view is consistent with the 
idea that approving in some sense is a necessary condition on attribution-
al-responsibility. However, proponents of each major Deep Self view take 
there to be additional elements to their account that are necessary for at-
tributional-responsibility. This, I argue, is false. Each Deep Self view suc-
ceeds at locating a sufficient condition for attributional-responsibility just 
to the extent that it secures the fact that in each instance of intuitively at-
tributable agency, the agent will approve to some degree of her action. Se-
curing the fact that the agent approves of her action in some minimal 
sense is both necessary and sufficient for attributional-responsibility.  
The first part of this argument will consist of showing that each major 
Deep Self view contains elements that are unnecessary for attributional-
responsibility. In this section I show how the valuing, caring, and plan-
ning views contain unnecessary elements. I hold off on addressing the 
unnecessary aspects of the endorsing view until §4 and §5 of this chapter, 
as this part of this argument serves to set up my positive view. 
 -54- 
2.1 Valuing is Not Necessary for Attributional-Responsibility  
If we think of the valuing view as being supported primarily by the idea 
that the mark of agency comes from an agent’s acting on her consideration 
of what she takes to be best to do, it is fairly easy to generate counterex-
amples. There are many actions for which an agent is attributionally-
responsible but does not judge her course of action to be all-things-
considered best. For example, in cases of normative silencing, an agent 
cannot form an all-things-considered judgment about what it would be 
best to do since there is no best option. Consider instead the view on 
which the agent must consider the action to be among her best options.  
Even on this view, there are counterexamples in which an agent may act 
in a way that she is attributionally-responsible for where she does not take 
her action even to be one of the all-things-considered best things to do but 
nevertheless embraces it on some level. Gary Watson, the original propo-
nent of the valuing view, now endorses this objection and has come to see 
his earlier view as being too rationalistic. As he puts it, 
 
When it comes right down to it, I might fully ‘embrace’ a course of ac-
tion I do not judge best; it may not be thought best, but is fun, or thrill-
ing; one loves doing it, and it’s too bad it’s not also the best thing to do, 
but one goes for it without compunction.65 
 
Cases in which people act out of love that they themselves take to be 
wholly irrational seem to be commonplace as well as particularly compel-
ling examples. People who are in love wholeheartedly act in ways that are 
not among the options they consider all-things-considered best, nor do 
they sometimes even consider them good. On a fairly regular basis people 
return knowingly to undeserving exes, begrudgingly do unreasonable fa-
vors for loved ones, and support family members in ways that go beyond 																																																								
65 Watson (2004): 168. 
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the realm of reason. And they seem to do so with enough agency that we 
rarely think of these agents as being excused from responsibility for their 
actions as a result of their reason being undermined. 
But, as David Shoemaker notes, despite their intuitive appeal, these 
cases are liable to be recast in terms of value by proponents of valuing 
views.66 For example, Angela Smith argues that in these sorts of cases, 
agents merely speak in terms of ‘having no reasons’ to do as they do as a 
façon de parler.67 When it comes down to it, agents really do judge what 
they are doing out of love to be best given their reasons, such as reasons of 
shared history, being entangled with someone in such a way, or the like. 
When an agent has the explicit thought that she ought not go back to her 
ex but does so anyway, she uses ‘ought’ only in the inverted commas 
sense. The thought she has, valuing view adherents allege, must really be 
something like everyone would counsel me not to do this, but still I find it most 
valuable.  
Shoemaker appeals to cases of well-planned revenge as another exam-
ple of actions an agent may be attributionally-responsible for despite un-
dertaking them independently of what she values. During the plotting of 
revenge an agent may come to realize that her doing so is morally wrong 
and prudentially disastrous, and even that there is nothing valuable what-
soever in so-acting yet nevertheless carry out her plot. And yet, agents are 
paradigmatically attributionally-responsible for acting on such desires for 
revenge. While these seem like perfect cases for making the point that val-
uing is not necessary for attributional-responsibility, valuing theorists 
could argue that such agents are impossible. In the ordinary case, agents 
who act like this, contrary to appearances, do value retributivism either in 
the abstract or in the particular case, and they are either wholly self-
deceived about their anti-retributivist values or else the values are merely 																																																								
66 Shoemaker (2015a): 129-134. 
67 Smith (2012). 
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aspirational: such agents only desire to be such that they value anti-
retributivism. Otherwise, perhaps the agents are suffering from sort of 
condition that should undermine their being held attributionally-
responsible. 
It seems to me, frankly, implausible that every single case of acting out 
of love and every single case of acting out of revenge are realistically re-
cast in such a way. One worry is that the intuitions that these cases are 
well described in terms of value are theory-laden and influenced by inde-
pendent considerations that favor motivational judgment internalism, the 
view that there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and 
motivation. Motivational judgment internalism is only plausible when it 
includes the caveat that agents are motivated by their values except in 
cases of volitional disorder. The concern is that if finding motivational 
judgment internalism plausible influences intuitions about the cases in 
which an agent acts out of love or revenge, some sense of what differenti-
ates volitional disorder from normal cases might already be smuggled in 
to the picture, when that is the very thing that is meant to be in question. 
Part of the force of these revenge and love cases, and our resistance to 
recast all of them in terms of values, is that they are realistic, common-
place, and seem to differ phenomenologically from the way they are de-
scribed by proponents of the valuing view.68 Perhaps the best case against 																																																								
68 Mere hypothetical cases are more fairly subject to be recast. To take a case that has been 
offered in support of the view that valuing is not necessary for attributional-
responsibility that I do not think will be successful in convincing any valuing theorists, 
Shoemaker gives a case of an artist and philosopher who cares only about being the type 
of person who lives beyond the realm of justification such that when he judges some-
thing to be best for him he instead acts on a perverse desire to do the very opposite. 
When he acts in this way, according to Shoemaker, he clearly doesn’t think his action is 
all-things-considered best, but he certainly seems to be attributionally-responsible for 
what he does. In order to make the case resistant to the recasting problem, Shoemaker 
specifies explicitly that this agent doesn’t desire to live beyond the realm of justification 
because he values it, but I think this is unlikely to convince any valuing view proponents. 
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the valuing view is a real life example Shoemaker provides in which his 
own volitionally necessitated will came apart entirely from what he 
judged to be all-things-considered best so persuasive. He describes a time 
in which he encountered an injured mouse in his apartment, and knew 
that the best thing to do would be to take a hammer and kill the mouse in-
stantly, saving the creature from a more protracted and painful death that 
would be caused by simply letting it out into the wild. But as he stood 
over the mouse with his hammer, he found he couldn’t bring himself to 
do it, and chose to let the mouse free instead. This is a case on which he 
judged it clearly best to take one course of action but couldn’t bring him-
self to act accordingly in such a way that nevertheless revealed something 
about what he is like as an agent. It seems very implausible to say that he 
was self-deceived about his view that putting the mouse out of its misery 
would be best; he is surely a very reasonable guy when considering what 
one ought to do. It makes most sense to suppose that he was instead moti-
vated by some combination of squeamishness and contorted mercy, nei-
ther of which operated via encouraging him to think it was among his all-
things-considered best options to let the mouse go free. And yet, despite 
the fact that he acted completely contrary to reason, he certainly seems at-
tributionally-responsible for his action. And so it does not seem that con-
																																																																																																																																																							
Valuing view proponents will describe such a man as engaging in paradoxical decision 
making. When he performs one of these contrary-to-judgment actions, the valuing theo-
rist will argue, it must surely be that he takes himself to have justificatory reason to do 
so; he can even provide the reason: he does it because it is the opposite of what he judges 
best! In coming to this realization, the undertaking of this opposite action becomes what 
the agent judges it best to do, but now should he do the opposite of that? Since this kind 
of case is not common, there is no reason to doubt the claims of the valuing view adher-
ent that this sort of case is paradoxical. 
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sidering a course of action to be among one’s best options is necessary for 
attributional-responsibility.69 
 
2.2 Neither Planning nor Caring is Necessary for Attributional-
Responsibility 
I reject caring and planning accounts of deep self mental states as being 
necessary for attributional-responsibility for reasons that apply to both, 
and so in this section I treat them in tandem. 
Both caring and planning views posit that in order for agents to be at-
tributionally-responsible they must act from a motivation that is in some 
way importantly tied to their past and/or future motivational architec-
tures. As I discussed in Chapter 1, this aspect of those views is usually 
touted as an advantage. If agents are constituted over time by plans or 
cares, this offers a neat explanation as to why compulsive behavior that 
does not mesh with one’s plans or cares is alienating: it literally stems 
from outside of the agent. While diachronic coherence in one’s action ar-
guably is a marker of agency par excellence, it is much less clear that acting 
in accordance with this kind of diachronic scaffolding is necessary for at-
tributional-responsibility. 
David Shoemaker, arguing against the necessity of Bratman’s planning 
states, gives an example of a racist who prudently decides “to never let his 
																																																								
69 Silverstein (2017) gives a compelling case that practical reasoning, understood as rea-
soning about what to do and normative reasoning, understood as reasoning about what 
one ought to do, are non-identical. An agent can settle the question of whether or not she 
should dine out for lunch while deciding to forestall reasoning about whether or not she 
will in fact do so until tomorrow. In this case normative reasoning has finished long be-
fore practical reasoning has even begun. While this by itself does not foreclose the possi-
bility that attributable agents must act in accordance with reason, it does drive a further 
wedge into the supposed tight connection between valuing and ordinary attributable ac-
tion. 
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hatred structure his will.”70  When he witnesses a KKK event though, one 
day, he says, “woo hoo!” In this case the man pretty clearly has not decid-
ed to treat his racist desires as giving him a reason for action, but never-
theless appears to be attributionally-responsible. Shoemaker explains that 
this man is attributionally-responsible because, despite the fact that he 
judged it best not to let his racism show, he is a racist; he has a longstand-
ing hatred for Black people and these attitudes reveal what he is generally 
like as a person. 
But consider a modification to the case that seems to tell against the 
caring view as well. Suppose the man who lets out a “woo hoo!” upon 
seeing a KKK event has never had a prior racist thought or attitude and 
never has one again. He is merely caught up in the racist fervor of the 
KKK demonstration and is temporarily overcome. Nevertheless, the man 
in this situation seems just as attributionally-responsible for his reaction. 
This indicates that it is the man’s approval of his action in the moment, ra-
ther than across time, that matters for attributional-responsibility. Suppos-
ing we were confidently assured of the fact that this was and would al-
ways be his sole racist action, this might have some effect on the sorts of 
attitudes it would appropriate to direct towards him compared to the 
thoroughgoing active racist, but it does not affect the fact that his current 
act is attributable to him. 
It’s possible that mental states like caring or planning may help illumi-
nate aspects of an agent’s personality that are elusive when considering 
only time-slice properties, but I think we should be skeptical of any claims 
that such understanding is required for attributional-responsibility and 
think to do so would be to conflate two different senses of the Deep Self.71  
Agents who are swept up in moments of anger, passion, or fleeting inter-
est can still act in ways that they stand behind; sometimes they even do so 																																																								
70 Shoemaker (2005a): 121. 
71 See Chapter 1, §3.1. 
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wholeheartedly. Thus, there is reason to think that even if the planning 
and caring views point to mental states that guarantee that an agent ap-
proves of her behavior in the right sense for attributional-responsibility, 
acting in accordance with these mental states cannot be necessary for at-
tributional-responsibility. 
Another, albeit less conclusive, reason to be suspicious that caring or 
planning states are necessary for attributional-responsibility is that they 
come with ontological baggage. Both Bratman’s planning view and Sripa-
da’s caring view involve countenancing the existence of new kinds of 
mental states that are said to play a crucial role in agential architecture. 
Considerations of parsimony put the burden on these theorists to prove 
that adding new mental state kinds to our ontology is absolutely neces-
sary. This concern is amplified by the fact that, at least outside of the do-
main of thinking about responsibility, it is intuitively plausible that plans 
and cares might be constructed out of beliefs and standing desires with 
particular sorts of content.72 Parsimony considerations are always weighed 
against the explanatory power of views, and both Bratman and Sripada 
offer arguments elsewhere about the global roles of caring/planning states 
on agent architecture. These comprehensive pictures of agency could each 
be given dissertation-level treatments, and so I will certainly not attempt 
to discredit them here. I merely mean to mark the fact that, without ante-																																																								
72 It may be worth considering the viability of a planning or caring view of attributional-
responsibility coupled with the view that planning or caring states are in fact constructed 
out of simpler component parts. Shoemaker (2003) in some ways presents an example of 
such a view, and so is not subject to the same criticism I pose in the section for Sripada’s 
and Bratman’s views. In thinking about the viability of demarcating deep self mental 
states via their content rather than their kind, it may be worth considering the view put 
forth in (Velleman [1992]), on which agents effective motivation must be suitably related 
to a standing desire with a particular content: the desire to act in accordance with rea-
sons. Depending on how one construes Frankfurt’s second-order volitions, his endorse-
ment account may also be construed in this way. 
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cedently agreeing with the arguments that these theoretical posits are nec-
essary to explain other aspects of human agency, it is more difficult to get 
on board with the planning or caring view than it would be to accept a 
view that makes do with mental states that are more or less universally 
agreed to exist. There is reason to wonder whether we really need to posit 
a special kind of mental state to do the work of supplying a criterion for at-
tributional-responsibility. 
3. From Type-Disjunctive to Token-Disjunctive Views 
Let’s take stock. I have now argued that each traditional Deep Self view 
provides a deep self mental state that is sufficient but not necessary for at-
tributional-responsibility. Each traditional Deep Self view succeeds insofar 
as it articulates a way that an agent may approve of her action such that 
she is not alienated from it. But the additional elements of each view that 
go above and beyond the fact that the agent approves of her action are su-
perfluous; as long as the agent approves of her action and this is related to 
why she acts, it doesn’t seem to matter much how she comes to do so. 
One way of proceeding in light of this would be to hold a disjunctive 
view on which an attributionally-responsible agent’s action may be 
caused by any of the several types of mental state that implicate that the 
she will approve of her resultant action. As mentioned in Chapter 1, §6, 
David Shoemaker’s ecumenical view is a disjunctive view that is also mo-
tivated by the thought that there is no single type of deep self mental state 
that is necessary for attributional-responsibility. On the ecumenical view, 
an agent is attributionally-responsible for her action iff her effective moti-
vation aligns either with her cares or her values. If endorsing and plan-
ning views also provide sufficient conditions for attributional-
responsibility, one way to capture this would be to hold a disjunctive view 
on which an agent is attributionally-responsible for her action iff her effec-
tive motivation properly aligns with her cares or her values or her en-
dorsement or her plans. 
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Recall, though, the distinction from Chapter 1 between the B-Tradition 
and the H-Tradition. On the H-Tradition, holding responsible is meta-
physically prior to being responsible and to be analyzed in terms of the re-
sponses (usually conceived of as reactive attitudes) that are fitting in hold-
ing one another responsible. Since Shoemaker follows the H-Tradition, his 
ecumenical view is allegedly supported by the fact that agents’ actions 
that mesh with either cares or evaluative commitments both seem to make 
fitting certain paradigm aretaic sentiments in response such as admiration 
and disdain. In Chapter 1, §5, I expressed my commitment to the B-
Tradition, according to which being responsible takes priority over hold-
ing responsible. So, while the responsibility responses that appear to be 
fitting may provide a defeasible epistemic guide to the conditions of re-
sponsibility, I have argued that we also need to locate some further reason 
why those particular criteria must hold rather than some other criteria. 
Given a methodological commitment to find some deeper reason relat-
ed to the structure of attributable agency in virtue of which the proposed 
conditions for attributional-responsibility are in fact the correct conditions, 
the disjunctive view occupies a somewhat precarious position. Given the 
B-Tradition, any disjunctive view invites the further question: in virtue of 
what should we count the kinds of mental states the disjunctivist posits, 
and only the kinds of mental states she posits as constituting sources of the 
deep self?  Suppose she answers this question by identifying some proper-
ty of these kinds of mental states, F, which justifies their inclusion as states 
that can imbue first-order motivational states with the authority to speak 
for the agent. If the fact that states of that type have F is the reason they 
can speak for the agent, the disjunctivist deep self theorist should admit 
that a state of any kind, just so long as it has F, can imbue an agent’s first-
order motivational states with the authority to speak for her. 
To maintain her position in light of this challenge, the disjunctivist 
would have an additional argumentative burden not shared by traditional 
Deep Self theorists. While it is open to traditional Deep Self theorists to 
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claim that there is something uniquely special about endorsing, valuing, 
planning, or caring that makes that kind of state the only kind that can 
imbue first-order motivational states with the authority to speak for the 
agent, the disjunctive Deep Self theorist would have to admit that there is 
some property shared by each kind of Deep Self state that has that author-
ity and then argue furthermore argue that no other state could in principle 
have that property.  
To preserve the advantages of the disjunctive view without having to 
meet that challenge, one could instead hold a disjunctive view of the fol-
lowing form: 
 
Type-Disjunctive Attributional Responsibility:  An agent is attribu-
tionally-responsible for ϕ-ing iff she acts on a motivational state that 
meshes in the relevant way with a further mental state type that has 
some property, F, by virtue of its being a token of that type. 
 
But if F is a feature most fundamentally not of mental state types but of 
all the token mental states that fall under a type (for example, if F is a fea-
ture of every caring state), then this invites a further question: what is the 
relevance of mental state types to the theory?  If the type of mental state 
plays no role in the theory except that of being a good predictor of wheth-
er the token will have F, then not including other mental state tokens that 
have F despite not being of a type that guarantees that all its members 
have F would be arbitrary.  
A better alternative is to adopt what I’ll call token-disjunctivism. Ac-
cording to token-disjunctivism, an agent is attributionally-responsible for 
any action caused by a motivational state that properly meshes with any 
further mental state or collection of states that have F. These mental states 
may be tokens of types whose tokens invariably have F, but the types of 
which they are tokens need not have only tokens that have F. 
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Token-Disjunctive Attributional-Responsibility:  An agent is attribu-
tionally-responsible for ϕ-ing iff she acts on a motivational state that 
aligns in the relevant way with a further mental state token (or group 
of mental state tokens together) that has some property, F. 
 
What should we fill in for F? Since, as I have argued, each Deep Self 
view seems to provide a successful criterion for attributional-
responsibility only to the degree that it ensures that the agent approves of 
her action, and that no additional elements are necessary, I suggest that 
for F we fill in “the fact that the agent approves to some degree of her ac-
tion.”  I am proposing that the fact that an agent’s action is brought about 
by a process that is non-coincidentally related to the fact that she approves 
of her action is both necessary and sufficient for attributional-
responsibility. 
In what follows I give an account of what it means for an agent to min-
imally approve of her action, and argue that a token-disjunctive account of 
attributional-responsibility based on minimal approval has a number of 
advantages over traditional Deep Self views. 73 
4. Partial Identification 
I am going to build up an account of what it takes for an agent to approve 
of her action in the sense that I believe should ground an account of at-
tributional-responsibility. Just as on Harry Frankfurt’s endorsing view, I 
think the agential criterion for attributional-responsibility has to do with 																																																								
73 I argued in Chapter 1 that the “Deep Self” label is ill-defined, and that the positive view 
I advance may or may not count as a Deep Self view depending on the criteria that are 
prioritized in classification. However, I will adopt the convention of referring to my view 
as a “Deep Self view”. That said, I don’t put much stock in whether or not the Deep Self 
label rightly fits the view I put forth, and I only label it as such to bring out the fact that it 
clearly shares some of the advantages, both dialectical and substantive, of traditional 
Deep Self views. 
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the structure of one’s will and is built out of desires. Although the view I 
will put forward is quite different from Frankfurt’s, I arrive at it by noting 
the ways in which it contrasts with views like Frankfurt’s. 
 The first way in which I think an account of attributional-responsibility 
needs to diverge from Frankfurt’s view is that it ought to locate the crite-
rion for partial identification rather than complete identification. In Chap-
ter 1 I hinted at the view that identification with a course of action need 
only be partial in order for the agent to be attributionally responsible for 
it, since it seems that agents need only approve of their course of action in 
some way, or to some degree. This idea stands in contrast to most tradi-
tional Deep Self views. For example, recall that on Frankfurt’s view, in or-
der to be attributionally-responsible for ϕ-ing, an agent must reflect on her 
first order desires and come to desire most to act on her desire to ϕ. Cru-
cial to this view seems to be something like the idea that an agent must 
completely stand in favor of coming to act as she does. But views like this 
seem unable to respect the intuitive judgment that agents can be attribu-
tionally-responsible for actions that are the result of weakness of will.74 In 
Chapter 3 I will argue that the view I put forth in this chapter is the most 
promising way for deep self theorists to handle weakness of will cases. 
For now I just want to show how weakness of will cases intuitively move 
us away from the view that complete identification is necessary for attrib-
utional-responsibility to the view that merely partial identification is suffi-
cient.  																																																								
74 This objection has been raised, in various forms, by Vihvelin (1994), Haji (1998), Haji 
(2002), Fischer (2010), Fischer (2012), McKenna (2011), McKenna and van Schoelandt 
(2015), and Strabbing (2016). A complication that should be noted here is that not all 
Deep Self views are always presented as views of the conditions for responsibility, and 
some theorists propose these sorts of conditions merely as views of self-governance, in-
tentional action, autonomy, or agency par excellence. This criticism should be taken to ap-
ply only to the (many) Deep Self theorists who do take acting in accordance with one’s 
Deep Self to be a criterion for responsibility. 
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Consider the following case: 
 
Murderous Max: Max strongly desires to go out on a killing spree this 
morning because he hates people and there is almost nothing he likes 
more in the world than shooting them—in fact he thinks of himself as 
having made an art of it, perfecting his technique more and more with 
each kill. There is one thing, however, that he cares about even more: 
he is extremely committed to his morning workout routine. As much 
as he wants to go out on a killing spree, he also realizes that if he does 
that, he’ll have to forego his morning workout ritual. He knows that if 
he misses even one morning of working out, he’ll probably fall off of 
his routine, and he’ll thus sacrifice the progress he hopes to be making. 
So, after considering and giving some post-reflective weight to his op-
tions to act on both desires, he decides that acting on his desire to work 
out is what he most wants to do, it aligns best with his values, and is 
consistent with the plans he has set for himself. However, his desire to 
hone his murderous craft by going on that killing spree ends up just 
being so intense that he caves from lack of willpower and goes out and 
does the deed. 
 
Max’s killing spree certainly seems to reveal something about what he is 
like such that his action speaks for him for the purposes of attributional-
responsibility; he is clearly blameworthy despite the fact that he endorses, 
in the senses relevant for most Deep Self accounts, going to the gym at the 
time of action. On Frankfurt’s view, Max forms a second-order volition to 
go to the gym but some other first-order desire becomes his effective mo-
tivation. Max does seem to identify with his desire to go on a killing spree 
in a way that seems relevant.  But if Frankfurt’s account were the right ac-
count of identification, we would have to say that he does not and, as a re-
sult, is not attributionally-responsible for his killing spree. But this seems 
clearly to be the wrong result.  
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Traditional Deep Self views suffer from this problem because they are 
specially designed to show how acting on desires that agents themselves 
do not see as most favorable undermine agency in such a way as to make 
such actions non-attributable, as in the case of compulsion. But weakness 
of will is often described as the failure to act in accordance with what the 
agent finds to be the most favorable course of action, and yet intuitively 
we think weak-willed actions are attributable. These views tend to lack the 
resources to differentiate compulsion from weakness, so in exempting 
compulsive action they overextend to exempt weak-willed action. 
The lesson we should draw from this is that while it makes sense to 
say that in compulsive cases agents are wholly alienated from their ac-
tions, it seems that there are cases, like the case of Murderous Max, in 
which an attributable agent doesn’t stand behind his action as being the 
thing to do and yet still endorses it, in at least a partial way. While most 
Deep Self views give accounts of what would be required for an agent to 
fully stand behind her action, an agent does not need to wholeheartedly 
endorse her course of action in order to be responsible for it. If lack of 
identification with one’s action is to be a relevant consideration in exempt-
ing an agent from attributional-responsibility, we’ll need to understand 
this in terms of total lack of identification with one’s action, rather than 
less-than-complete identification with one’s action.75  
In order to see the difference between what I’ll call complete and mere-
ly partial endorsement, it will be easiest first to look at a case in which an 
agent feels herself being pulled in more than one direction by her first-																																																								
75 This is not to deny the possibility that degree of identification with one’s action may 
play some further role in determining features of blameworthiness. It seems at least prima 
facie intuitive that wholehearted embrace of morally wrong action could be cause for ex-
tra/more intense blame or blame of a special kind of character, and my proposal should 
not be taken as being incompatible with this. I am merely suggesting that we shift from a 
conception in which anything less than wholehearted identification falls short of attribut-
ability to one in which merely partial identification makes the cut, so to speak. 
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order desires and then explicitly deliberates about what to do at the se-
cond-order. Consider the following case: 
 
Three Desire Theresa: Theresa is currently at work and has three first-
order desires, each with the potential to pull her in a different direc-
tion: she wants to complete the assignment she has been given by her 
boss, she wants to spend her time writing some thank you emails to 
some relatives who are waiting to hear from her, and she wants to slap 
her boss. She then considers each of these desires and considers which 
of them she most wants to act on. It’s not that she is uncertain about 
what she ought to do: she knows she should complete her assignment; 
but she nevertheless is unsure prior to deliberating about which of her 
desires she most wants to act on. Upon reflection she gives some 
weight to the possibility of acting on her desire to get her work as-
signment done and some weight to acting on her desire to send her 
thank you emails. There’s a part of her that wants to act on her inclina-
tion to do what she’s supposed to do, and there’s a part of her that 
would really prefer to act on her inclination to make sure her relatives 
hear from her today. Acting on her urge to slap her boss, she realizes, 
isn’t even a contender for what she should do right now; even though 
she is struck by the raw urge to do it, she would never really want to 
do this. She’s not even angry with her; it’s just an occasional urge that 
pops into her mind. She decides, in the end, to work on her assign-
ment. 
 
Three possible outcomes in this scenario lead to three different levels of 
potential alienation. First, there is the outcome in which what she actually 
does is her work assignment. She feels no sense of alienation in this case, 
given that she acts on the desire of hers that she most wants to act on; she 
stands behind her action. 
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Next, there is the outcome in which, when she opens up her work as-
signment, she shifts over to her email and instead starts writing those 
thank you notes. It’s possible this may feel somewhat alienating to her, as 
she is not, in the end, motivated by the desire that she decided she most 
wanted to act on. However, acting on a desire to write those thank you 
emails is in line with at least something that she wanted for herself. She 
may have decided in the end that what she wanted for herself more was to 
act on her desire to work on her assignment, but nevertheless she did 
want to some degree to act on her desire to write the thank-you emails. 
Furthermore, let’s make the reasonable stipulation that it was no mere co-
incidence that she gave some weight to her desire to write thank you notes 
and the fact that she actually wrote thank you notes. The elements of her 
psychology that led her to give some post-reflective weight to her desire 
to act on her desire to write thank you notes were also involved in causing 
her to actually write the thank you notes. This act, I want to argue, is 
therefore not wholly alien to her since she at least partially endorses it.	
Finally, there is the outcome in which she, despite never seriously con-
sidering it as a contender for the motivation she should act on, slaps her 
boss. If this happens, something seems to have gone seriously awry. Even 
though she had the first-order motivation to slap her boss, she experiences 
complete alienation since she acts on a motivation wholly outside of what 
was even in contention for what she wanted for herself to do upon reflec-
tion. In this case she is moved to action by a bit of her psychology that 
stands entirely outside of the complex psychological dispositions that af-
fect choices about which motivations she would want herself to act on. Be-
ing moved to action when one would fail to even partially endorse its mo-
tive is, I contend, what makes actions that are compulsive in this way 
stand outside of one’s agency, and thus fail to be able to speak for the 
agent. So, in order for an action to be able to speak for an agent it must be 
suitably related to the motivations the agent would at least give some se-
cond-order weight to in deciding on which motivation to act.  
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4.1 Partial Identification and Desire Individuation 
While I have still not yet provided a complete analysis of minimal ap-
proval, since its foundation is the notion of partially endorsing a first or-
der desire, and this partial endorsement is a special kind of desire, it is 
worth pausing to examine the notion of ‘desire’ at play here. I have ar-
gued that Theresa is attributionally-responsible for sending thank you 
emails because she gives some weight to acting on her desire to do so. In 
other words, she has a higher-order desire of some strength to act on her 
desire to send the emails.  
 Given certain conceptions of desire, though, one might think that 
whenever it is the case that Theresa wants to send the emails it is already 
the case that she has a desire to act on her desire to send the emails. For 
example, if ‘desire’ is given a simplistic dispositional analysis, Theresa’s 
desire to send the emails just amounts to a disposition to send the emails. 
Since the only way to send the emails is by acting on her desire to send the 
emails, a desire to act on a desire to send the emails would seem to 
amount to nothing more than a disposition to send the emails. Thus, the 
fact that she gives some weight to her first-order desire can be nothing 
over and above her first-order desire itself. 
However, there is reason to reject the simple dispositional analysis as 
inadequate. As I argue in “Depression’s Threat to Self-Governance,” in 
order to make sense of certain aspects of the phenomenology of agency, 
desires need to be individuated at least in part by their propositional con-
tents.76 The case of melancholic depression gives us reason to think that 
desires to ϕ and desires to act on desires to ϕ have distinct existences. This 
insight comes from thinking about cases in which an agent with melan-
cholic depression wants to act on a desire to get out of bed but lacks the 
corresponding desire to get out of bed. The fact that getting out of bed is 
the satisfaction condition for the depressed agent’s second-order en-																																																								
76 Gorman (Unpublished Manuscript). 
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dorsement is no guarantee that she already possesses a first-order desire 
to get out of bed. Likewise, the fact that acting on a desire to send emails is 
the satisfaction condition of Theresa’s first-order desire to send emails is 
no guarantee that she already possesses a second-order desire of some 
strength to act on her desire to send emails.77 
That said, aside from this stipulation, I will not aim to mediate the dis-
pute over the nature of desire here. In fact, my usage of ‘desire’ bears 
more similarity to the tradition of using the term ‘desire’ to refer to any 
motivational state whatsoever. When I use the term ‘desire’ in an example 
to refer to the each of the states that together make up a particular agent’s 
partial endorsement of a course of action, the reader may substitute in her 
favorite motivational state for the term ‘desire,’ each time it is used, just so 
long as it is the kind of state that is individuated in part by its proposi-
tional content.78 
5. Hypothetical Versus Explicit Endorsement 
Besides requiring only partial rather than complete identification, I also 
think the kind of endorsement required for the type of minimal approval 
that matters to attributional-responsibility differs in another respect from 																																																								
77 Other views of desire may also be difficult to hold in conjunction with the view that 
partial endorsement matters for attributional-responsibility, even if they are not outright 
ruled out like the simplistic dispositional analysis.  For example, consider the view that a 
desire to ϕ consists in nothing more than a judgment that one has some pro tanto reason 
to ϕ, coupled with an account of reasons on which pro tanto reasons are very easy to come 
by.  If I take myself to have a pro tanto reason to act on a desire to eat my car, say because 
it has nutrients in it, such a view would describe me as having a weak desire to act on my 
desire to eat my car. If I then acted on an urge to eat my car, it is hard to see how the fact 
that I very weakly desired to act on my desire would make me attributionally-
responsible for attempting to eat it.  So views on which desires are this cheap to come by 
will not be particularly good candidates to pair with a partial-endorsement based view. 
78 Including but not limited to: intentions and evaluative judgments with motivational 
components. 
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the Frankfurt’s traditional endorsement view. The traditional endorse-
ment view posits that it is the actual act of endorsement that makes the 
agent’s resultant action belong to her; the act of taking a stand results in 
ownership of one’s motivation and its results.79 However, not every case 
of attributable action involves the amount of intra-psychological reflection 
of Theresa or Max. In fact, we rarely go through the explicit process of tak-
ing a stand on which of our desires to act on in the course of deciding how 
to act. Yet, we are still able to say with some degree of confidence whether 
or not our actions align with the motivations we would have wanted for 
ourselves to act on if we did consider which motivations to act on. And 
this is what seems to make the difference between whether or not we 
identify at all with our actions. It is the fact that what the agent to some 
degree would endorse and what she in fact does align with one another, I 
propose, rather than any actual act of endorsement, that makes it the case 
that an action is suitably related to an agent’s deep self such that it can 
speak for her. Since what’s important here are the psychological disposi-
tions and not the endorsement itself, the actual act of endorsement can be 
merely hypothetical. So the view, so far, is this. An agent’s action can 
speak for her iff her act is suitably related to the fact that she would at 
least partially endorse (give some weight to) the desire that she acts on, if 
she were to consider which of her motivations she wanted to act on. 
We frequently do not explicitly deliberate about or give additional 
weight to our competing first-order motivations en route to acting, and so 
views that require explicit endorsement predict that we will regularly fail 
to identify with the springs of our actions. However, our actions are al-
most always caused by the kinds of motivations to which we would give 
at least some weight if we were to deliberate, and in the rare cases in which 
a person’s action fails to be produced by such a motivation, we generally 																																																								
79 This is crucial to David Velleman’s understanding of Frankfurt’s view. See Velleman 
(1992). 
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attribute the result to some sort of dysfunction. In moving from explicit 
endorsement to hypothetical endorsement, the view entails that relatively 
few actions fail to meet the requirements of attributability. I think this 
constitutes a point in favor of the hypothetical view for a couple of rea-
sons.  
First, it can help explain why some objectors to traditional Deep Self 
views are tempted to say that people who claim to be alienated from their 
actions must be making excuses. Recall that objectors to traditional Deep 
Self views sometimes object that they can too easily imagine situations in 
which they themselves might not go through the proposed attributability-
granting processes and even, perhaps in hindsight, feel some sense of al-
ienation from their actions, while they nevertheless maintain strong intui-
tions that they are attributionally-responsible for those actions. But a hy-
pothetical endorsement view explains why complete alienation of the kind 
that undermines attributability is rare enough that it is entirely possible 
that these objectors have almost never met the conditions for it.80 
Another benefit is that it can preserve the connection between felt al-
ienation and actual alienation. While alienation in the sense that is rele-
vant to attributability is not just a feeling, it is frequently accompanied by 
a feeling. One (perhaps non-essential) common feature of felt alienation is 
that it involves a sense that the process by which one comes to act is non-
typical. The hypothetical partial endorsement view, since it holds that 
there are so few actions that fail to be attributable to agents, is compatible 
with the fact that our interpersonal relationships function in ways that as-
sume that our actions generally issue from us in a way that speaks for us. 
If having many of our actions fail to speak for us was very common, the 
feelings that accompany any particular action failing to speak for us might 																																																								
80 Or, perhaps more accurately, most objectors have never experienced externality in the 
productions of actions that matter much. The scratching of itches at inopportune times 
might be a fairly common action that is often external. 
 -74- 
feel less prototypically “alien” since it would be a more regular occur-
rence. And so in further restricting the number of actions the account 
deems alien, the hypothetical view better preserves the connection be-
tween felt alienation and alienation in the sense of failing to identify with 
one’s action. 
Despite these considerable benefits, some may protest that hypothet-
ical endorsement is a poor substitute for actual endorsement. Why should 
we care about what motivations agents would endorse rather than what 
they actually do?   
In an analogous discussion about hypothetical consent in law and ap-
plied ethics, David Enoch makes the point that the question of whether or 
not hypothetical consent is a poor substitute for actual consent must be 
answered by paying careful attention to whether or not hypothetical con-
sent ever has the same kind of normative significance as actual consent. In 
order to answer that question, he says, we would need to know why actu-
al consent matters and whether or not hypothetical consent can supply 
those same resources.81 In the case of consent, Enoch argues that actual 
consent is sometimes important for reasons of sovereignty and sometimes 
for reasons of non-alienation. Hypothetical consent can answer to the lat-
ter but not the former concern.  
Something very similar seems to me to be true of endorsement. There 
are certain ways of thinking about actual endorsement that cast it as grant-
ing motivations with special agential power. For example, David Vel-
leman conceives of Frankfurt’s second-order volitions as providing a 
compatibilist response to agent-causal libertarianism; requiring an en-
dorsement process on his interpretation is an attempt to “put the agent 
back into the picture” of the causal story of action.82 If this is the aim, then 
it’s clear hypothetical endorsement won’t do. But, in the next couple of 																																																								
81 Enoch (2017). 
82 Velleman (1992). 
 -75- 
sections I will offer some cases in which non-attributable agents seem to 
make choices for themselves about what to do via processes that are very 
similar to the processes of attributable agents. This casts doubt on the idea 
that what goes awry in non-attributable actions is that the agent is missing 
from the picture in some way. 
I have argued that what is really at issue is the fact that non-
attributable agents are alienated from the motivational states that move 
them into action. And here, it is the coordinated symmetry between who 
the agent is and what she does and the fact that her action comes about 
due to a mechanism that plays a part in ensuring that coordinated sym-
metry that ensures non-alienation. Think about it this way: we’re not 
frightened by the notion of failing to actively pick which motivation to act 
on and acting anyway—we do so all the time when we let ourselves run 
on autopilot. What’s frightening is the prospect of being autopiloted in di-
rections that have nothing to do with our own perspective of our inter-
ests—the motivations that we would give weight to were we to reflect.83 
6. Approving as Endorsement with a Further Aim than Elimination 
A hypothetical-partial-endorsement-based view provides an appealing 
explanation of why certain paradigm cases of non-attributable action are 
non-attributable, while, unlike many traditional Deep Self views, does not 
overextend its reach to classify actions performed out of weakness of will 
or ordinary actions undertaken sans deliberation as non-attributable. Ac-
tions that are caused by rogue motivations that stand wholly outside of 																																																								
83 What, though, would we make of being perpetually on autopilot in such a way? This is 
a bit of a frightening prospect, but it might be frightening for reasons that have little to do 
with motivational alienation. For example, we might just value having phenomenal con-
sciousness of our agential processes for its own sake, or because it helps us clarify our 
self-perception or gain insight that leads to a sense of narrative coherence. Another con-
founding factor here is that we might need to not be on autopilot to form dispositions to 
partially endorse acting on certain desires. 
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the complex of psychological states that inform what agents want for 
themselves count as non-attributable. For example, straightforwardly 
compulsive actions, which the agent wholly disavows, will count as non-
attributable. Frankfurt’s unwilling addict, understood as someone who 
would give no weight to his desire to take drugs at the time of action, is 
another perfect example of a person whose action does not speak for him, 
according to this view. 
Such a view also gives the verdict that willing addicts, even those who 
are merely partially willing at the time of action, are responsible for their 
taking drugs. That is, an agent who comes to takes a drug due to a chain 
of mental states that ensure that she, at the time of action, would give 
some post-reflective weight to her desire to take drugs, acts in such a way 
that is self-disclosing for the purposes of attributional-responsibility.84 
When we fill in the story in a certain kind of way, this seems to be the 
right result. For example, imagine a woman whose conflicting first-order 
motivations are the motivation to take heroin and the motivation to tend 
to her child, and then imagine her being such that if she were to deliberate 
about what to do, she would give some weight to each motivation. “On 
the one hand” she might think to herself, “I want to act on my desire to 
tend to my child, but on the other hand I do really love heroin a lot and 
maybe the fun of taking heroin is more important to me than my child’s 
wellbeing…well, I guess my child’s wellbeing edges out my desire for 
heroin, so I guess that’s what I’ll do?”  In this case, if the woman ends up 
taking heroin due to her desire to have fun, despite the outcome of her ac-
tual or hypothetical deliberation, it seems that she is attributionally-
responsible for her action. 																																																								
84 Other factors may differentiate the wholly and partially willing in terms of the nature 
of the response that will be appropriate. For example, if the partially willing addict’s tak-
ing drugs in this case meets the remaining criteria for blameworthiness, this kind of 
agent may be less blameworthy than a wholly willing addict, but she is nevertheless an 
appropriate target of blame.  
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However, consider another kind of case that falls somewhere in be-
tween the paradigmatic cases of the willing and unwilling addict: the be-
grudgingly willing addict. Michael Bratman describes the case as involv-
ing an addict who, “since [he] is confident that his desire for drugs will 
soon so overpower him as to prevent him from acting intentionally, and 
since the struggle to remain drug-free is extremely painful… decides to 
cease resisting his desire, and to take the steps necessary for satisfying it.” 
“To be sure,” Bratman writes, “he would rather not perform an act of 
drug-taking. Nonetheless, given his options, he would rather perform this 
particular drug-taking act.”85 Such an addict does minimally endorse act-
ing on his desire to take drugs, and so would count as attributionally-
responsible for his action on the view currently under consideration, yet 
this doesn’t seem like the right result.  
To elaborate, the view apparently entails that if the agent were to 
wholeheartedly resist by not endorsing a desire to take the drug despite 
inevitably having his will being taken over by the urge, his resultant ac-
tion would not be attributable. However, if he were to wisely recognize 
that failure would be the inevitable outcome of his resistance and get it 
over with more quickly by acting on the desire to take the drug to get rid 
of the urge faster, his action would be attributable. But it seems that the 
wrong thing makes the difference in these two cases; the action’s connec-
tion to the agent shouldn’t be determined by whether or not the agent de-
cides to give in to an overwhelming impulse, but rather, by whether or not 
his desire is the kind of thing he’d wanted to be motivated by in the first 
place. The begrudging addict’s action is still caused purely by non-
agential neural activity, no matter how long the agent refrains from acting 
on it. He may feel just as alienated from his action as the unwilling addict, 
and would be right to feel this way since he feels compelled to endorse 
																																																								
85 Bratman (1996). 
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acting on a desire he would not want to act on were it not for the feeling of 
horrifying inevitability.86 
People whose psychological make-up has this structure are not limited 
to hypothetical addicts. Recent research into Tourette syndrome reveals 
that the initiation of ticcing behavior often comes about in a similar way.87  
Once thought to be akin to involuntary twitches like muscle spasms, Tou-
rettic tics are now acknowledged to be intentional movements consciously 
undertaken in response to premonitory urges, which are experienced by 
agents as alien. More than 90% of people with Tourette syndrome report 
that their tics are “voluntary” in the sense that they believe they take an 
active (though subservient) role in the action’s coming about.88 The re-
ported phenomenology echoes the neurophysiological findings. Ordinary 
action involves signals being sent from an agent’s frontal lobe, the site of 
considered judgments about what to do, to the motor cortex, the initiator 
of action. But in the brains of people with Tourette syndrome, disordered 
neural connections between the basal ganglia and motor cortex cause er-
rant signals to encourage the initiation of simple body movements (in-
cluding the utterance of words) that build up as a sort of mental pressure 
over time, making the sufferer more and more uncomfortable until she 
chooses to act on the urge. People with Tourette syndrome can, with some 																																																								
86 Some theorists believe that all addiction functions similarly to the way it’s described in 
these cases, that, in a sense, there are no truly unwilling addicts since addiction affects 
one’s judgment about what one should do in this kind of way. See, for example, Buss 
(2012). Most Deep Self theorists, by way of contrast, take it as given that compulsion of-
ten involves an agent’s deep self mental states being overpowered by a rogue urge. But 
this dispute needn’t be settled here. It seems that our view should tell us that irrespective 
of the prevalence of cases of its type, if there were a case of addiction in which an unap-
proved desire simply overpowered one’s approved desires, the agent’s action would 
count as non-attributable. 
87 Schroeder (2005) argues for the importance of the integration of this research into our 
theorizing about responsibility. 
88 Leckman et. al (1999). 
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difficulty, use their judgment to postpone the discharging of these urges, 
but ultimately usually choose to give in to the urges as a way of alleviat-
ing the pressure. 
Compare the person who utters slurs for the pure joy of harming mi-
norities to the person with Tourette syndrome who utters slurs purely to 
relieve the unbearable pressure of a strong premonitory urge to tic. The 
former, unlike the latter, seems to be agentially involved in the right sort 
of way with the motivation of her action such that her action represents 
something about her, while the latter’s action does not seem to be repre-
sentative at all. According to the kinds of endorsement views under con-
sideration so far, however, most agents’ tics would be attributable, since it 
seems that people with Tourette syndrome do give weight to the desire to 
act on their urges, which comes from their desires to rid themselves of the 
uncomfortable urges. 
Something seems to be going awry in the psychology of the begrudg-
ing addict and the person with Tourette syndrome such that the relation-
ships they have to their effective motivating desires do not grant the de-
sires the usual authority to speak for them. Here is what I think goes 
awry. There are oftentimes two functions of acting on a desire: acting on a 
desire to ϕ brings it about so that you are ϕ-ing, but it also in many cases 
gets rid of your desire to ϕ. For example, if you want to go to the library, 
and then you successfully act on this desire, you will be at the library and 
thus no longer have an occurent desire to go to the library. In most cases 
in which we endorse a desire to ϕ we do so because we want the satisfac-
tion of the desire to ϕ, not merely because we want to no longer want to ϕ. 
In cases in which we endorse acting on a desire because we approve of do-
ing so, we do so because we have some aim that acting on our desire satis-
fies other than its elimination through our action. When you ‘endorse’ giv-
ing in to such an urge due solely to its power, the force the urge exerts on 
you is no less purely mechanistic than when it overpowers your endorse-
ment. To distinguish, I will call the kinds of endorsements that are not 
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merely due to wanting to rid oneself of one’s motivation with no further 
aim “approvals.”  So, it is approval rather than just any kind of endorse-
ment that is relevant to attributability. 
With all the pieces in place now, we can formulate an account of what 
it takes to “minimally approve”. To “minimally approve” of acting in a 
certain way is to approve of it in just (at least) a hypothetical and partial 
sense.  
 
Minimal Approval: An agent minimally approves of ϕing-at-t iff at t 
she is such that if she were to reflect on her desire to ϕ at t, she would 
want to some degree to act on it with some further aim in doing so 
other than merely eliminating the desire. 
 
One more kind of case that sits between the willing and unwilling addict 
cases is also worth discussing: cases in which a person appears to act in 
order to eliminate their desire and does so to further some aim she has in 
eliminating it. Consider the following case: 
 
Thoughtful Tourette Sufferer: Tom has a Tourettic urge to say the 
word “dyke,” which he knows is a slur that targets lesbians.  Tom has 
absolutely no animus against lesbians and, in fact, he aims to minimize 
the harms his frequent utterances cause for lesbians who hear them 
and do not know about his condition. He is currently in the room with 
one lesbian, and knows that another will additionally enter the room 
in 5 minutes. He feels an overwhelming urge to utter the slur, one that, 
with some great effort, he would be able to postpone, but only for 
about 5-6 minutes. He decides that he prefers to act on the urge sooner 
rather than later, so as to only harm one person rather than two, and 
does so. 
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Is Tom attributionally-responsible for uttering the slur? Our intuitions 
pull in both directions. Tom seems praiseworthy for avoiding harming an 
additional person by uttering the slur now rather than later, which seems 
to indicate that he is attributionally-responsible.  But Tom does not seem 
blameworthy for harming the one person, since his utterance was due on-
ly to a need to eliminate a rogue urge. The Minimal Approval view can 
explain this by showing how he meets the conditions for attributional-
responsibility under one description of his ϕ-ing, and fails to meet them 
under another. 
 
Tom seems praiseworthy for uttering the slur now rather than later be-
cause the actual sequence of mental states involved in the production 
of Tom’s action guarantees that the agent at t is such that if he were to 
reflect on his desire to “utter the slur now rather than later” at t, he 
WOULD want to some degree to act on it with some further aim in do-
ing so than merely eliminating it. 
 
Tom does not seem blameworthy for uttering the slur full-stop because 
the actual sequence of mental states involved in the production of 
Tom’s action guarantees that the agent at t is such that if he were to re-
flect on his desire to “utter the slur rather than not utter the slur” at t, 
he would NOT want to some degree to act on it with some further aim 
in doing so than merely eliminating it. 
 
While it is controversial whether we ought to individuate actions and de-
sires this finely, and thus whether or not our concepts of praise and blame 
ought to be sensitive to these distinctions, I think the intuitive reactions to 
these kinds of cases tell in favor of doing so. The Minimal Approval View 
can help to make sense of our intuitions that initially seemed contradicto-
ry.  
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7. Minimal Approval and the Mechanism of Action 
I have argued that minimally approving, in the sense I have articulated, 
should play a central role in attributional-responsibility, but I have not yet 
specified just what the relationship is between minimal approval and the 
causal chain that leads the agent to act. The fact that the agent would min-
imally approve of ϕ-ing and the fact that she in fact ϕs, at minimum, 
should not be wholly coincidental. Consider the following case:  
 
Coincidental Compulsion: Carrie has a compulsion to do a jumping 
jack at 3pm every day. She has absolutely no ability to stop herself 
from acting on her first-order urge to do it, but she almost always hates 
that she does it. It often interferes with whatever else she actually 
wants to be doing at 3pm, but her first-order urge takes over and she 
does the jumping jack anyway. Today, as 3pm rolls around Carrie is 
feeling a bit low energy, and thinks to herself that doing a jumping 
jack might actually be nice for helping her wake up a bit, and so she 
desires to some degree to act on her desire to do the jumping jack for a 
reason other than just to get rid of the urge. However, she will be in a 
work meeting at that time, and all things considered she definitely 
would not prefer to act on the urge, since it will be embarrassing and 
difficult to explain to her colleagues. At 3pm the urge overtakes her 
considered opinion about what she wants to do entirely via the exact 
same mechanism it does every day (one that is not sensitive to any in-
formation about what she approves of doing), and she does the jump-
ing jack. 
 
Carrie, it seems, is not attributionally-responsible for her jumping jack.  
Even though she did minimally approve of doing the jumping jack, this 
had absolutely nothing to do with what caused her to act. Minimal ap-
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proval seems to matter only when it is non-coincidental that the agent acts 
in accordance with what she minimal approves of doing.  
But, given the fact that minimal approval is hypothetical, we can’t ex-
plain the connection by telling a simple causal story on which the approv-
al causes the action. It might be the case that an attributionally-responsible 
agent explicitly reflects, approves of acting on one of her desires and this 
approval itself brings her to act. But this is not the only possibility on 
which her approval and the causal chain leading her to act might be non-
coincidentally related. The process leading to her action, or some part of it, 
might cause her to be such that she would minimally approve. Or she 
might have a mental state that both her minimal approval and her action. 
The common principle shared by these relations is that for some particular 
chain of mental states leading to action, C, which leads the agent to ϕ, if 
the agent’s ϕ-ing is caused by C, then the agent minimally approves of ϕ-
ing.  
But now consider the following case: 
 
Conditional Fallacy Frankie: Frankie is addicted to alcohol and would 
give anything to stop drinking, but despite his other plans for himself 
he is often overtaken by an extremely powerful urge to drink. One 
day, while feeling hopeless about his powerlessness against his urge 
he decides to think hard about whether or not he should just form and 
act on a desire in order to act on it before it overpowers him. Ultimate-
ly, he does. Given what I have been arguing, it seems he should not be 
attributionally-responsible. His thinking leads him to act and so is part 
of the mental states making up the causal chain that leads to his action. 
But, now imagine that this same thinking also leads him to put his 
head down on some objects on his desk, one of which he hits hard 
enough that it stimulates his brain to have certain mental states, mak-
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ing it the case that at the moment of action he minimally approves of 
acting on his desire to drink alcohol.89 
 
In this case, Frankie’s causal chain of mental states leading to his action 
does make it the case that he minimally approves of acting on his urge to 
drink. But, intuitively, this is not the kind of connection that would make 
him attributionally-responsible for his resultant action.90 Instead I think 
the relevant connection is not that the causal chain of mental states lead-
ing to the agent’s action actually makes it the case that the agent minimal-
ly approves, but rather that the causal chain of mental states disposes the 
agent to minimally approve in the vast majority of cases (all non-fluky 
cases).91 92 The thought here is that it is not any particular counterfactual 
that matters for attributional-responsibility, but rather the fact that the 
agent has the actual mental states that dispose her to approve, whatever 
they may be. We’re not really interested in what the happens, that, gener-
ally speaking, in (most of) the worlds in which the agent considers this 																																																								
89 I call this case “Conditional Fallacy Frankie” because the problem here may be an ap-
plication of some version of the Conditional Fallacy. For discussion of the Conditional 
Fallacy in general, see Bonevac, Dever, and Sosa (2006). 
90 Less science-fiction-y cases can also be generated, although it is less clear that they pose 
a genuine threat to the view as stated. For example, a person who never reflects on her 
motivations might undergo an organic personality change if she were to reflect on her 
first-order desires. It is not wholly clear that these post-personality-change hypothetical 
approvals are not what matters for attributional-responsibility. But if this seems prob-
lematic enough to provide reason to think that the view should say that certain aspects of 
agent’s personalities ought to be held fixed, this gives additional reason to move to a dis-
positional view. 
91 This means that there will also be inverse Conditional Fallacy Frankie cases on which 
the agent does not actually minimally approve due to some fluke caused by the causal 
chain leading to action. 
92 The reader is invited to insert her own favorite theory of the metaphysics of disposi-
tions here. 
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particular choice situation, she approves to some degree of her desire. In 
ruling out certain outlier worlds, moving to a dispositional account en-
sures that there is actually some feature of the agent’s psychology that 
plays the relevant role here, rather than a mere fluke of the environment. 
 One final tweak must be made before an adequate account can be for-
mulated. It seems important to attributional-responsibility that the mental 
states involved in the causal chain of action, as well as in the agent’s min-
imal approval are really her own. By that I mean something quite modest, 
just that they are not inserted, say by an evil scientist or the like.93 There is 
an extensive literature here, and I am aware that making this concession 
opens the door for potential incompatibilist arguments to get a foothold.94 
However, I reluctantly adopt a modest ownership condition since it seems 
to me a trade-off worth making.95 Although the account loses theoretical 
simplicity, it gains the ability to make good on some of our strongest intui-
tions about attributability. 
 Putting all of these pieces together, we can now formulate the Minimal 
Approval view: 
 
The Minimal Approval View of Attributional-Responsibility: An agent 
is attributionally-responsible for ϕing-at-t iff the actual sequence of 
mental states involved in the production of her action is non-
implanted and together with her other mental states makes it the case 
that at t, if she were to reflect on her desire to ϕ at t, she would be suf-																																																								
93 See Matheson (2018) for a recent discussion of Manipulation Cases as they pose coun-
terexamples to Deep Self views. 
94 The most famous of these argument, Derk Pereboom’s Four Case Argument aims to 
show that there is no relevant difference on which to base an ownership condition be-
tween a case in which an agent’s deep self mental states are implanted and when they are 
acquired in the normal fashion, given the truth of determinism (Pereboom 2001).  
95 For a recent defense of adopting a modest ownership condition to protect against ma-
nipulation cases, see McKenna (2016). 
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ficiently likely to want to act on her desire to ϕ at t, with some further 
aim in doing so other than merely eliminating this desire.96 	
8. Advantages of the View 
8.1 Solving Frankfurt’s Infinite Hierarchy Problems 
Though the idea that higher-order desires have something to do with our 
agential identities is intuitive, the fact that higher-order accounts like 
Frankfurt’s endorsement account have problems dealing with infinitely-
ascending orders is often assumed to make higher-order accounts non-
starters. Watson first frames his valuing view as a view that can avoid the 
problems of infinite hierarchies caused by hierarchical account. Frankfurt 
himself has been aware of these sorts of issues since his first article dis-
cussing the view, and has modified his view numerous times in order to 
try to better handle the problems. In this section I will show how two of 
the most commonly discussed problems of infinite hierarchies are caused 
in part by contingent features of hierarchical views that Frankfurt’s ac-
count has but that the Minimal Approval view lacks.  
In order to see how the first problem of infinite hierarchies arises, first 
consider a case in which there is a conflict at the second-order about 
which first-order desire to endorse. Consider first an agent deciding be-
tween going to the gym and doing some grading who then acts on the de-
sire to go to the gym because she forms a second-order volition that is 
constituted by a desire to have her desire to go to the gym be the one to 
move her to action. But it seems very possible to have an agent who is not 
only first-order conflicted but also second-order conflicted; this agent not 
only wouldn’t be sure whether to go to the gym or get some grading done, 																																																								
96 “ϕ-ing” should be understood here as standing for an action, and the account should be 
taken to cover only attributional-responsibility for actions. Attributional-responsibility for 
omissions and for consequences is, on my view, derivative on attributional-responsibility 
for actions. I explore some of these issues in Chapter 5.  
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but additionally, she wouldn’t be sure whether to form the desire to act on 
her desire to go to the gym or to form the desire to act on her desire to get 
some grading done. Since the way Frankfurt seems to imagine that con-
flicts among desires of the same order are resolved is by moving to a yet 
higher order of reflection, we would then have to look at the agent’s third-
order desires to be moved by second-order desires to be moved by first-
order desires. If these desires were also in conflict, we would have to look 
at the agent’s fourth-order desires, etc. This process seems like it could too 
easily be such that it never terminates in wholehearted endorsement and 
so we might worry that this is just a bad candidate description for how the 
process that leads to autonomous action works in agents like us. Further-
more, it seems as though an agent who never decisively reaches a level at 
which she is wholly unconflicted can still act in ways that she should still 
be held attributionally-responsible for. 
But we are now in a position to see how this kind of problem of infinite 
hierarchies is related to contingent features of a higher-order desire ac-
count. One feature of Frankfurt’s view is that it seems to imply that 
wholeheartedness is necessary for an agent’s process to issue in action. 
This is what makes conflict at the n level a problem for understanding how 
the agent could come to act, and forces us to examine level n+1 to find the 
wholehearted endorsement. If we instead admit, as the Minimal Approval 
view does, that we may act despite having not settled conflicts among de-
sires at the second-order, we are left without reason to worry about third-
order desires as a way of mediating conflict in order to act. This is not 
possible on Frankfurt’s view because according to Frankfurt the reason se-
cond-order desires matter is in large part because they help settle conflicts 
between first-order desires leading the agent to make a decision that is-
sues in action.  
The second, and more troubling, problem of infinite hierarchies is the 
one Watson speaks most directly to in “Free Agency” when he writes, 
“Can’t one be a wanton, so to speak, with respect to one’s second-order 
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desires and volitions?”97 Watson’s concern is that just as an agent can be 
alienated from her first-order desire in the sense that she has not endorsed 
it, she can be alienated from her second-order desires as well. Since first-
order desires on Frankfurt’s view do not have the authority to speak for 
the agent unless they go through a process involving second-order de-
sires, it seems as though there is no reason to suspect that second-order 
desires wouldn’t also have to go through a higher-order process of their 
own to be granted such authority. Ever-higher levels would need to be 
appealed to in order to generate the appropriate authority, making it im-
possible for any desire to have the authority to speak for the agent. What 
we should conclude from this, Watson thinks, is that second-order voli-
tions do not really have the authority to speak for an agent since they do 
not guarantee that the agent is not alienated from them.98 Even if an agent 
forms a full-fledged unconflicted second-order volition, we have no rea-
son to privilege the authority of that state over a third-order volition to 
not want to act in accordance with the desire that aligns with her second-
order volition. Since second-order status does not automatically grant se-
cond-order volitions any special authority, it seems they have no more 
claim to represent the agent than any other candidate mental state. 
But on Minimal Approval non-alienation is already established by bare 
reflective endorsement of any strength. It is a contingent feature of a hier-
archical view that we should be concerned with determining the most de-
cisive or most authoritative endorsement. On the Minimal Approval 
view, even if the agent has a wholehearted third-order desire that repudi-
ates the second-order desire, as long as the second-order desire exists, 
then this is not enough to establish full alienation since the agent’s action 
would still come about in a way that is related to something that the agent 																																																								
97 Watson, (2004): 28. 
98 Velleman (1992) argues that this problem is more general and is a problem for Wat-
son’s own view as well. 
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would want for herself upon reflection (unlike when she is motivated by a 
rogue first-order desire). While higher-order desires may reveal further 
truths about us, attributional-responsibility is not about revealing the 
deepest truths about ourselves, but rather, it is about meeting a very min-
imal set of ownership conditions of our actions ensuring that their source 
is not completely alien to our interests. To be attributionally-responsible 
for our actions we must only be invested in them in some reflective way 
that goes beyond a bare desire. Once this reflectivity is established, there 
is no need to worry about ever-ascending orders of reflection. 
8.2 Capacity Without Process 
We tend to think that human agents’ actions can put them on the hook for 
what they have done in a way that non-agents’, like non-human animals’ 
behavior does not. We think that the kinds of moral responsibility re-
sponses that are appropriate for persons go above and beyond the ways it 
is reasonable to respond to a dog. Planning, endorsing, and valuing ver-
sions of Deep Self views generally aim to be able to make this distinction 
by positing some special kind of capacity that agents actively exercise 
when they undertake actions for which they are attributionally-
responsible. For example, on the endorsing view, an agent exercises her 
capacity to choose which action to initiate by picking amongst her first-
order desires.  
But this feature of these views is also problematic, because the idea 
that we as agents go through some sort of special mental process each 
time we act in an attributable way is implausible.99 The problem is that 
Frankfurtian descriptions of agents selecting which first-order desire to act 
upon, or Bratmanian descriptions of agents simultaneously acting and 
making choices about how to settle conflicts amongst desires in the future, 
just do not seem to be what we ordinarily do as agents in everyday life. 
Our conduct for which we are often rightly held morally responsible is 																																																								
99 See, for example, Arpaly (2002, 2006), Smith (2005), and Buss (2012). 
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sometimes spontaneous, initiated by subconscious motivation, out of 
character, or brought about in a fit of emotion. Furthermore, as the results 
of numerous social psychology studies appear to show us, we sometimes 
lack reflective access to some of the motivational influences on our actions, 
perhaps in ways that would implausibly preclude us from being attribu-
tionally-responsible for a large range of actions given the conditions of 
these more agentially demanding Deep Self views.  
On the Minimal Approval view, though, action brought about by sub-
conscious processes can still meet the requirements for attributability. The 
process that causes action needs to make it so that the action is in line with 
what the agent to some degree would want for herself, which requires the 
agent to be the sort of creature who has the capacity to form higher-order 
desires. But that capacity need not be exercised in the form of actual re-
flection, thus avoiding the charge that traditional Deep Self views face that 
in ruling out animal action, they rule out too much.  
While the Minimal Approval view has this advantage, the minimalist 
nature of the view might seem to run a different risk, namely, being una-
ble to plausibly explain why agents can be attributionally-responsible in a 
way that most non-human animals cannot. The Minimal Approval view is 
relatively silent about the nature of action-production and so even a crea-
ture with relatively instinctual or mechanical sorts of action production 
could, in theory, be eligible for attributional-responsibility. However, 
there is good reason to think that most non-human animals in fact do not 
have the capacity to form higher-order desires since they do not have the 
capacity for higher-order thought, and so would not be candidates for at-
tributional-responsibility according to the Minimal Approval view. 
While it is not wholly uncontroversial, the idea that humans are 
unique among animals in being able to have higher-order thoughts has a 
rich history of support in the literature on consciousness. Some argue that 
higher-order thoughts require possession of an I-concept in such a way 
that the thinker can understand themself as a self in a way that involves 
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complicated linguistic capacities that lower animals do not possess.100 
Daniel Dennett argues that the ability to say which mental state one is in is 
more fundamental than having a higher-order thought, and provides the 
basis of having a higher-order thought. Since animals cannot say which 
mental state they are in, according to Dennett, they do not have the capac-
ity for higher-order thought. Others question whether or not lower ani-
mals are capable of possessing mental-state concepts at all101; preliminary 
studies seem to indicate that they are not.102 
So a significant advantage of the Minimal Approval view is that it can 
preserve the distinction between the way agents and non-agents reveal 
themselves through action due to their having special capacities, while 
simultaneously allowing that agents may not actually engage in such me-
thodical deliberative processes when they act in ways that they can be 
held attributionally-responsible for. 
8.3 Criterion Operates Independently from the Type of Mental State 
that Causes Action 
A further advantage of the Minimal Approval view is that, unlike some 
Deep Self accounts, it is compatible with attributable actions being caused 
by mental states of any type, just so long as they meet the requirement of 
being appropriately related to hypothetical approval states. This agnosti-
cism about what the actual process of action production looks like is an 
advantage for at least two reasons.  
First, unlike several Deep Self views, accepting the view does not re-
quire accepting controversial positions in moral psychology. For example, 
the valuing view as advocated by Gary Watson assumes at least some 
form of motivational judgment internalism, and the caring views of 
Chandra Sripada and David Shoemaker rely on accepting that there exist 																																																								
100 See Quine (1995), Bermúdez (2003), and Bennett (1964, 1966, 1988). 
101 See Davidson (1984, 1985), and Bermúdez (2003). 
102 See, for example, Povinelli and Vonk (2004). 
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complex states or dispositions that we can identify as caring states, which 
are distinct from mere desires and play a central role in action production. 
In contrast, the Minimal Approval view is compatible with each of these 
pictures of action production, but its proponents can remain agnostic 
about which sorts of states have the ability to motivate. It is even con-
sistent with extremely minimal theories of action production including 
simple forms of Humean psychology. This might make the view attractive 
to those who are averse to more traditional Deep Self views due to the 
more complicated systems of action-production that they posit.  
But there is a further advantage to the fact that the Minimal Approval 
view does not posit that any particular kind of mental state must be in-
volved in the causal chain in order for an action to be attributable: certain 
mental state types may sometimes produce attributable action and some-
times produce non-attributable action. In order to illustrate this point, I 
want to focus on a class of actions to which Deep Self theorists have per-
haps paid insufficient attention: actions in which agents act directly “out 
of” emotions. Emotions are often thought to be partly constituted by mo-
tivational states or, at the very least, they are generally thought to have 
some unmediated influence on motivation. This accords with the com-
mon-sense ideas that we can “strike someone out of anger” or “hide out of 
embarrassment.” Such actions often characteristically do not align with 
our plans, values, cares, or second-order volitions concerning what we 
think the most preferable thing to do is in a given situation. Imagine, for 
example, an anti-retributivist who nevertheless is swept up in a wave of 
vengeful anger, or an ethically non-monogamous person who has disa-
vowed the appropriateness of jealousy being nevertheless moved to action 
by it. While these actions fail to align with Deep Self states, they neverthe-
less seem to be the sorts of things for which one can be attributionally-
responsible. 
 On the other hand, if a theory were to hold that a person is attribution-
ally-responsible for any action done out of emotion, it would not be viable. 
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Actions caused by psychological and neurological disorders that we intui-
tively tend to think exculpate an agent from attributional-responsibility 
can, it seems, cause action by impacting the agent’s emotional state such 
that she “acts out of” a given emotion. If this is right, a theory of attribu-
tional-responsibility should have a way of distinguishing between cases of 
acting out of an emotion that involve one’s agency in the right sort of way 
and ones that circumvent agency. 
One lesser-known disorder illustrates the importance of drawing such 
a distinction. Misophonia is a neurobehavioral syndrome in which certain 
ordinary human-produced repetitive sounds, such as the sounds of others 
chewing, sniffling, or clearing their throats, trigger reactions of anger, dis-
gust, and fear in otherwise psychologically healthy individuals.103  While 
research on misophonia is in its infancy, it is hypothesized that the cause 
of such reactions is extra-connectivity between a set of emotional pro-
cessing centers of the brain and the anterior insular cortex, the site of in-
teroception (the ability to sense what is happening to one’s own body) in 
the brain.104  Due to this over-connectivity, ordinary sounds cause these 
sufferers to react emotionally as if these innocuous sounds are threats, set-
ting off fight-or-flight reactions. When misophonia sufferers are in “fight” 
mode, their anger is not just an expression of being overwhelmed, but ra-
ther, tends to take the form of a directed expression of anger and disgust 
towards the source of the offending sound. To be clear, this is not just an-
ger towards the person for making a sound that they know bothers the 
sufferer, as anger can be just as strong towards those making sounds who 
do not realize their sounds are upsetting to the sufferer. Crucially, at the 
very same moment in time that she acts out of anger, a person with miso-
phonia is able to acknowledge that it makes no sense to be angry and that, 
for example, making sounds while chewing is entirely innocuous. Due to 																																																								
103 See Braut et. al (2018) for a cross-disciplinary review of the research on misophonia.  
104 See Kumar et. al (2017) , Edelstein et. al. (2017) 
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these irrational, embarrassing, and inescapable responses, people with 
misophonia often live increasingly reclusive lives as the disorder pro-
gresses in order to try to avoid both sounds and accidentally lashing out at 
those who they know have done nothing wrong. 
Consider the following pair of cases: 
 
Manners Mary: Manners Mary was taught as a child to always chew 
with her mouth closed and greatly appreciated the value of the lesson. 
Following her parents, she grew up believing that a decline in manners 
in society was the root of much evil and that it is deplorable that some 
people chew with their mouths open. In her adulthood, she has come 
to see this as a bit overblown, but she has retained the sense that it’s 
bad form to chew with an open mouth as well as an accompanying 
sense of disgust when she sees others behaving with such poor man-
ners. At an important dinner party she notices her fellow guests chew-
ing with open mouths, and thinks to herself that someone ought to tell 
them to stop, and that perhaps if no one else does, she should be the 
one to do so. However, she knows that these guests would only be of-
fended and would not change their ways if she were to mention their 
behavior, and so decides that this would probably be a bad time to say 
something. However, she fails to hold her tongue, gets increasingly 
angry, and yells out “chew with your mouth closed!” despite knowing 
that everyone will only be offended and not change their ways. 
 
Misophonia Mary: Misophonia Mary does not care about manners in 
the slightest and makes no effort to chew with her mouth closed. 
However, she suffers from misophonia, which makes her inexplicably 
angry when she hears people making chewing sounds. Even when in 
the throes of an episode of misophonia she recognizes that there is 
nothing wrong or bad in any way about eating with one’s mouth open, 
yet due to errant signals in her brain  that trigger a fight-or-flight reac-
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tion, Mary feels compelled to flee or else lash out at those making the 
sounds. With nowhere to flee to at a dinner party, out of anger Mary 
yells out “chew with your mouth closed!” despite knowing that every-
one will only be offended and not change their ways. 
 
Intuitively, it seems we should hold Manners Mary attributionally-
responsible but not Misophonia Mary, though they are both most directly 
motivated by their anger. This is some indication that our view should be 
consistent with the fact that acting out of anger is neither sufficient for at-
tributional-responsibility nor disqualifying for it.  
But because both agents’ actions are motivated by anger and not suita-
bly related to their plans, endorsements, judgments, or possibly even 
cares, traditional Deep Self views will have a difficult time explaining why 
Manners Mary’s action is attributable and thus licenses a different re-
sponse than Misophonia Mary’s.105 
The Minimal Approval, by contrast, is well-suited to explain the con-
trast. If we were, at the time of action, to ask Manners Mary to consider 
her motivation to yell out at the guests chewing with their mouths open 
she would give some weight to that option. After all, she thinks it is some-
what important that such ill-mannered behavior not go wholly ignored. 
But it does not seem appropriate to hold Misophonia Mary attributionally-
responsible for her yelling, and the Minimal Approval view shows how 
her motivation stands outside of her agency. If we were to ask her wheth-
er or not she would like to be motivated to some degree by the desire to 
tell the dinner guests to stop chewing she would say, even in a moment of 
her anger, that she has no desire to be so moved. The only reason she 																																																								
105 It might be argued that Manners Mary’s action is related to her judgments in a way 
that Misophonia Mary’s action is not. However, it is clear that Manners Mary does not 
take her action to be among the best options. She might take herself to have a pro tanto 
reason to act as she does, but acting in accordance with one’s pro tanto reason is not suffi-
cient for attributional-responsibility. See Chapter 3, §4.2 for further discussion. 
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might give any weight to the desire to lash out would be to relieve the 
psychological pressure of not saying anything, caused by her involuntary 
fight-or-flight reaction, and thus she would fail to meet the conditions of 
the Minimal Approval view. 
This pair of cases helps illustrate the fact that the Minimal Approval 
view can hold that agents who act out of emotions are often attributional-
ly-responsible for their actions while leaving room for the possibility that 
emotional motivation may factor prominently in action caused by non-
agential neurological activity for which we should not hold agents attribu-
tionally-responsible. The set of cases in which agents act out of emotions 
helps illustrate the broader point that in having a set of criteria for at-
tributability that does not require any particular mental state type to fea-
ture in the action-causing sequence it has better flexibility for handling 
some of the nuances of attributability and neurological dysfunction. This 
gives the Minimal Approval view yet another significant advantage over 
traditional Deep Self views. 
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Chapter 3: How Should Deep Self Theorists Account for  
Weakness of Will?106 
1. Introduction 
In the first two chapters of this dissertation I articulated and defended a 
new view of attributional-responsibility, the Minimal Approval view. 
Along the way I illustrated some of its advantages over more traditional 
Deep Self views. One such advantage mentioned but not yet explored in 
depth is the view’s ability to account for the attributional-responsibility of 
weak-willed agents. In this chapter I zoom in on this advantage of the 
view and argue that the Minimal Approval view is uniquely well-suited 
among Deep Self views to account for the difference between weak-willed 
actions, which are attributable to agents, and compulsive actions, which 
are not.  
I begin by showing how deeply entrenched the weakness of will prob-
lem is for Deep Self theorists. Traditional Deep Self views lack the re-
sources to adequately distinguish compulsion from weakness of will, 
which leads to their wrongly classifying certain attributable weak-willed 
actions as non-attributable. Most current solutions involve implausible 
bullet-biting, or else cede dialectical ground to control-based theorists. I 
suggest that Deep Self theorists instead must adopt an understanding of 
the self as having multiple strands that are competing yet individually 
have the power to speak for the person qua agent. The Minimal Approval 
view, I argue, is the only realization of this picture that appropriately sep-
arates non-attributable compulsive action from attributable weak-willed 
action. Thus the Minimal Approval view has a distinctive advantage over 
																																																								
106 This chapter benefitted from discussion by the participants at a 2018 Eastern APA 
symposium session. 
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competing Deep Self views. I conclude by addressing a family of fairness 
concerns for the Minimal Approval view’s treatment of these cases. 
 
2. The Weakness of Will Problem 
Consider the following case: 
 
Sam’s Exam: Suppose Sam knows that she should be studying for her 
final exam, even though there’s a party going on that night that she re-
ally wants to go to. She judges it would be best for her to study for her 
exam, endorses her desire to study for her exam, plans to study for her 
exam etc., and yet somehow she ends up going to the party anyway. 
Sam does not act on what she judges it best to do, or in line with what 
she plans to do, or on the desire she higher-order endorses. But com-
mon sense tells us that Sam’s action is still self-expressive and so she 
nevertheless ought to be attributionally-responsible for her action. 
 
This poses a problem for traditional Deep Self theorists because, according 
to their views, agents are not attributionally-responsible for their actions 
unless their actions are aligned with their planning, endorsing, valuing, or 
caring states. Traditional Deep Self views thus face an important objection: 
they counter-intuitively hold that we are not responsible for weak-willed 
acts, and so fail to provide a necessary condition for attributability. Per-
haps, then, the bounds of the Deep Self could just be drawn differently so 
as to cast a wider net around the class of attributable actions? 
The problem, however, is more deeply entrenched than this. Deep Self 
views are custom-made to show how acting on desires that the agent her-
self does not see as most favorable undermine agency in such a way as to 
make such actions non-attributable, as in the case of compulsion. But 
weakness of will is usually described as the failure to act in accordance 
with what one finds to be the most favorable course of action, and yet we 
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do intuitively think weak-willed actions are self-expressive.107 One of the 
motivations for Deep Self views is making sense of the claim that acting 
attributably just involves doing what one really wants to do, where “really 
wants” is qualified in such a way as to bracket off compulsive desires, 
which Deep Self theorists see as having the power to coerce agents ‘from 
the inside,’ so to speak. But they do this by bracketing off motivations that 
are counter to what agents judge best, endorse, or plan for, which also in-
escapably seems to bracket off weak-willed actions. So traditional Deep 
Self views not only incorrectly classify weak-willed actions as non-
attributable, they also seem to do so almost by design.108   																																																								
107 I should note at the outset that I am operating under the assumption that compulsion 
is primarily a conative or volitional phenomenon rather than a merely cognitive one. It is 
possible that some things that we colloquially call ‘compulsions’ may instead be instanc-
es of acting in accordance with pathologically acquired beliefs about the world. For ex-
ample, an agent might come to believe that her house would burn down if she didn’t 
check that her oven was turned off 18 times. Suppose she does so instead of getting to a 
meeting on time. On a view like the Minimal Approval view, we could easily explain 
how she would be exempt from blameworthiness by showing how even though her ov-
en-checking is attributable to her, given the background conditions, which include her 
epistemic state, she shouldn’t be blameworthy for doing what she reasonably judged to 
be the best course of action. If this account of why compulsion exempts agents from 
blame could be made plausible, there are two ways it might be bolstered to at least ad-
dress the distinction between compulsion and weakness of will. One possibility is that it 
could be argued that weakness of will is a truly volitional occurrence while compulsion is 
cognitive. Another route would be to argue that both compulsion and weakness are cog-
nitive phenomena and the distinction lies in differences in the beliefs, or the manner of 
their acquisition. Even if some compulsive cases do function in this this way, I am deeply 
skeptical that all compulsive cases function this way. If that’s right, there is a still a seri-
ous problem to solve here. I am grateful to Sarah Buss for pressing me to articulate this 
assumption. 
108 This problem has been articulated many times, notably in Vihvelin (1994), Haji (1998), 
Haji (2002), Fischer (2010), Fischer (2012), McKenna (2011), McKenna and van Schoelandt 
(2015), Strabbing (2016), and McKenna (forthcoming), and is often considered by many to 
be a knock-down objection to Deep Self views, despite Deep Self theorists having tradi-
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Take, for example, Bratman’s planning view. On Bratman’s view an 
agent’s act is only attributable if it meshes with her self-governing policies 
and plans about which desires of hers to act on. So if an agent makes a 
self-governing policy to always act on her desires to stay home and study 
before an exam, but then when the time comes is unable to get herself to 
act on her self-governing policy, her action will be non-attributable. But 
Bratman is also inclined to describe weakness of will in this way, as an 
agent’s inability to get herself to act on her own self-governing policies. In 
short, weakness of will is usually defined as a failure of self-governance, 
and self-governance is usually what is required for attributable action. 
This makes the fact that weak-willed actions do seem blameworthy very 
difficult to accommodate on Deep Self views. This is a very serious prob-
lem for these theories since weak-willed cases appear to many as cases in 
which it is particularly appropriate to hold agents responsible; in fact, 
Gideon Rosen has even argued that agents are responsible for their actions 
only when they are weak-willed.109 
We do, intuitively, want to say that compulsive cases are cases of non-
attributable actions, and Deep Self views are able to give a richly explana-
tory account of why agents are not responsible for compulsion. When act-
ing on compulsive desires, agents’ standpoints are overpowered such that 
their resultant actions do not express anything about what it is they really 
want to do. Yet the attraction of this proposal is severely undercut by the 																																																																																																																																																							
tionally relatively little to say about it. For example, Fischer writes of Frankfurt’s view, 
“The problem of weakness of the will is, in my view, a decisive problem for Frankfurt’s 
approach. Somewhat surprisingly, it has not received nearly as much attention as the so-
called ‘regress’ problem. (Indeed, I am not aware of any discussion of the relationship be-
tween his account of acting freely and the problem of weakness of will by Frankfurt)” 
[Fischer (2010)]. 
109 Rosen (2014) argues that agents could only be responsible for weak-willed actions be-
cause only weak-willed agents meet the high epistemic standards for knowing wrongdo-
ing that he takes to be a prerequisite for blameworthiness. 
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fact that weak-willed cases have these same features yet intuitively these 
actions are attributable. It seems there must be some way of distinguishing 
compulsion from weakness of will as well as what makes the latter but not 
the former attributable, but traditional Deep Self views seemingly have no 
resources available to make such a distinction. Since it seems the distinc-
tion between compulsion and weakness of will must be found elsewhere, 
we may wonder if we should look elsewhere, too, for an explanation of 
what makes agents non-blameworthy for compulsive actions.  
3. Current Solutions and Their Problems 
It is crucial that Deep Self theorists find some solution to this problem. In 
this section I will discuss existing solutions to the weakness of will prob-
lem, but I want to be clear that I will only be addressing them as resources 
for a Deep Self theorist to tell compulsion apart from weakness of will and 
also to correctly classify weak actions as attributable and compulsive ac-
tions as non-attributable. While non-Deep Self accounts of responsibility 
such as control-based and reasons-responsive accounts will also have to 
differentiate compulsion and weakness of will, these cases do not neces-
sarily pose any special problem for them, as the distinction might fall out 
as a result of the account’s calibration of the degree of control or reasons-
responsiveness required for responsibility. I will ultimately be arguing 
that this way of dividing up the cases is misguided, and hope to provide a 
compelling alternative picture, but giving a positive argument for my 
view over the solutions these non-Deep Self accounts posit is outside the 
scope of this chapter. Instead I will focus on the in-house debate over how 
to handle these cases that exists within the broadly Deep Self family of 
views. And so in discussing the options currently on the table, I will be 
analyzing them only as they are compatible with the aims of Deep Self 
theory. 
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3.1 Mismatched Accounts 
One possible way out of the puzzle, though it has not been much dis-
cussed in the literature, would be for the Deep Self theorist to deny that it 
is the very same kind of mental state that weak-willed agents fail to act in 
accordance with that also grounds ascriptions of attributional-
responsibility. For example, a Frankfurtian could say that weakness of will 
consists in an agent acting contrary to what she judges best, while at-
tributable action does not require acting in accordance with what one 
judges best, but rather, with the desires one endorses, since Frankfurt leaves 
open the possibility that agents may endorse desires arationally. So it is 
possible for Sam to judge it best that she should stay home and study, 
while endorsing her desire to go to the party. This at least shows that it is 
not impossible for a Deep Self view to account for some weak-willed ac-
tions being attributable. 
But unless it is plausible that in every case of weakness of will the 
agent endorses her course of action in Frankfurt’s sense, the view still fac-
es a weakness of will problem. All we need is one case to regenerate the 
problem that the view fails to identify a necessary condition for attributa-
ble action. A familiar case from Huckleberry Finn is helpfully illustra-
tive.110 Huck Finn befriends a slave named Jim and helps him escape from 
slavery. While on a raft being used for the escape, Huck is plagued by 
what he refers to as “conscience.”  He believes, as do other white people in 
his society, that helping a slave escape amounts to stealing, and that steal-
ing is morally wrong. He judges that the moral wrongness of this action 
outweighs the demands of loyalty to one’s friends, and never considers 
the idea of doubting what his society has told him is right. Though he re-
solves to turn Jim in because he judges it to be the right thing to do, he 
nevertheless finds himself psychologically unable to follow through on 																																																								
110 This case first appears in Adams (1985), and is discussed in regards to Deep Self views 
in Arpaly (2002). 
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this resolve, chastising himself for remaining a “bad boy.”111  While this 
case has a non-standard feature of examples of weakness of will cases, 
since what Huck ends up doing is the right thing rather than the wrong 
thing, this is still clearly a case of weakness of will. It also seems that Huck 
is attributionally-responsible for helping Jim escape from slavery, and po-
tentially even praiseworthy.  
Having the mismatch of a judgment-based conception of weakness of 
will and an endorsement-based conception of attributability will not help 
with cases like Huck’s. On the judgment-based conception of weakness of 
will, Huck judges it best to turn Jim in but ends up helping him escape 
nevertheless. So we correctly count Huck as weak-willed. But Frankfurt’s 
traditional endorsement view won’t lead to the result that Huck is attribu-
tionally-responsible, because it does not seem plausible to suppose that 
Huck in Frankfurt’s sense endorses his first-order desire to help Jim es-
cape. While it’s plausible that Huck may endorse a more general desire to 
help his friends, or desire to some degree to help Jim, he clearly does not 
form a second-order volition to act on his desire to help Jim escape. In fact, 
he desperately wants to be moved by his desire to do what he takes to be 
the right thing, so this looks like a case in which the desire he most wants 
to be moved by is his first-order desire to turn Jim in. So we have a case on 
which the mismatched view under consideration still incorrectly predicts 
that a weak-willed action will not be attributable, when intuitively it is. 
Other mismatched accounts will be even less plausible, since it’s quite 
clear that there are weak willed actions that agents are attributionally-
responsible for in which they neither judge the course of action they un-
dertake to be best nor have they planned or committed to act in accord-
ance with it. 
																																																								
111 Arpaly (2002): 75. 
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3.2. Skepticism About Weakness of Will 
While experiences of weakness of will seem to be very common, there is a 
long history of skepticism about their existence. As Gary Watson points 
out there are at least two different ways to be a skeptic about weakness of 
will.112 
Traditional Socratic weakness of will skepticism consists in the claim 
that no one ever truly acts against her best judgment. While there is noth-
ing logically incompatible about such denial and a Deep Self approach to 
attributability, denying the possibility of acting against one’s better judg-
ment is counter to one of the primary motivations of Deep Self theory. 
One of the main things that the Deep Self is used to explain is the fact that 
when an agent acts on a motivation external to her standpoint, like the 
unwilling addict does, she is not attributable for such action. So coupling 
such an approach with the idea that a person never acts in ways that con-
flict with what she judges best would be an unusual move. Socratic skep-
tics usually argue that all of our acts are what we at the time of action real-
ly judge to be the best courses of action. Otherwise, they allege, we 
wouldn’t act in such ways. Coupled with Watson’s view, the claim that 
we always do what we judge to be best leads to the conclusion that all ac-
tion is attributable action. Frankfurt’s view sits strangely with Socratic 
skepticism as well. One of the most interesting parts of Frankfurt’s view is 
that it allows for some actions to count as attributable that are not judged 
best, but there just are no such actions if weakness of will skepticism is 
true. 
A more natural kind of skepticism for the Deep Self theorist to adopt is 
skepticism that anyone ever freely acts in conflict with what she most 
wants to do.113 For the Deep Self theorist this would amount to biting the 																																																								
112 Watson (1977). 
113 Gary Watson considers and argues for such a view in Watson (1977). However, his ar-
gument only speaks to views on which freedom is understood as being related to control, 
so it does not provide an argument for favoring skepticism over the view I ultimately de-
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bullet and accepting the consequence of her theory that weak-willed ac-
tions for which agents seem to be attributionally-responsible are really 
compulsions for which they are not attributionally-responsible, or else are 
misdescribed. In the absence of a compelling argument for such skepti-
cism, the Deep Self theorist opens herself up to a charge that such skepti-
cism is ad hoc. But even more worryingly, such a view would be highly re-
visionary. While this in and of itself is not a knock-down argument, the 
view would have some very difficult consequences to accept. To illustrate, 
consider again the case of Murderous Max from Chapter 2 (reprinted be-
low): 
 
Murderous Max: Max strongly desires to go out on a killing spree this 
morning because he hates people and there is almost nothing he likes 
more in the world than shooting them—in fact he thinks of himself as 
having made an art of it, perfecting his technique more and more with 
each kill. There is one thing, however, that he cares about even more: 
he is extremely committed to his morning workout routine. As much 
as he wants to go out on a killing spree, he also realizes that if he does 
that, he’ll have to forego his morning workout ritual. He knows that if 
he misses even one morning of working out, he’ll probably fall off of 
his routine, and he’ll thus sacrifice the progress he hopes to be making. 
So, after considering and giving some weight to each option, he de-
cides that acting on his desire to work out is what he most wants to do, 
it aligns best with his values, and is consistent with the plans he has set 
for himself. However, his desire to hone his murderous craft by going 
on that killing spree ends up just being so intense that he caves from 
lack of willpower and goes out and does the deed. 
 																																																																																																																																																							
fend in this chapter. For critiques of the argument in Watson (1977), see Watson (1999), 
Strabbing (2016), and Watson (Forthcoming). 
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Is this case either misdescribed or else Max is not attributionally responsi-
ble for his killing spree, as the skeptic would have it? The characterization 
of his mental process seems normal enough (despite, of course, the strange 
content of his thought process). And it seems very difficult to believe that 
his action in this case is not self-disclosing for the purposes of attribution-
al-responsibility. The fact is, he does desire to a great extent to act on his 
desire to kill people, and it doesn’t seem right to excuse him for his action 
just because he wanted to act on another motivation more.  
3.3. Attributability for Failure to Exercise a Deep Self Capacity 
In a recent paper, Jada Twedt Strabbing suggests that, in response to the 
weakness of will problem, Deep Self views ought to allow that in addition 
to exercises of attributability-relevant capacities, failures of attributability-
relevant capacities also are self-expressive for the purposes of attribution-
al-responsibility. This is Strabbing’s principle, which she says can be 
adopted by any Deep Self theorist:	
 
Having the Capacity (HC) Principle: An agent is attributionally re-
sponsible for an action A if and only if 1) A results from the exercise of 
his attributability-relevant capacity to do A or 2) A results from the 
failure to exercise his attributability-relevant capacity to avoid doing 
A.114 
 
Now, just as objectively wrong actions are not by themselves sufficient 
for attributional-blameworthiness, failures to act may constitute wrongdo-
ing but are not by themselves sufficient for attributional-blameworthiness. 
What Deep Self views add to wrongdoing to generate attributional-
blameworthiness is some form of agential authorization or assent that 
shows us that the agent’s action is not only wrong but also expresses 
something about what she is like through that action. So to take seriously 																																																								
114 Strabbing (2016): 14. 
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the fact that Strabbing offers her principle as a Deep Self principle, the 
most charitable interpretation of this principle as it applies to weak-willed 
action is to understand failures to exercise and act on attributability-
relevant capacities as expressing implicit assent to either the omissions or 
to the alternate courses of action undertaken. 
When the HC Principle gets applied to a particular Deep Self view, 
several ambiguities arise, and no interpretation of the view ends up feasi-
ble. I will illustrate these problems by applying the HC Principle to Frank-
furt’s endorsement view after I briefly preview the structure of the argu-
ment.  The first ambiguity arises in interpreting what is meant by an “ex-
ercise of an attributability-relevant capacity.” On one interpretation the 
“exercise” is the formation of the deep self mental state, and on another it 
is an agent’s getting herself to act in accordance with that deep self mental 
state. Given the first interpretation, another ambiguity arises: is the attrib-
utionally-responsible agent the one who fails to form a deep self mental 
state to do something that would prevent her from acting impermissibly if 
she were to act in accordance with it? If so, the principle does not give the 
result that weak-willed agents are attributionally-responsible. Or is the at-
tributionally-responsible agent the one who fails to form a deep self men-
tal state that will actually be effective in getting her to avoid acting im-
permissibly? If so, I’ll argue, the view mischaracterizes the character flaw 
revealed by the weak-willed agent. This leads an interpretation on which 
the attributionally-responsible agent is the agent who fails to get herself to 
act in accordance with her deep self mental state given that she had the 
ability to.  But on this interpretation, I’ll argue, the view cedes crucial dia-
lectical ground and opens itself up to an especially difficult incompatibil-
ist challenge. 
Let’s see what these interpretations of the HC Principle look like when 
applied to Frankfurt’s view. Given the first interpretation, an agent “exer-
cises her attributability-relevant capacity” by forming a second-order voli-
tion. If interpreted this way, we get the following view: 
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Frankfurt-HC1: An agent is attributionally responsible for an action A 
if and only if 1) A results from the agent’s forming a second-order voli-
tion to act on a first-order desire to A or 2) A results from the failure to 
form a second-order volition to act on a first-order desire to avoid do-
ing A. 
 
On this view, the only sorts of omissions for which a person can be attrib-
utionally-responsible are those that result from failing to form second-
order volitions. 
But unless we adopt a Mismatched Accounts strategy, it is natural for 
Frankfurt to think that weak-willed agents do form second-order volitions 
to avoid doing A but just don’t act on them.115 Sam, for example, forms a 
second-order volition to act on her desire to study, which, if it were suc-
cessful, would lead to her avoiding doing A (in this case, going to the par-
ty), she just isn’t motivated to action by it. On this interpretation there is 
no way to distinguish weak-willed actions from compulsive ones, and 
both seem non-attributable. Sam does form a second-order desire to act on 
a first-order desire to avoid doing A, namely, she forms a second-order 
desire to act on her desire to study, a way of avoiding going to the party. 
																																																								
115 An alternate, but misguided interpretation of Frankfurt’s “second-order volition” 
would have it that second-order volitions directly cause actions when unimpeded. On 
this view, we would still need to understand why weak willed urges don’t count as im-
pediments while compulsive urges do; this just moves the problem to a slightly different 
location. I call this approach misguided because, as I argue in “Depression’s Threat to 
Self-Governance,” melancholic depression’s impact on the will seems best described by a 
disconnect between an agent’s second-order volition and her action even in the absence 
of a countervailing first-order urge. See Gorman (Unpublished Manuscript) for further 
discussion both of this point and of the two competing conceptions of second-order voli-
tions. 
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And so, on Frankfurt-HC1, since she does not fail to form such a second-
order volition, it seems Sam is not attributionally-responsible.  
There is something that Sam fails to do, though: she fails to form a se-
cond-order volition to study that actually gets her to avoid going to the 
party. Even though the agent might believe that forming a second-order 
volition to study will get her to avoid going to the party, she is wrong. 
This leads us to the second possible interpretation. Could we instead in-
terpret Frankfurt-HC1 as delimiting weak-willed actions as the set of ac-
tions that involve an agential failure to form a second-order volition to do 
something that actually would make the agent avoid doing A, independ-
ent of her beliefs?  Cases like the following one show why such a view 
would be unappealing: 
 
Secret Spinning Desire: Suppose Sam believes, incorrectly, that the on-
ly second-order volition she could form that would get her to avoid 
acting on her urge to go the party is the second-order volition to act on 
her desire to study. However, unbeknownst to her, doing so would be 
wholly ineffective. The only second-order volition she could form that 
would get her to avoid going to the party would be a second-order vo-
lition to act on a desire to spin around on her desk chair one time and 
then start studying. But Sam never considers acting on such a desire. 
Instead, she forms the second-order volition to act on a desire to study, 
which is ineffective, and she ends up going to the party instead. 
 
While I think this interpretation of the view would correctly hold that Sam 
is attributionally-responsible for going to the party, it wholly mischarac-
terizes the character-flaw that weak-willed action expresses. It’s not be-
cause she failed to realize that acting on a desire to spin around on her 
desk chair and then study that she is attributionally-responsible. This sort 
of epistemic flaw neither reflects the fact that an agent implicitly assents to 
the course of action (a crucial part of Deep Self explanations) nor does it 
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seem to track our common-sense understanding of what it is about agents 
like Sam that is objectionable. 
So, more charitably, I think we should interpret Strabbing’s proposal 
as applied to Frankfurt’s view in a third way: 
 
Frankfurt-HC2: An agent is attributionally responsible for an action A 
if and only if 1) A results from the agent’s getting herself to act on a 
desire to A that she second-order endorses or 2) A results from the 
failure to get herself to act on a first-order desire to avoid doing A that 
she second-order endorses. 
 
The problem with this suggestion is that in some ways, just like weak-
willed actions, compulsive actions might seem like failures to exercise and 
act upon general attributability-relevant capacities. Compulsive actions 
would thus count as attributable on this view when they are in fact non-
attributable.  
Instead, the view would need to be coupled with an argument that 
compulsive actions are not failures in the relevant sense to act in accord-
ance with one’s second-order volitions but rather, cases in which the agent 
lacks the ability to act in accordance with her second-order volition. This 
echoes a suggestion recently offered by Michael McKenna that the appro-
priate response to the problem of weakness of will for theorists like Frank-
furt and Watson is to reintroduce talk of ability. For example, building on 
some textual support for this position in the article where Watson first 
proposed the valuing view, McKenna suggests that valuing theorists 
ought to adopt the following modified principle: 
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We act freely just in case we are able to act in accord with what we 
value, as issuing from our evaluative system; we act unfreely just in 
case we are unable to act in accord with what we value. 116 
 
McKenna has in mind here the kind of freedom relevant to attributional-
responsibility, and so we can derive the following principle: 
 
An agent is attributionally-responsible for her action just in case she is 
able to act in accord with what she values. 
 
The idea here is that the valuing theorist could account for the fact that 
agents are attributionally-responsible for weak-willed actions despite the 
fact that such agents do not act in accordance with what they most value, 
because they have the (unexercised) ability to act in accordance with what 
they most value.  
Something similar seems to be what Strabbing really has in mind when 
she writes, for example, 
 
But why is an action attributable to an agent just in virtue of resulting 
from his attributability-relevant capacity, even if that capacity is not 
exercised? On my view, the answer is this: when an action results from 
the agent’s attributability-relevant capacity, he has control over the fact 
that he performs it. An agent clearly has control over the fact that he 
performs action A when A results from his exercising his attributabil-
ity-relevant capacity to perform A. Yet an agent also has control over 
the fact that he performs A when A results from his failing to exercise 
his attributability-relevant capacity to avoid A, and this is precisely be-
cause he could have avoided A. 117 																																																								
116 McKenna (Forthcoming): 5. 
117 Strabbing (2016): 22-23. 
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So weak-willed action on this view is self-expressive because, for example, 
Sam’s going to the party when she possesses the relevant ability to stay 
home and study instead is tantamount to her implicit assent to the alterna-
tive course of action. 
The fact that Strabbing invokes the notion of self-control within the 
context of attributability is notable, since focusing on an agent’s volitional 
control is usually seen as a competing approach to a focus on attributability 
and the Deep Self. For example, Al Mele argues that the fact that we are 
not responsible for actions stemming from manias, compulsions, and ad-
diction is better explained by the fact that we lack volitional control over 
such mechanisms, and so talk of the Deep Self seems unnecessary.118 Giv-
en that it is presented as a friendly modification for Deep Self theorists, 
Strabbing’s idea, instead, is that volitional control itself is not sufficient for 
responsibility, but rather, whether or not an agent exercises volitional con-
trol over her Deep Self-relevant capacities reveals something about what 
she is like. But it’s just not clear what work the Deep Self is actually doing 
in this picture, or if, instead, this is really just the ability view in disguise. 
Ability, it seems, is really the heavy lifter on this interpretation of the ac-
count. 
McKenna agrees. He argues that taking on board the notion of ability 
to distinguish weakness of will from compulsion amounts to giving up on 
the dialectical aims of Deep Self theory. As he puts it,  
 
Relying upon the notion of ability does not fit well with the strict aims 
of a [Deep] Self view and the attempt to treat compromises to free 
agency as external impediments to acting freely. If the weak willed 
non-addict’s desire to take the drug is after all external to her, then it 
appears not to be the case that externality rather than internality is 																																																								
118 Mele (1992, 1995). 
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what explains self-determination or lack of it. Something else is doing 
the work—an ability. But now, if it is merely an ability to resist a de-
sire, what’s it matter if it is internal or external to the agent? What mat-
ters is whether her ability affords her sufficient control over it to be 
free with respect to whether she acts on it.119 
 
Dialectically, this view just cedes too much important ground to the abil-
ity theorist to really be attractive to a Deep Self theorist. In Chapter 1, §2.1, 
I explained how the Deep Self view’s unique advantage over Classical 
Compatibilism is that it is able to bracket off incompatibilist concerns 
about the relevant kind of ability required for responsibility by shifting 
the conversation entirely away from talk about ability altogether. Any 
principle that reintroduces ability is subject to incompatibilist interpreta-
tion. On Strabbing’s, weak-willed action is attributable to the agent only 
when she could have acted on her attributability-relevant capacity but 
didn’t. But the incompatibilist will say that no agent can act otherwise 
from how she actually acts so long as she is determined. So, given the 
truth of determinism, no one is attributionally-responsible for any weak-
willed actions. The burden is then on the compatibilist to prove that her 
compatibilist-friendly conception of ability is instead what differentiates 
failures to exercise a capacity from instances of entirely lacking the capaci-
ty. Although moving past this stalemate may not be an impossible task, it 
is a task that Deep Self views were designed to circumvent.  
The great advantage of Deep Self views is the fact that they move be-
yond this stalemate by attempting to show how ability to do otherwise is 
irrelevant to questions of responsibility and by replacing this with another 
condition that is meant to be unquestionably compatibilist-friendly, name-
ly, internality. This sort of move is leveraged by Frankfurt’s arguments 
against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. By analyzing internality 																																																								
119 McKenna (Forthcoming): 5. 
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in part in terms of ability, we lose part of the motivation for shifting to a 
focus on internality in the first place. And if a Deep Self theorist finds the-
se arguments compelling, she should be wary of reintroducing talk of abil-
ity.120  
Furthermore, some of the charges against compatibilist conceptions of 
ability are sharpened further by considering them in the context of a Deep 
Self view. In particular, the charge that compatibilist notions of ability fall 
short of explaining how an agent’s actions/omissions are “up to her.” For 
example, combining the view with Michael Smith’s account of ability we 
get the view that failures to exercise capacities are cases in which an agent 
does not actually act on the desire she endorses when there is a raft of 
counterfactuals in which she does act in accordance with the desire she en-
dorses.121 This thin notion of ability is open to the following charge, which 
is well articulated by Pamela Hieronymi: 
 
																																																								
120 Making the distinction normative rather than metaphysical does not help matters 
much. In both weak-willed and compulsive cases it is already true that the agent has, for 
example, endorsed her first-order desire to do the right thing. So to ask whether or not it 
is fair to expect the agent to exercise her attributionally-relevant capacity is tantamount 
to asking whether or not it is fair to expect the person to resist her desire to do the wrong 
thing. But attributionally-relevant capacities drop out of the explanation altogether here, 
as the answer to this question is just an answer about what amount of control over our 
desires we think is reasonable to expect of people to have, and the explanation makes no 
essential reference to anything about attributionally-relevant capacities. At the very least, 
the notion of the Deep Self would need to be quite different from how it is ordinarily un-
derstood to play any more significant role in this explanation. The boundaries of the 
Deep Self would need to be set by normative facts about when it is reasonable to take an 
act to be self-disclosing, rather than by facts that indicate whether or not the agent in fact 
(in at least some way) stands behind her action. See Chapter 5, §4.2 for further discussion 
of this point. 
121 See Smith (2003) for a development of this view. 
 -115- 
Suppose I have a heart attack. It may well be that, in a host of similar 
possible worlds, I do not have a heart attack. Further, the fact that I do 
not have a heart attack in those worlds may be explained by the under-
lying structure of my cardio-vascular system. Thus, I have the capaci-
ty, in Smith’s sense, to have not suffered the heart attack. The truth of 
this claim does nothing to show that it was up to me whether I had a 
heart attack…122 
 
In the context of a Deep Self view, this charge is particularly troublesome. 
If it’s not up to you, nor does it have anything to do with what you really 
want, whether or not you act on the desire you endorse, how can whether 
or not you act on the desire you endorse determine whether or not your 
action is self-disclosing? 
Even setting aside all of the dialectical problems with the reintroduc-
tion of ability, it’s just not clear that the agent does assent to her action by 
failing to bring herself to act in accordance with her values/ endorsements/ 
commitments when she has the ability to. In order for this to be true, we 
would need an argument that this minimal kind of assent is the relevant 
kind of assent. One could make an argument that this notion of assent 
seems too minimal to do the justificatory work it’s meant to do. Instead, 
my criticism comes from a slightly different angle:  if we need to make the 
notion of assent much weaker than it’s ordinarily understood in tradition-
al Deep Self theories, we may as well just identify the kind of mental state 
that constitutes this form of assent, and make that mental state itself the 
criterion for attributability. 
4. Adopting a Mosaic Conception of the Deep Self 
The only truly feasible strategy for a Deep Self theorist to respond to the 
weakness of will problem is to alter the way she conceives of deep self 																																																								
122 Hieronymi (2007): 16. 
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mental states such that it makes sense to say that weak-willed agents do 
identify with the actions they undertake in a way that makes these actions 
self-disclosing. In order to understand the way in which an agent can as-
sent to a course of action that is counter to what she takes to be her most 
favorable course of action, the traditional Deep Self theorist will have to 
alter her conception to allow that both the favored option and the weakly-
willed option would, if undertaken, have the power to speak for the agent. 
So, for example, both Sam’s desire to stay home and study, were she to act 
on it, and her desire to go to the party would both count as being part of 
her Deep Self. The idea behind this approach is to in some way weaken 
the pre-requisites for agential self-expression so that an agent does express 
something about who she is directly via her weak-willed action.  
Chandra Sripada calls the view of the Deep Self that corresponds to 
this alternate picture on which more than one mental state and their re-
sultant actions can speak for the agent a “mosaic” conception. Mosaic con-
ceptions of the Deep Self permit conflicts and tensions within the Deep 
Self since, as Sripada writes, “conflict can and often does extend all the 
way to our very practical foundations.”123 He contrasts this with “homog-
enous” conceptions of the Deep Self, according to which the Deep Self can 
contain no conflicts, and all apparent conflicts are merely illusory. On 
such views, for an action to issue from a person’s Deep Self is for the agent 
to authorize an action, and an agent can only authorize an action by 
uniquely and decisively picking it out in some way. I have shown that 
most traditional homogenous Deep Self theories are unable to accommo-
date weak-willed actions as attributable actions because weak-willed ac-
tions are caused by motivations that conflict with the motivations the 
agent has authorized herself to act on. This suggests that the way to solve 
the weakness of will problem for a Deep Self theorist is to adopt a mosaic 
																																																								
123 Sripada (2016): 24. 
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picture of the Deep Self and correspondingly, a weakened criterion for at-
tributability. 
4.1. The Minimal Approval View as a Mosaic Deep Self View that Can 
Solve the Weakness of Will Problem 
Adopting the Minimal Approval account solves the weakness of will 
problem because it explains the way in which even the weak-willed agent 
may assent to her course of action: via minimally approving of her course 
of action. It is able to solve the problem precisely because it is a mosaic 
view: more than one course of action can be assented to since conflict is 
permitted at the agential foundations that are relevant for responsibility-
ascriptions.  
Recall that the Minimal Approval account just requires the following 
for attributional-responsibility: 
 
The Minimal Approval View of Attributional-Responsibility: An agent 
is attributionally-responsible for ϕing-at-t iff the actual sequence of 
mental states involved in the production of her action is non-
implanted and together with her other mental states makes it the case 
that at t, if she were to reflect on her desire to ϕ at t, she would be suf-
ficiently likely to want to act on her desire to ϕ at t, with some further 
aim in doing so other than merely eliminating this desire.124 
 
The account accommodates the fact that weak-willed agents have less-
than-complete identification with the courses of action they undertake, 
and are nevertheless attributionally-responsible for them. For example, it 
makes sense to think that Murderous Max’s action comes about in part 																																																								
124 “ϕ-ing” should be understood here as standing for an action, and the account should 
be taken to cover only attributional-responsibility for actions. Attributional-responsibility 
for omissions and for consequences is, on my view, derivative on attributional-
responsibility for actions. I explore some of these issues in Chapter 5.  
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due to the fact that he wants to some degree to act on his desire to go on a 
killing spree, and that this desire is not just to relieve some urge but is ra-
ther related to his love of the art of murder. Therefore, his action, though 
weak-willed, is clearly attributable. 
It might be helpful at this point to see how the Minimal Approval view 
comes apart from traditional ability-based views in terms of what it posits 
about the difference between weakness and compulsion. Now it may be, 
as a matter of empirical fact, that it is often harder to get oneself not to act 
on a desire that has no correspondence to what you endorse, making it 
such that you have less control over acting on such desires, and so there 
may be fairly substantial overlap in the extensions of the two theories. The 
difference is that, on my view, the difficulty one has in resisting a piece of 
behavior is not essential to what makes something non-attributable, nor to 
what makes something a compulsion. An agent may be such that she 
could easily have avoided the compulsive behavior if she tried, but simply 
due to absent-mindedness forgot to. She would still not be responsible for 
her compulsive action because it does not express anything about who she 
is. On the other hand, Sam, whether she has the capacity to resist her 
weak-willed desire to go to the party or not, still does something she is at-
tributionally-responsible for because her doing so is related to the fact that 
she would want to act on this desire due to some aim, and this tells us 
something about what Sam is like. I think is precisely what a Deep Self 
theorist should want to say about the cases, not only because it is exten-
sionally adequate, but also because it gives the right kind of explanation 
for why weak-willed but not compulsive agents are attributionally-
responsible.  
4.2 Can Other Deep Self Views Adopt a Mosaic Conception to Solve the 
Weakness of Will Problem? 
The reason the Minimal Approval view is able to solve the weakness of 
will problem while Frankfurt’s endorsement view is not is that it does not 
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require a homogenous conception of the Deep Self and so can offer a 
weaker criterion for attributability. This raises the question: can any other 
Deep Self view follow suit and adopt a criterion that is compatible with a 
mosaic notion of the Deep Self in order to solve the weakness of will prob-
lem?  
Not every Deep Self makes sense in mosaic form. Bratman’s planning 
view, for example, seems inextricably bound up in a homogenous concep-
tion of the Deep Self since the agent’s deciding decisively on a certain 
unique course of action to prioritize is meant to be precisely what author-
izes attributional-responsibility for that action. Bratman emphasizes the 
role of cementing agential coherence in planning agency, and adopting a 
mosaic conception of planning would certainly forgo these appeals of the 
view. However, even if a version of the planning view did allow for an 
agent to make conflicting plans, it is not feasible to think that in all at-
tributable weak-willed cases the agent must have a plan to act in the way 
she does, nor need her action be related to any of her larger plans. In fact 
it’s quite a natural thought that part of the nature of weak willed actions is 
the very fact that they deviate entirely from our plans for ourselves. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that each traditional Deep Self view proposes a 
criterion that contains additional elements that are unnecessary for at-
tributability. Mosaic versions of valuing and caring views, I’ll now argue, 
are subject to a parallel criticism in their handling of weakness of will cas-
es. In both cases weakening the criterion to accommodate a mosaic Deep 
Self conception does not weaken it enough to capture all cases of attribut-
able weak-willed action. 
Strabbing considers and then, for this very reason, dismisses a mosaic 
version of the valuing view on which rather than requiring that agents act 
on what they most value in order to be attributionally-responsible for their 
actions, agents just need to act in accordance with something they (pro tan-
to) value at all. So according to this view, in Sam’s case, we could say that 
while she values studying for her exam the most, she does value going to 
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the party as well to some degree. But there are cases, as Strabbing points 
out, in which a weak-willed agent does not even pro tanto value the course 
of action she takes, yet she still seems attributionally-responsible for her 
action.125   
Watson’s own examples of a mother overcome with a sudden urge to 
drown her bawling baby in the bathtub, and a squash player with a desire 
to smash his opponent in the face with his racquet can be used to illustrate 
here. 126 There are cases in which a person desires something without valu-
ing it at all, yet we appropriately take a person’s acting on such a desire to 
say something about what she is like. Agents who act on weak-willed de-
sires to do such things provide counterexamples to the claim that weaken-
ing the criterion of the valuing view in this way can solve the weakness of 
will problem.  																																																								
125 Another problem with this view might be that it seems in other respects too expan-
sive—it gives the result that agents who are intuitively compulsive who nevertheless see 
something of value in taking a drug, etc. are in fact attributionally-responsible. This point 
is not crucial to my argument in this chapter since there is, I take it, already sufficient rea-
son to reject this view. But it is worth mentioning since a similar though somewhat less 
serious worry exists in regards to the Minimal Approval account. Consider a case in 
which an alcoholic desires to some small degree to act on her desire to drink, not just be-
cause she wants to get rid of the desire to drink, where her second-order desire is not ex-
plained by any sort of special epistemic circumstances, and where acting on a desire to 
drink is morally problematic. My view may seem unreasonably austere in classifying 
such agents as attributionally-responsible and blameworthy. While I won’t fully develop 
it here, if this result is unpalatable, one possible route is to say that attributability is grad-
able such that the alcoholic’s action is less attributable than the action of an agent who 
wanted most to satisfy her desire to drink (where such desire to satisfy is not explained 
by wanting to rid herself of a desire to drink. (In theory, a mosaic value theorist could 
make some sort of analogous move to circumvent this issue.) A natural idea might be 
that the gradability comes from the strength of the desire to drink relative to her other 
desires to some degree satisfy first-order desires. I hope to explore this issue further in 
future work. 
126 Watson (1987). 
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This is an application of the charge against the valuing view I made in 
Chapter 2. It is just a fact that we are attributionally-responsible for some 
things that we don’t value at all, and there are many weak-willed cases 
that illustrate this lesson particularly well. As Watson himself now 
acknowledges, the valuing account is just too rationalistic; this is a prob-
lem for accounting for the fact that even some non-weak-willed actions 
are attributable in the absence of valuing.127  In such cases an agent whole-
heartedly decides to do something that she does not judge to be good, and 
intuitively is attributionally-responsible for her action.  
The caring view is a better candidate for solving the weakness of will 
problem, and in fact, it is usually advanced in an explicitly mosaic form, 
as a view that is therefore well-positioned to handle cases of weakness of 
will.128 As with the valuing view, though, a somewhat parallel criticism to 
the one I advanced against caring views in Chapter 2 extends to the view’s 
treatment of weak-willed cases.  
The issue is what Strabbing calls the problem of weak-willed whims.129 
The idea is that oftentimes the desire an agent acts on in a weakness of 
will case is a whimsical desire that intuitively is not related to what the 
agent cares about. Nevertheless, intuitively, the agent is responsible. Cer-
tainly some cases that we are tempted to describe as weak-willed whims 
may truly be instances of very minor compulsions, and the line here may 
not always be clear. Whereas attributional-responsibility for acting on 
whims may seem inconsequential in many cases, in weak-willed cases act-
ing on these whims is in many cases what makes the agent fail to do what 
she believes she ought to do. Supposing she is right about what she ought 
to do, if her responsibility for failing to do what she ought to do is deriva-
tive on her responsibility for acting as she in fact does, then it matters very 																																																								
127 Watson (1987). 
128 See, for example, Shoemaker (2003), and Sripada (2016). 
129 Strabbing (2016): 16. 
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much whether or not she is attributionally-responsible for her whimsical-
ly-motivated action.130 
Suppose Sam has decided to stay home and study for her exam and is 
overtaken by a sudden whim to pace around her dorm room instead. It 
seems strained to say that Sam cares about pacing around the room or that 
her desire to do so would be suitably related to any sorts of distinctive car-
ing states she has. But it is likely that Sam’s desire to pace around the 
room is not just a random fluke either. In fact, it may be that whimsical 
desires always stem from subconscious intrinsic desires. Arpaly and 
Schroeder argue that “in each case [involving someone acting on a whim] 
it is easy enough to imagine credible intrinsic desires that each person 
might have such that the person’s whim is instrumental toward, or a real-
izer of, the content of the intrinsic desires.” It seems plausible that there 
will always be similar stories to tell about whimsical desires even if the 
agents themselves don’t always have access to the explanations.131 
If whimsical desires are always instrumental or realizer desires of sub-
conscious intrinsic desires, it is easy enough to see how a weak-willed 
agent who acts on a whimsical desire would satisfy the requirements for 
Minimal Approval for these actions. The fact that she would act on her 
whimsical desire is related to the fact that if she were to reflect she would 
have a desire (not necessarily consciously held) to act on a motivational 
state that would further her intrinsic desire (her further aim). 
But dialectically speaking, care theorists cannot appeal to the presence 
of a mere intrinsic desire to show that the agent is attributionally-
responsible, because they are at pains to show that caring states are not 
reducible to mere intrinsic desires, but rather, involve a complex set of 																																																								
130 I think it makes the most sense for mosaic Deep Self theorists to consider responsibility 
the actions that are omitted in weak-willed cases as derivative from responsibility for act-
ing on the motivation the agent in fact acts on. I develop this idea more fully idea in 
Chapter 5. 
131 Arpaly and Schroeder (2013): 10. 
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dispositions. Chandra Sripada does take caring states to be partially con-
stituted by intrinsic desires, and so he may tell a similar story to show 
how the presence of these intrinsic desires is evidence that they agents 
whimsical desires are suitably related to her caring states. However, it is 
just not clear that the sorts of intrinsic desires for which whimsical desires 
are instrumental towards or realizer desires of need always be related to 
what she cares about in Sripada’s sense. 
It is plausible that Sam’s pacing around the room is caused by a sub-
conscious fear of failure that is suitably related to the fact that she cares 
about being a good student. But it is equally plausible that her pacing is 
due to a spontaneous and fleeting intrinsic desire to not think so hard; she 
is moved to act on a desire that realizes an intrinsic desire she has no long-
term or emotional investment in whatsoever. This echoes the objections to 
the caring view I advanced in Chapter 2. 
It is interesting to note that David Shoemaker, who also advances a 
care theory, seems to openly embrace the fact that according to his view 
agents are not attributionally-responsible for acting on whims.132 The costs 
of this move are mitigated by the fact that, according to his picture, agents 
who act on whimsical desires may be candidates for answerability-
responsibility and/or accountability-responsibility. These forms of respon-
sibility, for Shoemaker, are serious forms of moral responsibility that do 
not require agents’ actions to be attributable (at least not in the kind of 
sense required by attributional-responsibility). For care theorists who take 
attributability to be necessary for the most central kinds of moral respon-
sibility, however, denying that agents who act on weak-willed whims are 
attributionally-responsible comes at a much higher cost.  
This shows that there is a distinctive advantage to adopting the Mini-
mal Approval View. While the main innovation in responding to the 
weakness of will problem is to lower the criterion for attributability such 																																																								
132 See Shoemaker (2015b): 113. 
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that conflicted strands of the self can both speak for the agent, the Mini-
mal Approval view is the most promising implementation of this strategy. 
5. Responses to Fairness Objections 
Despite the advantages of the Minimal Approval view’s handling of the 
weakness of will problem, it does have some features that may seem unin-
tuitive due to worries about the fairness of demarcating compulsion and 
weakness in the way that I have suggested we should. In this section my 
aim is to respond to these concerns. 
First, some may object that on my view we let people off too easily for 
their compulsions. I am committed to the claim that it can be the case that 
a person is not attributionally-responsible for her action even if she could 
have done otherwise had she resisted. On my view, compulsions in theory 
need not even be particularly difficult to resist to make a person exempt 
from attributional-responsibility for the resultant actions. To the extent 
that this strikes some people as implausible, I take it this is motivated by a 
concern about fairness.  
I have several lines of response to such worries. First, there is much 
contested ground over which questions about free will and moral respon-
sibility should be answered in the domain of metaphysics and which 
should be answered in the domain of first-order ethical theory, but I take 
there to be a methodological problem with raising concerns about fairness 
at least with this part of the picture. This is not to say that questions of 
fairness need not enter consideration at all, just that if they do, they do so 
at a different level of generality. We might reasonably ask the question, 
given considerations of fairness, what is the appropriate basis on which to judge 
people to be attributionally-responsible for their actions? Once we have decided 
that the answer to that question is that it is appropriate to hold people at-
tributionally-responsible for their actions just in case they reveal some-
thing about what they are like as agents, and commit to a Deep Self view, 
our further question is now: what does it take for someone to reveal something 
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about what she is like as an agent through her action? Our criterion for answer-
ing that question should be based on how well the proposed state or pro-
cess corresponds to the proper notion of self-disclosure that is relevant to 
praise and blame. Reintroducing concerns about fairness in answering this 
question seems to admit a certain kind of defeat for the metaphysical in-
quiry of the B-Tradition. We sought to discover the conditions that tell us 
when an act actually is self-disclosing, not just when it would be best for us 
to think of someone’s act as self-disclosing given the consequences of do-
ing so as they bare on considerations of fairness. 
Setting aside these methodological concerns, it is not even clear that 
considerations of fairness would make us favor an ability-based theory of 
when people are exempt from attributional-responsibility for compulsive 
action over the view I have put forward.  
There are at least two different concerns about fairness that might be 
raised in regards to my proposal. First, one might think the victims of 
moral transgressions that are caused by compulsive agents who could 
have easily resisted their compulsive actions have a right to blame the 
people who wronged them. Moral wrongdoing could have been prevent-
ed easily, and so, given considerations of fairness, blame seems warrant-
ed.133 Second, given that on my view agents are attributionally-responsible 
for weak-willed actions that are very difficult to resist, it seems unfair to 
exempt similarly situated compulsive agents who would not have the 
same difficulty resisting were they to try. One thing to note is that the 
view is a view about attributional-responsibility, not just blameworthi-
ness, so presumably the inverse fairness concerns could equally be raised 
for praiseworthiness. These concerns might be thought in a way to balance 																																																								
133 I actually agree that such victims might deserve an apology, but do not think they 
have the right to blame compulsive agents. I develop a brief sketch of a sense of respon-
sibility that might make the former but not the latter response appropriate in Chapter 5, 
§5. 
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each other out. But given that susceptibility to blame may be more bur-
densome than susceptibility to praise is a benefit, noting this may do little 
to quell worries.  
But isn’t it also unfair that compulsive agents are expected to shoulder 
the burden of resisting external urges? If compulsive urges are in fact ex-
ternal, why should they be the responsibility of the agent to have to man-
age them? One could try to somehow balance this consideration of fair-
ness against those raised against the proposal, but I think to make fairness 
the sole criterion for the theory would be to make a methodological mis-
take. It would amount to reducing blame and responsibility practices to 
mere burdens rather than acknowledging them as practices that are inex-
tricably bound up in a context that makes such practices apt.  
If remaining concerns linger, the following is at least dialectically open 
to the Minimal Approval theorist. She may admit that even if concerns 
about fairness do not influence ascriptions of attributability, they may in-
form the background conditions of the agent’s action such that they influ-
ence blaming practices, thus affecting the way in which it is appropriate to 
interpret and respond to the meaning of the agent’s action. The Minimal 
Approval theorist may even accept that while it plays no role in assign-
ment of attributional-responsibility, difficulty resisting countervailing mo-
tives may have a role to play in distinguishing between whether or not, 
for example, an agent reveals through her action an overtly malicious trait 
or a mere lack of moral fortitude. In this way the Minimal Approval theo-
rist can accommodate the datum that degrees of difficulty resisting does 
seem to play some role in our assessment of agent blameworthiness with-
out ceding the crucial point that control plays no role in setting the 
bounds of attributability. 
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Chapter 4: The Finely Individuated Trait View of  
Blame’s Content 
1. Introduction 
My central goal in this dissertation so far has been to advance an account 
of the conditions of attributability, the Minimal Approval view. I have ar-
gued in favor of an account that locates attributability in a set of agential 
conditions, and accordingly, my focus has primarily been on the attitudes 
of the responsible party. In this chapter I illuminate some of the core fea-
tures of blame itself, and so my focus is instead on the attitudes of the 
blamer, rather than the person blamed. 
Recall that the view I articulate in the first three chapters is meant to 
be, in theory, compatible with a wide range of stories about the route from 
attributability to blameworthiness and blame, and about the relationship 
between attributional-responsibility and other kinds/faces of moral re-
sponsibility. In this chapter I will develop one possible story about the re-
lationship between attributability and blame that I think ought to be 
adopted, and in Chapter 5 I will say more about what I take the relation-
ship between attributional-responsibility and accountability-responsibility 
to be. But it should be noted that Chapters 1-3 are, in a way, self-standing. 
One may accept the claims of the first three chapters without also accept-
ing the claims I will make in this chapter or the next. 
That said, an accompanying account of blame can make a particular 
account of its preconditions more or less plausible. In particular, the Min-
imal Approval view leaves us with a view on which the “self” that is im-
plicated in attributional-responsibility may be both arational and fragmen-
tary. This is a less robust conception of the self or will than might be re-
quired for certain accounts of blame. Does the possibly arational and 
fragmentary nature of the self that accompanies the Minimal Approval 
picture threaten our ability to tell a compelling story about blame? My 
main goal in this chapter will be to argue that it does not. 
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Developing a complete theory of the nature of blame would require 
providing answers to two different questions. First, there is the question 
of what kinds of mental states blame consists in. Candidate answers to 
this question in the current literature include judgments, emotions, de-
sires, and dispositions to communicate or protest. Second, there is the 
question of what the content of these blaming attitudes are. For example, 
suppose blame amounts to targeted resentment: does B blaming A mean 
just that B resents the fact that A ϕ-ed? The judgment that A’s ϕ-ing reason-
ably implicates? A’s quality of will as exhibited by her ϕ-ing? A’s charac-
ter as exhibited by her ϕ-ing?  
These two questions may not be wholly independent, but since I will 
not be able to offer a complete account of the nature of blame in this short 
chapter, I focus primarily on the latter question, which speaks more di-
rectly to the challenges that arise for articulating a theory of blame to go 
along with the Minimal Approval view. My aim is to sketch a theory of 
blame’s content that is attractive in its own right, but also one which is 
particularly well suited to be accepted in conjunction with the Minimal 
Approval view. 
2. From Attributability to Blameworthiness 
Once it is determined that an agent is attributionally-responsible for ϕ-ing, 
what else must be added to this fact in order for it to be appropriate to 
blame the agent on the basis of her ϕ-ing?  If the kind of blame in question 
is moral blame, then one thing that must be added is that the agent does 
something that is in some sense morally objectionable. I take the relevant 
sense of an agent doing something morally objectionable to be that she 
does something that she morally ought not to have done relative to her 
non-moral beliefs at the time of action.134 Although it is controversial, I 																																																								
134 I say her “non-moral beliefs” because I believe that unlike other sorts of ignorance, 
moral ignorance does not exempt, but I will not here be able to give a defense of the fact 
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take it that this way of conceiving of the sense in which a blameworthy 
agent does something morally wrong avoids the need to posit an addi-
tional epistemic requirement on blameworthiness135 or an additional re-
quirement to rule out cases in which an agent acts under severe duress. It 
is not that these factors are irrelevant to an agent’s blameworthiness, but 
rather that they are factors that play a role in normative ethical theorizing 
about wrongdoing itself. There is no need to offer additional criteria here 
beyond the fact that the agent attributably does something morally objec-
tionable for blameworthiness because I take it that it is just not morally 
wrong in the sense relevant to blameworthiness to tell a lie due to your 
child being threatened, or to give someone a glass of poison when you be-
lieve that it is gin.136 
A proponent of the Minimal Approval view need not be beholden to 
this picture of the relationship between moral wrongness and blamewor-
thiness, however; there are interesting and largely underexplored issues 
regarding which of these issues ought to fall under the domain of theoriz-
ing about moral wrongness and which should fall under the domain of 
																																																																																																																																																							
that moral ignorance is special in this way. For recent discussion of this issue in the litera-
ture see the papers collected in Robichaud and Wielend (2017). 
135 A belief-relative notion of moral wrongness subsumes several kinds of proposed epis-
temic conditions on blameworthiness including but not limited to Susan Wolf’s “sanity 
condition.” See Wolf (1987). 
136 Many think we need to leave room in the picture for the possibility of morally wrong 
action committed by agents who are excused from blameworthiness due to duress in or-
der to explain intuitions about cases of, say, murder or assault under duress. Although I 
won’t argue for it here, I suspect these intuitions can be explained instead by a combina-
tion of uncertainty about the degree of duress that makes typically wrong actions become 
permissible, and sufficient attention to the importance of the gradability of moral wrong-
ness. 
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theorizing about blameworthiness.137 While these are interesting issues in 
their own right, I will largely bracket them here.  
Aside from the fact that the agent does something morally objectiona-
ble, my proposal is that there are no additional requirements for being an 
appropriate target of blame over and above the fact that the agent’s action 
is attributable to her. She need not act with ill-will, she need not possess 
any (further) kind of free will, nor need she possess any special sort of 
communicative or normative-competence.  
3. Robust Traits and Implicit Judgments: Between Scylla and Charybdis  
But blame is not merely the recognition that an attributable moral wrong-
doing has occurred. It is important to respect the fact that, as George Sher 
points out, it is central to our conception of blame that blame is fundamen-
tally “a reaction to a person on the basis of the wrongness of what he has done” 
in which we take “wrong acts to…reflect badly on the agents who perform 
them”(7). Even a moral responsibility skeptic might allow that there are 
morally wrong acts and that we are justified in reacting to the fact that 																																																								
137 To give just one example, Taylor (2003) argues that hierarchical accounts of autono-
mous agency ought to be rejected given that they generally fail to account for cases of se-
vere duress since they wrongly predict that agents are still autonomous when they act 
under duress. The Minimal Approval view does in a certain sense propose conditions for 
“autonomous agency” but the sense of autonomy relevant to attributional-responsibility 
is taken to be rather minimal. (There is a good case to be made that the fact that acting 
under duress is not compatible with autonomy in its various stronger senses invoked 
outside of discussions of responsibility, including medical and political contexts.) While I 
take it that it is important that the complete specification of blameworthiness make room 
somewhere to explain the fact that agents are not blameworthy in cases of severe duress, 
it is not obvious to me that this must be done via showing how duress undercuts at-
tributable agency, given just how minimal the sense of attributable agency required for 
the Minimal Approval view is. But views that posit that less minimal agential conditions 
and thus stronger senses of autonomy are required for attributability may seem more ob-
jectionable if they relegate exemptions for duress to the normative domain instead of ex-
plaining them via their accounts of autonomous agency.  
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such actions have occurred. But this seems to fall short of genuine blame, 
which goes above and beyond a mere judgment that someone has com-
mitted a wrongdoing or the admonishment of such an act. Dispassionately 
telling a murderer that what she did was wrong and that she ought not do 
so again in the future falls short of blaming her on a fundamental level. 
When we blame her we, in some important respect, react to her on the ba-
sis of her action. The central question an account of blame needs to an-
swer, therefore, is what blaming adds over and above a judgment that 
someone has acted wrongly that somehow relates her wrongdoing to a re-
action to the wrongdoer herself.  
However, two straightforward ways of implicating the agent herself in 
the content of blaming attitudes: via robust traits or implicit judgments, 
are not available to proponents of the Minimal Approval view.  
According to various traditional Deep Self views, an agent’s act is at-
tributable iff it is caused by a mental state that has an especially tight con-
nection to an agent’s practical standpoint or character. For example, Mi-
chael Bratman posits that agents’ actions must align with their planning 
states, and their planning states, when taken all together, jointly constitute 
an agent’s diachronic practical identity. On certain readings of Frankfurt’s 
theory, such as on David Velleman’s interpretation, second-order volitions 
play the role of being functionally identical to the agent herself such that 
blaming attitudes directed at the initiation of an attributable action just are 
blaming attitudes directed at the agent herself. Blame’s sting, on such 
views, comes from the fact that one’s attributable acts express one’s deep-
est commitments and so criticism of an agent’s attributable action im-
pugns the core of her being. Sometimes this idea is coupled with the idea 
that an agent’s diachronic commitments or values make up her character 
traits, and so when we blame an agent due to her action, we are really 
blaming her for having certain morally problematic traits, which are ex-
pressed through her action. Call this the Robust Trait view.  
 -132- 
But given a simple correlation between attributability and attribution-
al-blame, the Minimal Approval theorist cannot avail herself of the Robust 
Trait view. If an agent’s act is attributable, according to the Minimal Ap-
proval theorist, all we know is that some part of her self stands behind it, 
not that who she most deeply is stands behind it. Given the way the Min-
imal Approval view handles weakness of will, it could be possible for a 
person to be generally kind, and even to most strongly endorse doing the 
kind thing in every scenario, but still be blameworthy for acting unkindly 
in a one-off weak-willed scenario. For her to blameworthy, doing that un-
kind thing must be something she approved of to some minimal degree, 
but unkindness needn’t be a part of any larger or more defining feature of 
her will. 
On another view, one that is meant to be compatible with more mini-
mal conceptions of attributability, the content of blame is the not the char-
acter of the agent, but rather, the meaning of the agent’s action, which is in 
part a function of the agent’s position with regard to the person doing the 
blaming. As T. M. Scanlon puts it, the meaning of an action for a person is 
“the significance that person has reason to assign to it, given the reasons 
for which it was performed and the person’s relation to the agent.”138 On 
Angela Smith’s version of the view, which she calls the Rational Relations 
view, the content of blame is the judgment of the agent taken to be implic-
it (by the blamer) in her so acting.139 It is because Smith takes it that at-
tributable actions can reasonably be taken to reveal the judgment of the 
agent that agents are answerable, or can be called upon to provide justifi-
cation for their actions. But according to the Minimal Approval view, 
agents do not need to take themselves to have normative reasons to per-
form the attributable actions they perform; they may approve of them for 
																																																								
138 Scanlon (2008): 54. 
139 Smith (2005): 17. 
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no reason at all. So it would be unreasonable for blamers to assume that 
agents take their attributable actions to be justifiable.  
4. The Ledger View 
Given that the Minimal Approval view neither requires attributable ac-
tions to be expressions of robust character traits nor claims that attributa-
ble actions make it the case that others can reasonably assume that they re-
flects in some way on the judgments of the agent, there is reason to adopt 
a view on which the contents of blame are taken to be much more mini-
mal. One candidate view is the Ledger View of blame. Ledger views hold 
that what blame adds to the judgment that someone has done something 
wrong is that the wrong act itself adds a ‘negative mark’ to the wrongdo-
er’s ‘moral record.’ The content of blame then, is the wrongdoing itself as 
it bears on the blamed person’s overall record. A theory of attributability, then, 
would give the conditions for when an agent’s action does/ does not re-
flect on her moral record. 
The insight of the Ledger view that is worth preserving is that it is the 
fact that the agent (attributably) committed the wrongdoing itself that re-
flects poorly on the person blamed rather than the fact that the agent’s 
traits more generally align with the propensity to commit similar wrong-
doings. What should it matter to the victim of a horrific crime if the perpe-
trator was acting in a way that, while she endorsed it in the moment, does 
not reflect her more general character?  The Minimal Approval view can 
explain why the fact that an agent acts “out of character” sometimes 
seems to explain why she is exempt from blame due to the fact that acts 
that she does not minimally approve of are oftentimes out of character. 
But it is not some further requirement on blame that actions need be relat-
ed to past or future traits or dispositions. The Ledger view’s focus on the 
attributable act’s mark against the person’s character itself better reflects 
this. 
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Nevertheless, the Ledger view, in the ways it is usually defended, suf-
fers from a couple of serious problems. First, in focusing on a person’s 
overall ‘score’ it overemphasizes the degree to which the blamed person’s 
wrongdoing is blameworthy due to diminishing her moral standing in 
general. When a person with a generally exemplary history of moral be-
havior commits a wrongdoing, she is still blameworthy, though her score-
card may still be much better than average. The Ledger view leaves us 
with unanswered questions about why such people should be blamewor-
thy for failing to achieve overall moral perfection. 
Second, our practices of holding one another responsible as they actu-
ally exist often seem quite removed from the practice of moral grading 
and accounting posited by the Ledger view. As a result, this sort of view 
can run the risk of distorting our interpersonally engaged social practices 
to make it seem, as Gary Watson puts it, “as though in blaming we were 
mainly moral clerks, recording moral faults... from a detached and aus-
terely ‘objective’ standpoint.”140 Furthermore, even if this did provide an 
apt description of our actual processes, I doubt that a system of demerits 
and point-scoring could really be the institution that many of us seek to so 
fiercely defend.  
A suitable account of blame’s content to accompany the Minimal Ap-
proval view ought to borrow from the Ledger view the idea that an agent 
may be blameworthy on the basis of evidence from an individual wrong-
doing without it necessarily revealing a larger character flaw, while aim-
ing to avoid these pitfalls of the view. 
5. The Finely Individuated Trait View  
5.1 A Paradigm Shift for Thinking About Aretaic Traits 
In order to avoid the unappealing consequence of thinking in terms of a 
person’s overall ‘score’ being the focus of appropriate blame directed at a 																																																								
140 Watson (2004): 226–227. 
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person, it will be helpful to reconsider the relevance of aretaic traits. On 
the orthodox view of aretaic traits, traits are robust character dispositions 
that influence agents across a variety of circumstances. However, recent 
evidence from social psychology threatens to show that robust traits as 
philosophers have often conceived of them simply do not exist. The Situa-
tionist Challenge, as it’s been called, argues that our morally relevant 
traits are highly contextual and influenced by morally trivial situational 
factors. Since a single agent usually has evaluatively inconsistent disposi-
tions triggered by these various contextual factors, it is very rarely apt to 
ascribe traits like “viciousness” or “kindness” to agents.141 
To take a commonly cited study, participants were 84% more likely to 
help a woman pick up her papers if they found a dime in a phone-booth 
just prior to the papers scattering. One natural conclusion, given a wealth 
of similar data across other studies, is that it’s the dime finding and not 
the good will that leads participants to help the woman.142 A possible re-
sponse to this concern is to hold that we ought not utilize the concept of 
traits at all in our moral practices. But does it mean that we ought not 
blame a study participant for failing to help the woman (supposing it is 
morally wrong not to help in the scenario)? It seems that we still can co-
herently blame the participant because she does reveal something about 
her character; she reveals that she is the kind of person who wouldn’t help 
a woman whose papers are scattering, at least in the case in which she has 
not first found this dime. Nothing in the Situationist critique tells against 
the fact that it is appropriate to have a blaming response to the fact that 
someone attributively acts unkindly in a particular situation. Even if an at-
tributable morally wrong action is aptly described as being influenced by 																																																								
141 See Doris (2002, 2015). 
142 Although see Earp and Trafimow (2015) for the alleged replication crisis for social psy-
chology, which may cast doubt on some of the data used to bolster criticism of the exist-
ence of robust character traits. 
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a morally trivial situational factor, and is thus not correctly described as 
stemming from a more general trait like cruelty or dishonesty, that doesn’t 
mean we shouldn’t respond to the more finely individuated trait that is 
evidenced just from the agent’s attributably performing that action alone. 
In order to say that we blame agents for their traits in these sorts of 
scenarios, we would need to consider a paradigm shift in thinking about 
the metaphysics of aretaic traits. Ordinarily, more robust traits are taken 
to be fundamental and to consist in dispositions to perform token actions 
of a certain type. For example, viciousness is taken to consist in a collec-
tion of dispositions to, say, steal candy from a baby, ruthlessly punch 
someone, con someone out of out of money, etc. Instead, I think we 
should think of the paradigm examples of traits as being more finely indi-
viduated, such as: being the kind of person who would on at least one particular 
occasion steal candy from a baby. Arguably, we can still appropriately use 
terms like “vicious” to point to patterns of more finely individuated traits 
that are similar or co-occur due to a common cause, and we can do so 
without countenancing the existence of viciousness as having an inde-
pendent existence or as having the power to shape behavior more globally 
across an agent’s psychology. 
The orthodox way of thinking about aretaic traits obscures the fact that 
we do learn something about an agent’s moral character when she at-
tributably commits a moral wrongdoing, even on a view like the Minimal 
Approval view with very minimal conditions for attributability. Namely, 
we learn that she is the kind of person who would attributably ϕ, where ϕ-
ing is morally wrong, in the kind of circumstances in which she in fact ϕs. 
The proper content of blaming attitudes, I want to suggest, are these very 
finely individuated aretaic traits, individuated roughly as finely as actions 
themselves. While this may seem too fine to individuate traits compared 
to the way they are often conceived of in the philosophical literature, I be-
lieve we do in fact blame people on the basis of quite finely individuated 
traits all the time. For example, consider the following paradigmatic blam-
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ing statements: “I can’t believe you are the kind of person who would do 
that!” or “I didn’t think, when I first started dating her, that she was the 
kind of woman who would ever say something like that to me!” While the-
se statements are focused on the character of the person blamed, their fo-
cus is quite narrow. The man who blames his wife for cheating on him 
may have an interest in whether or not her act is part of a more general 
propensity to be unfaithful, but it would be absurd to insist that he should 
relinquish his blame entirely if he were to be presented with conclusive 
evidence that it was a one-time thing. 
In individuating traits this finely it might seem that the view runs the 
risk of collapsing into the view that blame’s content is just the morally 
wrong action itself. But if we allow that blaming involves attitudes be-
yond mere judgments about or that something has occurred, the role of 
finely individuated traits becomes less obscure. 
For example, on George Sher’s account, blame centrally involves a de-
sire not only for the bad action to not have occurred, but also for the agent 
to have been different, although the evidence that the agent has a trait that 
we blame her for is fully supplied by her attributable act itself. In blaming 
it seems we want not just for the horrible thing to not have been said, but 
for the agent to not have had something in her psychology that she would 
countenance at all that would lead to her saying such a thing. As Sher puts 
it, blame, in its most characteristic form, often seems bound up in the frus-
tration of a desire that leads “not to the generalized frustration that we 
feel when we get stuck in traffic or botch a plumbing repair, but rather to 
bad feelings that are directed specifically at the wrongdoer or bad person 
himself.” To see why this is not surprising, Sher continues,  
 
we need only remind ourselves of the peculiarly close connection be-
tween that person and what is wanted. When we have an unsatisfiable 
desire to scape a traffic jam or fix a broken drain, we may indeed want 
other people to act in certain ways…but we want this only because it 
 -138- 
would produce a father result that does not essentially involve them. 
By contrast, when we have an unsatisfiable desire that someone…not 
have a bad character, our desire is directed at that person not merely in 
the superficial sense that we want something that he could bring 
about, nor yet in the somewhat deeper sense that we want something 
that we cannot fully describe without mentioning him, but rather in 
the deepest sense that we want him to have exercised his own deci-
sion-making capacities in a certain way.143 
 
This kind of view makes sense of the fact that something about the agent 
herself is the content of blaming attitudes, rather than the act itself. 
Consider also a view on which some sort of negative behavioral re-
sponse to an agent is made appropriate due to the fact that the agent is 
blameworthy. For example, blame may consist in part in the blamer’s al-
tered patterns of attention towards the blamed person and/or the revoca-
tion of charitable interpretations of the blamed person’s behavior more 
generally. The licensing of these sorts of responses seems to be a feature of 
the blamed agent revealing something about what she is like through her 
action rather than of wrong actions themselves. 
 
5.2 Why Blame Can Sometimes be Emotional and Impair Relationships 
Recall that one criticism of the Ledger view is that it seems to advance a 
picture of blame as a detached objective assignment of a demerit, and this 
threatens to distort the emotional and interpersonal dimensions of blame. 
While simply attending to the phenomenon of blame in real life gives us 
plenty of evidence that blaming someone can be infused with emotion and 
can play some role in modifying or even ending relationships, there is a 
further question as to whether either of these features might be essential to 
blame. But even if neither of these aspects plays an essential role in a theo-																																																								
143 Sher (2005): 105. 
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ry of blame, there ought to be a coherent story to tell about why these fea-
tures are often present, even if they are secondary to blame itself. The 
Finely Individuated Trait view is well suited to explain these connections. 
Some philosophers who aim to give an account of blame solely in 
terms of fitting reactive emotions draw a sharp distinction between agent-
focused anger or resentment on the one hand and generalized frustration 
on the other. According to these views blameworthy agents are defined by 
the fact that they are the appropriate targets of fitting resentment. But no-
tice that the Finely Individuated Trait view is well-positioned to both help 
distinguish between frustration and resentment as well as explain why re-
sentment may often be warranted when an agent is blameworthy. Anger 
in its most general form tends to be a reaction to the threat of something 
taken to be valuable. It is plausible that people take it to be valuable that 
people who are important to them (and perhaps people in general) not 
behave in certain ways. When a person attributably acts in one of these 
disvalued ways, she is in a way both the person who threatened the thing 
taken to be valuable as well as, in a way, the lost value itself. By locating 
what is blameworthy as an aspect of the blamed agent’s self in some 
sense, we can better see why agential anger, or resentment, is often pre-
sent in an episode of blaming rather than mere frustration. 
In many cases these sorts of valued social norms that prohibit people 
from acting in certain ways are part of the implicit contracts that make up 
the bounds of our interpersonal relationships. I think we should accept the 
Strawsonian idea that we attach great importance to what the actions of 
others reveal about their attitudes towards us. We all have normative ex-
pectations of one another that sustain our social practices, it would seem. 
We rely on the fact that most of our friends are not the kind of people who 
will intentionally harm us, our wives will not laugh in our faces, and our 
students will not throw paper airplanes at us while we’re lecturing. 
In some but not all of these cases, our relationships are conditional on 
not seeing a person in such a way and, in revealing what they are like, the 
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person being blamed impairs her relationship with those affected. The 
frustration of the affected persons’ expectations may be grounds for with-
drawal from the relationship on their part. We think we know what kind 
of people we are dealing with when we form certain kinds of bonds with 
them, and when we come to learn, through their actions, that they are not 
the sorts of people we took them to be, we may come to question our con-
nections with them. We needn’t agree with T. M. Scanlon’s idea that blam-
ing consists in part in taking one’s relationship to be (at least partially) 
impaired by the blamed person’s action to see why via the process of 
blaming people often come to see that there are impairments to their rela-
tionships.144 Notice that our reactions in these sorts of cases are better en-
capsulated by statements like “I just can’t be friends with someone who 
would say such a thing to me” than “you’ve reached 10 demerits so your 
moral scorecard is too low for me to respect you as a fellow moral agent.” 
The particularities of the situation matter and relate to sometimes highly 
specific relationship-customized norms and expectations about partici-
pants’ characters.  
5. The Time-Slice Property Objection 
On the Finely Individuated trait view of blame, the contents of blame in-
volve a property of an agent that is time-specific. This leads to a couple 
features of the view, which, on the face of it, might seem puzzling.  
First off, even if a blamer knows that the blamed person’s action re-
veals that she has the property of being the kind of person who would ϕ given 
circumstances C, the blamer might be in a position to know that the blamed 
person will never again be in circumstances C. Despite the fact that after 
the act the blamed person would still have the property of being such that 
she would act in an immoral way in circumstances C, we might wonder 
																																																								
144 See Scanlon (2008, 2013). 
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why we should care about that when that trait has no bearing on the per-
son’s current or future actions. 
Secondly, the blamed person might be immediately regretful such that 
she changes after the act so that she no longer does have the trait of being 
such that she would attributably ϕ in circumstances C, say because she 
comes to realize that you will blame her for it. Since she no longer ap-
proves of her action, we may wonder why it would be permissible to 
blame her on the basis of a time-slice property she no longer possesses. 
Another way to think about the worry, specific to the Minimal Approval 
View, is this. It seems that at t2 an agent can be alienated from the desire 
she approved of at t1, but it is only in virtue of not being alienated from 
her desire that she is blameworthy for it. Why then, should we not take 
the kind of alienation she has at t2 as disqualifying her from blame at t2?  
But in both cases, I want to give an initially somewhat flatfooted re-
sponse. The action is related to an agent, even one who has changed, be-
cause she is still the one who performed the action. The content of the 
blame is not time-indexed; it just contains the details about the circum-
stances within its content and specifies that this time-particular trait is true 
of the agent. The agent now is numerically identical, if not qualitatively 
identical to the agent who performed the action, and so it is related to her 
by being a part of her agential history. The affected parties still learn 
something about the blamed person and it’s still perfectly reasonable in 
many cases for someone to take learning that someone is the kind of per-
son who could ever be capable of doing what they’ve done to be grounds 
for taking a blaming stance towards that person. Worrying that the 
blamed agent is alienated from her action is misplaced, because we know 
that if her action is attributable then at the time of action she was not al-
ienated from it, and so she met the ownership conditions for it. It might 
make sense to speak about some kind of alienation that the agent now has 
from her past action, but this is not the kind of externality-grounding al-
ienation that is relevant to responsibility. The function of inquiries about 
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alienation is just to find out if the agent meets the minimum conditions for 
ownership over her action such that it is expressive at the time of action. 
However, this might seem to make the view subject to an opposite 
worry. It seems that the fact that an agent has changed for the better after 
the fact does and ought to in some cases modify our stance towards her. If 
an agent who does something she is blameworthy for becomes such that 
she no longer would do such a thing, apologizes, and does restitution, it 
seems that forgiveness becomes appropriate. On the view I have been ar-
guing for, though, given that she is still numerically identical to the per-
son with the blameworthy trait, it might seem that the view would predict 
that instead, blame continues to be warranted. 
But the view I have put forth should not be confused with the view 
that once a morally problematic trait is revealed, blame is the one set re-
sponse that is all-things-considered best. I have only argued that the con-
tents of blaming attitudes are finely-individuated morally problematic 
traits as revealed by agent’s actions. Depending on what kind of attitudes 
these are, other factors may influence their appropriateness in a given cir-
cumstance.   
For example, take the view that warranted blame involves the appro-
priateness of a certain kind of directed attention. One possible scenario is 
that the aptness of blame gives you pro tanto reason to focus on the 
wrongdoer through a certain lens, but, given her repentance, you have 
more reason focus your attention elsewhere.  Another possibility is that it 
may be equally permissible to blame or to withdraw one’s blame, since the 
appropriateness conditions for focusing one’s attention plausibly involve 
lots of cases in which its permissible to go in any one of several different 
ways.  
Similarly, an emotion-based view of blame can, arguably, make sense 
of cases on which, for example, there is reason to be mad at a person on 
the basis of their having exemplified a certain trait, but there is also coun-
tervailing reason to feel some other emotion that is mutually-exclusive 
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with remaining angry. In general, it should be emphasized that describing 
the content of blaming attitudes does not yet settle an ethics of blame. 
I admit, however, that it is hard to see how countervailing considera-
tions of an agent’s post-action transformation could act to mitigate blame 
on the basis of finely individuated traits given a view on which blame 
consists merely in beliefs or judgments of some sort. On a crude version of 
the view on which blaming just is the judgment that someone has a moral-
ly objectionable trait, and traits attach to persons across time, then blame-
worthy people seem inexorably doomed to lives on which it once and for-
ever all-things-considered appropriate for others to blame them. It is pos-
sible that more sophisticated accounts of the judgment view, when paired 
with the Finely Individuated Trait view, might be able to concoct ways to 
avoid this problem. However, it may be more promising to pair the Finely 
Individuated trait view with a different account of the kinds of constitu-
tive attitudes of blaming. 
6. The Minority Report objection: Pre-Blame 
In the Stephen Spielberg film Minority Report, fortune-tellers known as 
pre-cogs are able to apprehend would-be criminals by foreseeing that they 
will commit a crime. The idea that someone ought to be punished on the 
basis of a crime without actually committing the crime (yet) is, on the face 
of it, unappealing. Certain compatibilist views have been accused of hav-
ing the unintuitive consequence of allowing, at least in theory, for the pos-
sibility of morally sanctioned pre-punishment. 
While the Finely Individuated Trait view is not a theory of the ethics of 
punishment, it does face an analogous problem: what I’ll call the problem 
of “pre-blame.” Suppose that neuroscientists were able to conclusively 
show that someone is the kind of person who would do some morally 
wrong thing, say Ψ-ing, in a set of circumstances, but it is a set of circum-
stances that she is not yet in, or perhaps will never be in. According to the 
Finely Individuated Trait view, since such a brain scan or other neurologi-
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cal test seems to reveal the relevant information about the person, it seems 
that she would be attributionally-blameworthy for being the kind of per-
son who would Ψ in a particular set of circumstances, despite the fact that 
she has not actually Ψ-ed. This seems counterintuitive, presumably be-
cause we tend to think that it is only through a person’s actual action that 
we can rightly blame her. While my strategy to respond involves biting 
the bullet, I want to show that focusing on several possible factors that 
drive its underlying intuition can diffuse the force of the counterintuitive 
consequence.6.1 Actual Action as Usual Evidence 
In real life as we know it, the only completely decisive evidence we are 
ever given that someone has such a finely individuated trait comes via 
their action. Given the current state of science, it is not possible to defini-
tively prove that someone is the kind of person who would ϕ in some 
maximally specified set of circumstances. That means that the only time 
we have conclusive evidence that someone is the kind of person who 
would ϕ in circumstances C is when we know that that person attributive-
ly attempts to ϕ in circumstances C. Given that these things always over-
lap in the actual world, it’s not surprising that we would come to the con-
clusion that it is only appropriate to blame someone when she actually ϕs. 
We have deeply embedded norms, perhaps supported by principles of 
morality, about not assuming the worst about someone and not acting as 
though we know how they will act before we have conclusive evidence of 
it. Despite the fact that we would have conclusive evidence if we were able 
to scan people’s brains, according to the objection, it’s possible that our in-
tuitions are nevertheless influenced by the fact that we are so used the on-
ly conclusive evidence of the relevant kind of trait being an actual action. 
We don’t know what it would be like to live in a world in which we 
could tell exactly what someone would do before they have done it, and 
there is just a general strangeness in imagining the scenario which may 
end up pervading all of our intuitions about it. Imagine we reject the view 
that it is appropriate to blame someone for their finely individuated trait 
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in favor of a view on which her action must actually occur. Whatever kind 
of attitude we take blame to consist in, it is strange to think that in a world 
in which we knew exactly what was going to happen we would be able to 
entirely withhold that attitude until the action took place. Once we know 
that someone will commit a horrific murder we will resent them, make 
certain judgments about them, desire that they are otherwise, potentially 
want them to suffer or be punished, have reason to modify our relation-
ship to them, etc. These cases in which we know what someone will do be-
fore they actually do it just seem to lead to seemingly unpalatable conse-
quences about blame no matter whether we hold that people in such a sit-
uation can be blamed before their actions or only afterwards. This is rea-
son not take a counterintuitive consequence of what a view posits about 
pre-blame to be a decisive objection. 
6.2 Victim Relation and the Standing to Blame 
Take another case in which the Finely Individuated Trait view seems to 
predict that it is appropriate to blame someone that might seem unintui-
tive. 
 
Trapped Tara: Tara wakes up one morning and declares that she going 
to murder someone, and you have every reason to believe that, if given 
the opportunity, she would follow through on her declaration. Little 
does Tara know, though, that while she was asleep last night her bed-
room was air-lifted to a deserted island with her in it, so no murdering 
will be possible. Escaping from the island, let’s suppose, is also impos-
sible.  
 
In this case you are given good evidence that Tara has the finely individu-
ated traits of being such that she would murder someone in many circum-
stances in which she has people available to murder. However, you also 
know that she will never be in those circumstances. The Finely Individu-
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ated Trait view says that blaming Tara would be apt, but this may seem 
somewhat unintuitive. After all, Tara didn’t actually do anything wrong, 
and she hasn’t harmed anyone. 
 But I think our reaction is not so much that it’s unfair to blame Tara, 
but rather that it’s not so clear why we should bother with blame in this 
case. In particular, part of the intuition that blaming Tara is inappropriate 
seems to derive from the fact that it seems that that some of the standard 
ways of outwardly expressing blame would be inappropriate in a case in 
which no wrongdoing was committed. But it is standard to draw a prima 
facie distinction between the permissibility of blame and the permissibility 
of outwardly expressing blame or confronting the blamed person. The lat-
ter might take into account additional moral reasons one might have to 
express or refrain from expressing blame, and it also might take into ac-
count the standing of the blamer.145 
It is controversial just what conditions give a person the standing to 
express blame, but three commonly cited factors thought to undermine 
one’s standing to blame are complicity, hypocrisy, and meddling.146 One 
suggestion as to what might unify these disparate seeming conditions is 
that standing is at least in part a function of the blamer’s relationship to 
the victim of the wrongdoing.147 When the blamer is complicit, she is par-
tially at fault for the victim’s situation; when the blamer is hypocritical, 
she cannot honestly align herself with the victim; and when the she is 
meddling she lacks the requisite connection to the victim. 
If there’s no possibility of Tara actually committing the wrongdoing, 
there is no real victim. Even if the content of blame strictly speaking 																																																								
145 Although, one might also need certain standing to appropriately blame in the unex-
pressed sense. This may seem more or less plausible depending on the account given of 
blaming attitudes and their contents. It is less controversial that standing matters for 
outward expressions of blame than for blame simpliciter. 
146 See Coates and Tognazzini (2013). 
147 See, for example, Bell (2013). 
 -147- 
doesn’t require a victim, merely the existence of a trait, the permissibility 
of expressing it might be mitigated by the absence of a victim. It might be 
inappropriate to outwardly direct blame at Tara when there is no one she 
has actually harmed. To a lesser degree, the appropriateness of expressing 
blame might be mitigated in a similar way in pre-blame cases. While there 
is a future victim, there is no current victim, and that might alter the ap-
propriateness of expressing blame. Since it can be difficult to untangle in-
tuitions about the appropriateness of blame from the appropriateness of 
expressing blame, this is one further reason that we should give pause to 
putting a lot of stock in the seeming counterintuitiveness of appropriate 
pre-blame. 
6.3 Stubborn Incompatibilist Intuitions 
The intuition that the permissibility of pre-blame is unacceptable might al-
so stem in part from sticky incompatibilist intuitions, which, methodolog-
ically speaking, we shouldn’t permit at this stage to provide a knock-
down objection to the view. Libertarians will hold that it isn’t really possi-
ble to have 100% certainty about what someone will do, even in a world 
that has access to the most advanced possible scientific discoveries. In an 
indeterministic world, therefore, anytime someone predicts the future, the 
prediction can only ever be a confident guess. If a fortuneteller predicts 
that a person will act in an immoral way, it is, however unlikely, within 
that person’s power to overcome the situationally-influenced factors and 
change courses due to a pure exercise of the will. It’s possible that what 
rubs some of us the wrong way about these scenarios in which a person is 
pre-blamed is that deep down we think blaming someone on the basis of a 
prediction is unfair since she might not act in the way she is predicted to 
act. If so, then we have clearly failed to isolate the appropriate intuition. 
Of course, an incompatibilist might use the fact that we seem unable to 
move away from these kinds of intuitions that tell against the permissibil-
ity of pre-blame as evidence that we have unshakable incompatibilist intu-
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itions. This could be bolstered into an argument that the compatibilist pro-
ject has gone awry at some point. However, it is part of the nature of the 
dialectic that we do have stubborn intuitions that pull us in favor of liber-
tarianism, but that we also have stubborn intuitions favoring aspects of 
compatibilism and skepticism as well. All three of the following state-
ments have intuitive appeal, and yet they are jointly incompatible: “We 
are morally responsible” “Being morally responsible requires having mul-
tiple paths available at the moment of choice.” “Determinism is true, and 
rules out responsible action.” The point I want to make here is just that in-
sofar as our intuitions about cases may stem from intuitive support for 
one of these general ideas, we have reason to at least be cautious about us-
ing them to rule out views. 
6.4 Denying the Existence of Resultant Moral Luck 
I have, so far, acknowledged that the fact that it is somewhat counterintui-
tive that pre-blame would hypothetically be appropriate on the Finely In-
dividuated Trait view, though I have argued that we ought to have a 
measured response to its counter-intuitiveness. But it should also be noted 
that this same consequence of the view actually helps explain our intui-
tions about another issue: resultant moral luck. 
It seems that, in the actual world, it is appropriate to treat a successful 
murderer and a murderer whose plan is thwarted by something wholly 
outside of his control differently. This is puzzling, though, since the only 
real difference in the two cases is something that has nothing to do with 
any features of the two individuals.148 But an adherent of the Finely Indi-
viduated Trait view could make use of what is known as the epistemic ar-
gument for denying the existence of resultant moral luck. In other words, 																																																								
148 Discussion of these issues in the contemporary literature tends to center on the treat-
ment of the issue provided in Williams and Nagel (1976), although discussion also ap-
pears earlier in Feinberg (1962). For one recent treatment of the issue as it pertains to 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, see Hartman (2017). 
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the Finely Individuated Trait view is consistent with and even helps bol-
ster a powerful argument that, despite appearances, it really is not appro-
priate to treat successful and (un)luckily unsuccessful murderers differ-
ently when all else is held equal. 
As I have been arguing, the epistemic argument against resultant mor-
al luck holds that the reason we often treat the two cases differently is be-
cause in the real world we rarely know the strength of someone’s com-
mitment to undertaking a certain course of action unless we have evi-
dence from the fact that they actually went through with it.149 As Dana 
Nelkin explains,  
 
Thus, rather than indicating our commitment to cases of resultant 
moral luck, our differential treatment of successful and unsuccessful 
murderers indicates our different epistemic situations with respect to 
each. If we were in the unrealistic situation of knowing that both 
agents had exactly the same intentions, the same strength of commit-
ment to their plans, and so on, then we would no longer be inclined to 
treat them differently.150 
 
The Finely Individuated Trait view helps explain why we ought to treat 
the two the same if we were in the same epistemic circumstances: what 
matters is the fact that the person has the quality of being such that she 
would ϕ in circumstances C. 
Countenancing moral luck is generally taken to be a problem of some 
sort, and so it is meant to be counterintuitive that moral luck should make 
a difference. Since something like the Finely Individuated Trait view is 
needed to bolster a crucial argument that moral luck doesn’t make a dif-
ference, this should count in its favor. The same aspect of the view that 																																																								
149 See Richards (1986), Rescher (1993), Rosebury (1995), and Thomson (1993). 
150 Nelkin (2013). 
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under one lens looked counterintuitive, also has strong intuitive appeal 
when focusing on issues of resultant moral luck. Thus the problem of pre-
blame does not give us anywhere near conclusive reason to reject an ac-
count of blame’s content that seems as promising as the Finely Individu-
ated Trait view. 
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Chapter 5: The Case of Forgetting 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous four chapters I developed the Minimal Approval account 
of attributional-responsibility. I suggested that an agent can be attribu-
tionally-responsible for acting when the production of her action meets 
fairly minimal ownership conditions. In Chapter 3 I showed how this ac-
count explains why agents are attributionally-responsible for weak-willed 
actions: unlike in cases of compulsion, agents minimally approve of their 
weak-willed actions. Given this explanation, it seems right to say that 
weak-willed agents are also derivatively attributionally-responsible for 
failing to do what they would have done were they to have been strong-
willed. 
In this chapter I consider the prospects for extending a similar line of 
thought to account for cases in which agents seem responsible for forget-
ting to do something they ought to have done. I argue that this move is 
not as appealing as it might seem, and, in addition, I argue that similar at-
tempts to expand the notion of attributional-responsibility by other theo-
rists to account for these kinds of cases are misguided. 
Instead, I argue that agents are responsible in a non-appraising, role-
responsibility sense for these sorts of forgettings, but they are not attribu-
tionally-responsible. This sets an important limit on the project of the dis-
sertation as a whole; while I argue that blaming practices that center 
around finely individuated traits as expressed by actions of which agents 
minimally approve play a crucial and significant role in our moral respon-
sibility practices, they are not exhaustive of our responsibility practices. 
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2. The Minimal Approval View and The Case of Forgetting 
Consider the following case from George Sher’s book, Who Knew? Respon-
sibility Without Awareness: 
 
Alessandra, a soccer mom, has gone to pick up her children at their el-
ementary school. As usual, Alessandra is accompanied by the family's 
border collie, Bathsheba, who rides in the back of the van. Although it 
is very hot, the pick-up has never taken long, so Alessandra leaves 
Sheba in the van while she goes to gather her children. This time, how-
ever, Alessandra is greeted by a tangled tale of misbehavior, ill-
considered punishment, and administrative bungling which requires 
several hours of indignant sorting out. During that time, Sheba lan-
guishes, forgotten, in the locked car. When Alessandra and her chil-
dren finally make it to the parking lot, they find Sheba unconscious 
from heat prostration.151 
 
Assuming that Alessandra is a generally caring and thoughtful person 
who loves Sheba, it is not easy to get clear on our intuitive responses to 
such a case. On the one hand, we might feel bad for Alessandra for mak-
ing such an upsetting mistake, one that does not on the face of it seem to 
reflect any sort of characteristically morally wrong personality traits. On 
the other hand, she seems to have acted negligently—we think she should 
still be held responsible in some sense for what happened. To bring out 
this intuition, imagine that Alessandra were to offer no apology to her 
children and family for what she had done.152  This, I think, would seem 																																																								
151 Sher (2009): 24. 
152 Although, perhaps apology is warranted even in cases that involve no responsibility. 
See, for example, Talbert (Forthcoming): 17, and Scanlon (2008): 150. Perhaps a similar in-
tuition could be brought about, though, by considering the case in which Alessandra 
feels no remorse or special duty to comfort others affected as a result of her causal re-
sponsibility. 
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highly inappropriate. While her family might rightly be sensitive to the 
fact that Alessandra herself might be suffering from the tragedy of the in-
cident, we might not think them out of line to expect her to make amends 
of some sort. The verdict here is unclear, but there is at least a prima facie 
case for Alessandra’s being responsible in some way. 
What does the Minimal Approval view say about Alessandra’s neglect 
of Sheba in this case as it pertains to her attributional-responsibility? It 
might be thought that the Minimal Approval view actually has resources 
that other views in the Deep Self family lack to show why Alessandra is, 
after all, attributionally-responsible for leaving Sheba in the car. In Chap-
ter 3, I argued that agents could be attributionally-responsible for acting 
out of weakness of will. When Sam acts out of weakness of will and ends 
up going to a party rather than studying for her exam, she is attributional-
ly-responsible for going to the party. It makes sense in these cases to also 
say that she is derivatively attributionally-responsible for not studying. If 
being attributionally-responsible for what you actually do can render you 
attributionally-responsible for what you fail to do as well, then we might 
think we should conclude from the fact that Alessandra is (let’s stipulate) 
attributionally-responsible for staying to talk to the school administrators, 
that she is also attributionally-responsible for leaving Sheba in the car. 
In order to evaluate whether or not this is right, though, we’ll need to 
pay more attention to the principle that lets us move from Sam’s attribu-
tional-responsibility for her action to her attributional-responsibility for 
her omission. One principle that might get us from Sam’s responsibility 
for going to the party to Sam’s responsibility for failing to study is the fol-
lowing: 
 
Modal Bridge Principle: If an agent, A, is attributionally-responsible 
for ϕ-ing-at-t, then A is also attributionally-responsible for not ψ-ing, 
where ψ-ing is anything else A could have done at t. 
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Adopting this principle would also give the result that Alessandra is re-
sponsible for not tending to Sheba, since, arguably, she could have tended 
to Sheba rather than stayed to talk to the administrator. But notice that 
adopting this principle reopens the issue that Deep Self views were par-
tially created to avoid. Given the fixity of the past and the truth of deter-
minism, Incompatibilists will argue, there is nothing that Alessandra 
might have done at t other than what she actually did—stay and talk to 
the administrator. Given the hard work of maneuvering around these 
questions and arguing for their irrelevance in the case of attributionally-
responsible action, it would be unfortunate if they were simply to reap-
pear in the case of attributionally-responsible omission. 
There is also a larger problem with this view. Consider the following 
case:  
 
Oblivious Ollie: Ollie is walking to work and meets the conditions of 
Minimal Approval for walking to work. Unbeknownst to him, there is 
a small child drowning in the river behind him, but he never turns 
around and notices the child drowning. Is Ollie attributionally-
responsible for failing to turn around and help the child?  It would 
seem that he should not be, but given a plausible (compatibilist) con-
strual of the Modal Bridge principle, he is attributionally-responsible 
for walking to work, and could have instead turned around and saved 
the drowning child. 
 
So perhaps, instead, we ought to adopt a principle like the following: 
 
Evidence Bridge Principle: If an agent, A, is attributionally-responsible 
for ϕ-ing-at-t, then A is also attributionally-responsible for not ψ-ing-
at-t where ψ-ing is any act that the agent has sufficient evidence is a 
potential course of conduct for her. 
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This principle both correctly exempts Ollie from attributional-respons-
ibility, and, at least on the face of it, might even avoid the incompatibilist 
worry. But consider the explanation it gives as to why Alessandra is re-
sponsible for leaving Sheba in the car. She is responsible for talking to the 
school administrators when it is the case that she also had evidence (to 
which she failed to attend) that she could go tend to Sheba to avoid catas-
trophe at that moment instead. But what role does the existence of the ev-
idence to which Alessandra failed to attend play in explaining why she is 
responsible? Alessandra may fail to attend to the evidence due to a ran-
dom misfiring in her brain, and so the fact that this evidence existed 
doesn’t tell us anything about what Alessandra is like agentially. It may be 
true that it tells us that a surface-level normative fact is true about Ales-
sandra: there was evidence that an alternative course existed, evidence to 
which she ought to have been responsive. But grounding the explanation 
of an ascription of attributional-responsibility in a normative fact like this 
would require accepting a sort of deep foundational asymmetry between 
attributability for acts and omissions. Since attributability for actions on 
the Minimal Approval view is determined by pure metaphysical condi-
tions of agency, it would be odd if first-order normative theorizing needed 
to take place in order to determine the conditions for attributability for an 
omission,.  
Instead, I think the Minimal Approval view should be coupled with a 
principle that ties attributional-responsibility for omissions more closely 
to the fact that the mechanism of the agent’s action relates to the fact that 
the agent would approve to some degree of what she does do instead of 
the omitted action. This will explain why Sam is attributionally-
responsible for failing to study, but will have the result that Alessandra is 
not attributionally-responsible for failing to tend to Sheba. This is the 
principle I think the Minimal Approval theorist ought to adopt: 
 
Contrastive Approval Bridge Principle: If an agent, A, is attributional-
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ly-responsible for ϕ-ing-at-t, then A is also attributionally-responsible 
for not ψ-ing-at-t, when ψ-ing is an alternative considered in the 
worlds in which A meets the conditions of minimal approval.153 
 
Sam is attributionally-responsible for not studying, not because she could 
or should have studied, but because of a fact about her agency. Sam min-
imally approves of going to the party even though she knows that she 
could be studying, and this is related to what leads her to go to the party. 
Notice that, given this bridge principle, Sam’s responsibility for her omis-
sion actually has something to do with her approval. She’s responsible for 
going to the party because she minimally approves of it, and she’s respon-
sible for not studying because she minimally approved of doing some-
thing else instead. Her responsibility for her omissions comes from the fact 
that we know something about what she is like when she is faced with the 																																																								
153 What grounds these bridge principles? One possibility is that they are derived from 
principles that would explain why agents are responsible not just for their actions, but al-
so for the consequences of their actions. On this strategy, the fact that an agent does not ψ 
instead when she ϕs is just a consequence of ϕ-ing like any other. Different principles of 
this form correspond with the modal, normative, and contrastive approval bridge princi-
ples. For example: 
Modal: If an agent, A, is attributionally-responsible for ϕ-ing-at-t, then A is also attributionally-
responsible for all of the consequences of ϕ-ing that she could have foreseen, (possibly including 
the fact that A will not ψ instead). 
Evidence: If an agent, A, is attributionally-responsible for ϕ-ing-at-t, then A is also attributional-
ly-responsible for all the consequences of ϕ-ing that she had enough evidence to foresee, (possible 
including the fact that A will not ψ instead) 
Normative: If an agent, A, is attributionally-responsible for ϕ-ing-at-t, then A is also attribu-
tionally-responsible for all of the consequences of ϕ-ing that she should have foreseen (possibly in-
cluding the fact that A will not ψ instead). 
Contrastive Approval: If an agent, A, is attributionally-responsible for ϕ-ing-at-t, then A is also 
attributionally-responsible for all of the consequences of ϕ-ing she foresees in the worlds in which 
she reflects on which of her motivations to act on at t and approves of ϕ-ing, (possibly including 
the fact that A will not ψ instead). 
 -157- 
choice situation in which the option of studying features—there’s a part of 
her that wants to go to the party anyway.  
The same can’t be said of Alessandra. Her minimal approval of talking 
with the administrator doesn’t tell us anything about what she cares about 
with respect to Sheba, since considerations about Sheba aren’t among 
those that would factor into her agential psychology whatsoever when she 
so approves.  
Note that Alessandra’s failure to think about Sheba’s being in the car is 
plausibly one of the things we ought to hold fixed when assessing wheth-
er or not she has the disposition required for being attributionally-
responsible for talking to the administrator according to the Minimal Ap-
proval view. To see why this should be so, notice that people are plausibly 
attributionally-responsible for ϕ-ing even if there are other options that 
they do not remember that would silence their desires to ϕ were they to 
come up with those options. If I had remembered that I had spaghetti in 
the pantry I would never have given any weight to a desire to go to the 
grocery store, but this doesn’t mean that I’m not attributionally-
responsible for going to the grocery store. 
 
Alessandra never considers Sheba, and so there is no bridge that 
shows that just because she is attributionally-responsibility for talking to 
the administrator, she should be attributionally-responsible for forgetting 
Sheba. This leaves us needing to look elsewhere to explain the intuition 
that Alessandra is in some sense responsible for failing to tend to Sheba. 
3. The Tracing Strategy 
One possible way to show that Alessandra might, after all, be attribution-
ally-blameworthy for failing to tend to Sheba would be to use the tracing 
strategy.  
The tracing strategy is used to explain why agents are responsible for 
certain acts that are not directly attributable to agents. According to pro-
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ponents of the tracing strategy, an agent may also be attributionally-
blameworthy for acts that should have been and could have been prevent-
ed by an earlier act, when the agent is attributionally-blameworthy for the 
prior omission. For example, an out of control drunk driver who hits an-
other car may not meet the attributability requirements for hitting the car, 
but nevertheless be blameworthy. Given the tracing strategy, we can ex-
plain her attributional-blameworthiness for her behavior via the fact that 
she is attributionally-blameworthy for her earlier acts of getting intoxicat-
ed and choosing to drive rather than catch an Uber to and from the bar. 
Note that the agent must be blameworthy for the prior action in order for it 
to explain why the agent is blameworthy for the current action. It cannot 
merely be that the person made a choice in the past that lead to the bad 
outcome. If a mother decides to pick her child up from school rather than 
have him take the bus home, and on the way home the child gets injured 
in a car accident due to no fault of the mother’s driving, she does not be-
come blameworthy just because she made the prior choice to pick him up 
by car.  
While some have voiced concerns with the viability of the tracing 
strategy in general, for the sake of argument I’ll grant that the tracing 
strategy, generally speaking, works, and provides a good explanation for 
a broad range of cases of blameworthiness.154 The question then is whether 																																																								
154 Tracing strategies are more often invoked by reasons-responsiveness and control-
based theorists of responsibility. While the tracing strategy is in principle open to de-
fenders of the Deep Self view, defenders of Deep Self views sometimes couple their theo-
ries of attributability with defenses of the H-Tradition of responsibility and aim to defend 
a Strawsonian quality-of-will thesis on which blameworthy agents’ actions must express 
ill-will. It’s not clear that a tracing strategy is compatible with this sort of view. Although 
I’ve developed the Minimal Approval account as B-Tradition account of responsibility, 
interestingly, the hypothetical nature of the reflectiveness required for Minimal Approval 
might make the tracing strategy somewhat less necessary in certain standard cases, and 
so adopting it might help quality of will theorists avoid the tracing strategy. Another re-
cent set of objections to the tracing strategy concerns certain articulations of the strategy’s 
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or not a Minimal Approval theorist could use the strategy to explain the 
intuition that Alessandra is attributionally-blameworthy.  
I think such an explanation is bound to fail. There are things that Ales-
sandra could have done that would have made it so that she didn’t forget 
Sheba in the car. She could have tied a string around her finger or set a 
phone alarm reminding her that the dog was in the car, or she could have 
avoided bringing the dog altogether. She failed to do those things, but in 
order to make it the case that she is attributionally-blameworthy for leav-
ing Sheba, we would also need to know that she is attributionally-
blameworthy for those prior omissions. Given the reasonable assumptions 
that she would be no more than a minute or two picking up her kids, that 
she doesn’t have any general tendency to forget important things when 
her plans get modified, and doesn’t have any particular tendency to forget 
about Sheba, it’s just not clear that she would be attributionally-
blameworthy for not setting a phone alarm. 
Using just our intuitive notion of attributional-blameworthiness, it is 
just not clear that Sheba does anything that reflects a bad trait prior to her 
leaving Sheba in the car. And using the Minimal Approval view combined 
with the Contrastive Approval Bridge Principle doesn’t seem to give us 
the result that there is anything that she is attributionally-blameworthy for 
either. In order for her to be derivatively attributionally-blameworthy for 
leaving Sheba in the car due to a tracing explanation, it would have to be 
the case that in every specification of the story that generates the intuition 
that Alessandra is responsible for leaving Sheba in the car, she is also such 
that she is blameworthy for minimally approving of what she was doing 
instead of setting a phone alarm, or blameworthy for minimally approv-
																																																																																																																																																							
compatibility with reasonable epistemic conditions on responsibility. For this line of ar-
gumentation, see Vargas (2005), and Shabo (2015). 
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ing of what she was doing instead of thinking about ways to keep herself 
vigilant about Sheba’s wellbeing. 
Furthermore, I don’t think tracing can give us the right kind of explana-
tion for our intuition that Alessandra is responsible in some sense. Take a 
case in which Alessandra has complete knowledge and full awareness of 
the fact that there is a 1/10,000 possibility that she will leave Sheba in the 
car at some point. If Alessandra were to fail to set a phone alarm, given 
the other demands of her busy life as a mother, I think few would blame 
her for this. Nevertheless if she were to in fact leave Sheba in the car I 
think this would still elicit our reaction that she owes some form of rec-
ompense to her family in light of leaving the dog in the car. Even when 
she has done nothing wrong in the past, we still think she ought to be held 
responsible in the present. 
4. An Argument Against the Minimal Approval View as the Correct 
View of Attributability? 
Although I have presented the Minimal Approval view as a view that is 
robust across a wider variety of different causal stories than traditional 
Deep Self views, cases like Alessandra’s open up the possibility of the ob-
jection that it is not robust across a wide enough variety of causal stories. 
One such challenge comes from proponents of a loosely associated set of 
views sometimes called New Attributionist views.155 In this section I raise 
the possibility that the case of Alessandra could be leveraged into an ob-
jection that agents are in fact attributionally-responsible for an even 
broader range of acts and omissions than what the Minimal Approval 
view can account for. I consider George Sher’s and Angela Smith’s views 
as offering competing views of attributional-responsibility that give the 																																																								
155 New Attributionists include George Sher, Angela Smith, Matt Talbert, and T. M. 
Scanlon. For a discussion of this term and its application, see Talbert (2016). Matt Talbert, 
however, explicitly takes the view that Alessandra is not responsible [see Talbert (Forth-
coming)]. 
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result that Alessandra is attributionally-responsible for leaving Sheba in 
the car, but argue that neither account succeeds at this task. 
4.1 Sher’s Agent-Constituting Mechanism View 
On Sher’s account, agents need not approve of their motivations in any 
sense in order to be attributionally-responsible for them. The criterion for 
attributional-responsibility on his view is instead just that the action or 
omission in some way stems from the constitutive features of the agent 
qua the particular rational agent she is. He takes these features to include 
not just the agent’s cares, values, and plans but also her general disposi-
tions and tendencies, as well as the relevant neurophysiological mecha-
nisms that cause such things.156 In this way, he is able to hold that agents 
may be attributionally-responsible for their actions and omissions even if 
they are not endorsed by the agent in any way, so long as they are caused 
by one of the kinds of mechanisms that are involved primarily in agency.  
In Alessandra’s case, is the fact that she leaves Sheba in the car caused 
by her constitutive agential features? According to Sher, it is. Things like 
“her concern for her children, for example, or her tendency to focus in-
tensely on whatever issue is at hand” are just the sorts of things that make 
her the agent that she is. And even though Alessandra would never ap-
prove or judge it best to leave Sheba in the Car, according to Sher, “…we 
must locate the significance of Alessandra's failure to remember Sheba not 
in what it reveals about her judgments about reasons, but rather in its be-
ing caused by the same psychophysical structure that sustains her ability 
to make such judgments.”157 And so, he thinks, we should conclude that 
she is in fact attributionally-responsible for her omission. 
I’d like to echo a general line of criticism taken up by Angela Smith 
and others to Sher’s larger account, though.158 The problem is that, while 																																																								
156 Sher (2005): 122. 
157 Sher (2009): 131.   
158 See, for example, Smith (2008), and Mason (Provisionally Forthcoming). 
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he articulates a promising-sounding necessary condition for attributional-
responsibility, Sher fails to provide a sufficient condition, since a mere 
causal connection between these kinds of structures and action is intui-
tively not sufficient make an agent attributionally-responsible. Take the 
following example: Imagine a case in which an agent has the quality that 
she thinks really really hard about her decisions just about all the time. 
But this same feature of her agency sometimes causes her brain, at other 
times, to short out due to being in overdrive, making her collapse in place. 
Suppose that she does not know that these incidences are related. One day 
she collapses and falls into someone on the way down, injuring this per-
son. Pretty clearly, this agent is not attributionally-responsible for her fall-
ing, and yet her behavior is, it seems, caused by one of the features that 
makes the agent who she is qua rational agent. 
Perhaps Sher could tell a story about how this behavior is not caused 
in the right sort of way by her tendencies, but it is unclear what that story 
could amount to without changing the extension of the view pretty signif-
icantly. The broader lesson here is that the criterion for attributional-
responsibility can’t just be that the behavior is a side effect of the agent’s 
rational-agent tendencies, as Sher would have it. 
4.2 Smith’s Rational Relations View 
In a series of articles, Angela Smith defends the Rational Relations view of 
responsibility according to which, broadly speaking, if an agent’s behavior 
displays a lack of rational concern, it is appropriate to hold that agent re-
sponsible for the behavior.159 Her view is generally taken to be an account 
of attributional-responsibility that can accommodate the fact that agents 
like Alessandra are attributionally-responsible for things like forgetting. 
However, I will show that depending on the interpretation of Smith’s 
view, it either does not give the result that Alessandra is responsible, or is 
not really a theory of attributional-responsibility. 																																																								
159 Smith (2005, 2008, 2012, 2015). 
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I’ll start with the first horn of the dilemma. It is understandable that 
Smith’s view would generally be taken to be able to give an account of 
Alessandra’s attributional-responsibility, since Smith’s own paradigm 
case of responsibility that she uses to motivate her view is very similar to 
the Alessandra case, and Smith seems to explain responsibility in this case 
as being grounded in a revealed lack of concern via an omission. This cer-
tainly sounds like attributability language. In Smith’s case, she forgets a 
friend’s birthday and the friend takes her to be morally responsible for her 
forgetting, as her dispositions and patterns of attention reasonably convey 
to her friend a lack of care. 
Smith describes the birthday-forgetting case in the following way: 
 
I did not intend to hurt my friend’s feelings or even foresee that my 
conduct would have this effect. I just forgot. It didn’t occur to me. I 
failed to notice. And yet, despite the apparent involuntariness of this 
failure, there was no doubt in either of our minds that I was, indeed, 
responsible for it. Although my friend was quick to pardon my 
thoughtlessness and to  dismiss it as trivial and unimportant, the act of 
pardoning itself is simply a way of renouncing certain critical respons-
es, which it is acknowledged, would, in principle, be justified.160 
 
But does Smith’s forgetting her friend’s birthday reveal an objectiona-
ble degree of concern about her friend? Certainly it might. Someone self-
absorbed or who undervalued her friendship might make this mistake 
frequently precisely for the reason that she failed to cultivate the appro-
priate level of concern. But it is not obviously true that any such descrip-
tion is true of Smith in this case. It might be that perhaps a better friend 
would focus her attention so intently on the birthdates of all her friends 
with the special intent to ensure this never happens. But if Smith has no 																																																								
160 Smith (2005), 236. 
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special reason to worry that she’ll forget, behaving this way would seem 
to be supererogatory. It’s possible, it seems, to have an appropriate level 
of concern for one’s friends without doing this. 
Commenting on the preceding passage from Smith, Matt Talbert says 
the following: 
 
Though Smith doesn’t say that she is blameworthy here, it’s a natural 
way to read the case and it’s easy to imagine a person in the position of 
Smith’s friend responding to her with the negative attitudes involved 
in moral blame. I take Smith’s view to be that if blame is appropriate in 
this case, then what makes it appropriate is just that in forgetting her 
friend’s birthday, Smith reveals something objectionable about her ori-
entation toward her friend.161  
 
Presumably Talbert’s reading of Smith would also apply to Alessandra’s 
case. If Alessandra’s forgetting did display objectionable lack of concern 
for Sheba, then this would be sufficient for appropriate blame. The ques-
tion then becomes, in in Alessandra case: is blame, after all, appropriate in 
the particular case due to objectionable lack of concern for Sheba?  
I agree with Talbert that if it’s true that we can tell the story such that 
Alessandra more generally cares a great deal about Sheba then we should 
conclude, on an account like Smith’s, that leaving Sheba in the car does 
not reveal anything objectionable about her orientation towards the dog, 
and thus Alessandra is not attributionally-responsible for her omission. 
And so we are left with cases on which it seems intuitive that Alessandra 
is responsible in some sense, despite the fact that leaving Sheba does not 
reveal anything objectionable about her level of concern for Sheba. Again, 
the only way of avoiding this outcome for Smith would be to argue that 
the very fact of Alessandra’s omission makes it the case that it is impossi-																																																								
161 Talbert (Forthcoming). 
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ble for her to have sufficiently cared about Sheba. But this seems implau-
sible. 
As Talbert points out, the idea that anytime someone leaves a dog in 
the car this shows an objectionable attitude of lack of care must be mistak-
en, because were an extraordinary circumstance to occur, even a high level 
of concern for Sheba would not be enough to prevent forgetting her in the 
car. But perhaps we could modify the view to something like, in the ab-
sence of extraordinary intervention (and presumably Alessandra’s discus-
sion with administrators should not count as extraordinary) if Alessandra 
had properly cared for Sheba she wouldn’t have left her in the car. But, as 
Talbert is I think right to point out, 
 
Even under normal circumstances, people sometimes forget or fail to 
notice things about which they care very much. More generally, I take 
it that even under normal circumstances, what we notice, what we re-
member, what fails to occur to us, and so on, doesn’t necessarily indi-
cate what we value or how much we value it.162 
 
It might be that forgetting a birthday or forgetting a dog in the car general-
ly indicates that a person has an objectionable lack of concern, but this is 
not sufficient evidence that a lack of concern is actually attributable to any 
particular agent. This is why it’s crucial in an account of attributability to 
have some condition that makes reference to the agent’s psychology, not 
just the agential psychology that her action/omission makes us warranted 
in believing might be the case. As a theory that can explain why Alessan-
dra’s responsibility for leaving Sheba must be grounded in some trait that 
is attributable to Alessandra, Smith’s theory falls short. 
This leads to the other horn of the dilemma, though. It seems to me 
that Smith might be able to agree that Alessandra is responsible even in 																																																								
162 Talbert (Forthcoming): 16. 
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the cases in which her forgetting doesn’t indicate an objectionable lack of 
concern for Sheba. In fact, in various places it seems as though Smith con-
ceives of the connection between our tendencies and our evaluative judg-
ments to be that our tendencies merely give those around us prima facie ev-
idence of our evaluative judgments such that we are required to answer 
for our tendencies—to either own up to the fact that they do reveal what 
we are like in a given instance or, crucially, to explain how in the particu-
lar case they came about in some way that shows that they did not stem 
from our lack of concern. Smith writes that: 
 
If one judges some thing or person to be important or significant in 
some way, this should (rationally) have an influence on one's tendency 
to notice factors which pertain to the existence, welfare, or flourishing 
of that thing or person. If this is so, then the fact that a person fails to 
take note of such factors in certain circumstances is at least some indi-
cation that she does not accept this evaluative judgment.163  
 
I am not sure whether Smith means here that it’s reasonable for the 
blamer to take it as some indication or it’s reasonable for us as philoso-
phers knowing the full specification of the story including the mental-
causal story of the potentially blamed person’s behavior to take it as indi-
cation that she does not accept the evaluative judgment. If we read Smith 
on the former interpretation, though, then this gives her a way to preserve 
the idea that Alessandra is responsible even if Talbert’s claims are all true. 
In Alessandra’s case, her leaving Sheba in the car gives others a prima facie 
reason to think she does not care sufficiently about Sheba, to which she 
ought to respond. And the required response may involve apology and/or 
other recompense for what happened that helps to make clear that she 
does not have any lack of general care about Sheba or her family. 																																																								
163 Smith (2005): 244. 
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But just because some fact is evidence that Alessandra doesn’t care 
enough about Sheba, this doesn’t suffice to show that Alessandra actually 
doesn’t care enough about Sheba. And so it seems that, whatever the mer-
its of this view, it is no argument against the Minimal Approval view as a 
view of attributional-responsibility since it is possible no negative trait is, 
in fact, attributable to Alessandra, (though it might not be unreasonable 
for her family to initially attribute one to her.) It might be possible to use 
the word “attributability” to refer not the set of actions that reveal some-
thing about what the agent is like such that the agent is properly subject to 
praise and blame on the basis of those traits but instead to the set of be-
haviors for which it is reasonable to respond to as if they revealed some-
thing about what the agent was like due to the fact that they have a special 
kind of significance for moral-social relations.164 But doing so puts the 
view out of conversation with the Minimal Approval view, which aims to 
give the fully specified conditions on which a behavior does, after all, re-
flect a blameworthy trait of the agent. So, on this second horn, the reading 
of Smith’s view may be more charitable, but it can’t be leveraged into an 
objection that the Minimal Approval view misidentifies the bounds of at-
tributional-responsibility due to its handling of the Alessandra case. 
5. Accountability Without Attributability 
Let’s take stock. I have argued that while it seems that Alessandra is in 
some sense responsible for leaving Sheba in the car, the most promising 																																																								
164 For evidence that there is more than one sense in which the word “attributability” 
tends to be used in this literature, see the discussion in the comments thread of this post 
at the PEA Soup blog: http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2009/05/scanlon-on-moral-
responsibility-blame-part-1.html Here, T.M. Scanlon writes that the special relevance of 
attitudes that are in principle judgment-sensitive comes from the fact that they are “par-
ticularly significant for our relations with each other (not because they are “attributable” 
or “belong to” the agent in a sense in which other attitudes to do not).” “Or, to put the 
same point differently,” he writes, “we tend to think of these attitudes as ‘attributable’ in 
a way that others are not only because their content has this greater significance.” 
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bridge principle to explain attributional-responsibility for omissions on 
the Minimal Approval view gives the outcome that she is not attribution-
ally-blameworthy. The tracing strategy also gives the result that Alessan-
dra is not attributionally-blameworthy even in cases in which she still 
seems responsible. Alternative views of attributional-responsibility that 
are able to return the result that Alessandra is attributionally-
blameworthy for her omission seem either to face serious problems of 
their own or else not truly be views of attributional-responsibility in the 
sense I have been concerned with. 
One option would be to bite the bullet and conclude that Alessandra is, 
after all, exempt from all moral responsibility for leaving Sheba in the car. 
Sometimes theories should prompt us to give up our common sense intui-
tions about every day cases, and our intuitions in this case seem far from 
clear. Some have defended the view that mistakes like Alessandra’s are 
not the kinds of things for which a person can be morally responsible, and 
this is not always seen as a difficult bullet to bite.165 This line of thought 
can be further supported by the fact that Alessandra ought to reassure her 
family that her omission was not due to lack of concern for Sheba. Fur-
thermore, people may often be in poor epistemic circumstances in regards 
to knowing whether they are in fact attributionally-responsible for their 
mistakes, and so if Alessandra were to confidently proclaim her inno-
cence, given the stakes we might rightly find her to lack appropriate hu-
mility. Biting the bullet here is not obviously wrong, and is certainly open 
to the Minimal Approval theorist. 
But I don’t think the intuition that Alessandra is in some sense respon-
sible should be written off so easily. One reason is that there’s an im-
portant difference between an uncertain intuition and an ambivalent intui-
tion. And our intuitions about Alessandra seem to me to be of the latter 																																																								
165 See, for example, Zimmerman (1986), and Talbert (Forthcoming). 
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type. It’s not just that we’re not sure if Alessandra’s case counts as a case 
of something one can be morally responsible for, it’s that she does seem 
responsible in one sense while not seeming responsible in another sense. 
Following David Shoemaker’s approach to ambivalent intuitions about re-
sponsibility, I think we should take this ambivalence in our intuitions as 
evidence of the fact that Alessandra’s omission fails to satisfy the condi-
tions for one type of responsibility but does satisfy the conditions for an-
other type.166 In particular, I think that our intuitions reflect the fact that 
this is not the kind of thing that does reveal something about what Ales-
sandra is like as a person, and so character-implicating responses of the 
kind that are appropriate in cases of attributional-responsibility are inap-
propriate. And yet, it still seems that Alessandra owes something to her 
family in light of her mistake. Even in the case in which her family is 
completely assured of her lack of attributional-responsibility, it seems that 
they would be justified in expecting and feeling entitled to an apology. 
And it seems she owes it to them. This sense of owing recompense of 
some sort plausibly implicates some form of responsibility response that 
goes above and beyond the mere the appropriateness of agent-regret since 
it is not just that she Alessandra ought to feel badly about what happened; 
it seems that her family deserves something from her: at minimum, an 
apology. 
My proposal is that Alessandra is not attributionally-responsible but is 
responsible in a non-appraising accountability sense. The relationship be-
tween attributional-responsibility and accountability-responsibility is fre-
quently thought to be that attributability is sufficient for mere appraisals 
while an agent must meet the further requirements for accountability in 
order to be subject to proper sanctioning responses of any kind. On this 
picture, attributability is a necessary condition for accountability and in 
order for an agent to be accountability-responsible an agent’s behavior 																																																								
166 Shoemaker (2009, 2011, 2015). 
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must not only be attributable but she also must possess some further ca-
pacities such as normative-competency or even libertarian free-will. On 
this sort of picture, if Alessandra is not attributionally-responsible for 
leaving Sheba in the car, she is certainly not accountability-responsible for 
doing so. I want to instead adopt an alternate picture on which attribu-
tional-responsibility and accountability-responsibility are wholly dis-
tinct.167 
I will not be able to give anywhere near a full account of accountabil-
ity-responsibility, but I do want to very briefly sketch once possible pic-
ture. Accountability-responsibility, on this picture, is derived from role re-
sponsibility.168 Many of the roles we play in relationship to others, such as 																																																								
167 As Zheng (forthcoming) points out, this way of distinguishing concepts, while not as 
popular in moral philosophy has a number of analogues in in political philosophy. Two 
distinct concepts of responsibility, an appraising and non-appraising sense, have some-
times been distinguished by using different terminology. For example, Schmidtz and 
Goodin (1998) distinguishes “blame responsibility” from “task responsibility” and Lavin 
(2008) distinguishes “liberal” from “post-liberal” responsibility.  
168 A somewhat similar picture is sketched in Zheng (2016, Forthcoming). In Zheng (2016) 
the distinction between attributional-responsibility and accountability-responsibility is 
made by grounding it in a “conceptual genealogy” meant to show how attributability 
and accountability concepts arise from distinct sources of philosophical concern. Zheng 
shares my general conception of attributional-responsibility as arising from a metaphysi-
cal question about how to make room on a naturalist picture of the world for our sense 
that we are in some important way the authors of our own conduct such that our behav-
ior can open us up for appraisal-based praising and blaming responses. The concept of 
accountability, in contrast, concerns issues of fairness and arises from strictly practical 
normative concerns in moral and political philosophy. For Zheng, accountability-
responsibility derives from the fair division of labor. Individuals have duties to shoulder 
certain social burdens that they are involved in causing because, as Zheng puts it, “when 
a person’s action brings about some negative consequences for others, this generates a 
social problem that simply cannot go unaddressed. These costs must be picked up some-
how and by someone, even if there is no bad intention or fault on the part of the person 
involved, because there are victims who deserve redress. This means that under a fair 
system of distributing burdens, it will often be appropriate for the person who performed 
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our roles as caretakers, guardians, teachers, and bosses, generate certain 
kinds of role-related responsibilities. As Sam Scheffler puts it, “...it is a fa-
miliar fact that such ties are often seen as a source of special responsibili-
ties. Indeed, we would be hard pressed to find any type of human rela-
tionship to which people have attached value or significance but which 
has never been seen as generating such responsibilities.”169 Role-related 
responsibilities might be more or less moral depending on the particular 
role in question.  
It might be thought that all we mean when talking about role-
responsibilities is that we have some duties or obligations that obtain in 
virtue of our relationships.  However, I suspect the connection between 
role-responsibilities and moral responsibility is tighter than that. It seems 
to me that we are directly accountable to others for failing at our role-
related responsibilities, and when our responsibilities are moral, we are 
generally straightforwardly morally accountable for doing so. 170 The ques-
tion of whether or not I am responsible in this sense completely circum-
vents the question of whether or not my action/omission expresses some-
thing morally bad about me. I might take responsibility for the welfare of 
another person’s children while they are on my watch, but if one of these 
children gets hurt on my watch this does not necessarily reflect something 
bad about what I am like as a person, such that it would be appropriate to 																																																																																																																																																							
the action to bear a large share of the costs: she can be asked to compensate for damages, 
make reparations, or to change her practices to prevent future failures. But notice that 
none of this requires an assessment of character, intentions, attitudes, or values—she can 
justifiably be required to bear (at least some of) the costs of her behavior whether she per-
formed them out of malice, negligence, or sheer (non-culpable) ignorance or accident.” 
Zheng (forthcoming) builds on this foundation and argues that accountability in this 
sense is grounded in role-related responsibility. 
169 Scheffler (1997): 190. 
170 Similar ideas are developed in several different contexts in: Scheffler (1997), Miller 
(2004), Cane (2016), Zheng (2017, forthcoming), and Lawford-Smith and Collins (2017). 
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blame me in any kind of appraising sense. I still owe my friend an apolo-
gy and special concern for the child’s recovery given that I am accountable 
to her.  
This is not to say that there is no set of excusing conditions for ac-
countability-responsibility, but these conditions do not come from failing 
to meet certain metaphysical agential criteria. Rather, they might pertain 
to the fairness of being held to have certain role-related responsibilities at a 
given time and circumstance. For example, the fairness of the conditions 
under which a person comes to take on a role-related responsibility may 
be one relevant factor. As David Miller puts it when discussing a similar 
concept of responsibility,171 fair ascriptions of role-related accountability 
may also 
 
... rest on implicit norms concerning the capacities that human beings 
can be expected to possess. Thus we do not hold people responsible for 
the consequences of their actions in cases where those consequences 
could only have been avoided by a superhuman display of strength. 
Likewise we do not hold people outcome responsible in cases where 
they are coerced into acting as they do, and in making these judgments 
we rely on our intuitive sense of how much pressure a normal person 
could be expected to resist. At the same time, diminished capacity does 
not relieve a person of outcome responsibility. People cannot escape it 
merely because through ignorance they failed to anticipate the results 
of their actions. An unusually clumsy person can be held responsible 
for the damage he causes as he blunders about the world172 
 																																																								
171 Miller speaks of “outcome responsibility” which roughly maps on to what I am calling 
“accountability” and contrasts this with “moral responsibility” which he describes as 
playing a similar role to what I have called “attributional-responsibility.” 
172 Miller (2004): 245. 
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I suspect that in many cases when a person “takes responsibility,” it is in 
this role-related accountability sense. In taking responsibility an agent 
clarifies or reaffirms what she takes to be her reasonably assigned role-
related duties for which she is directly accountable even in the absence of 
displaying any immediate morally objectionable traits in failing to meet 
those duties. 
Returning to the case of Alessandra, her role as Sheba’s caretaker 
makes her liable for something bad happening to Sheba on her watch, and 
this holds completely independently of whether or not her failure to do so 
reflects a bad (even finely individuated) aretaic trait of hers. Alessandra, 
while not attributionally-responsible for leaving Sheba in the car does owe 
redress to her family members for her mistake. Her family would be 
wrong to think that she has a bad trait, or to alter their perceptions of her 
or their relationships to her in light of her mistake. Her family, however, 
would be right to expect that Alessandra should apologize and make any 
and all attempts to make it up to them. She should do these things not just 
because she is the mother of a family that has just experienced a horrific 
event but also because of the specific accountability to others affected that 
she has, given that she had a role-based obligation to care for the dog at 
that point in the day. 
It should be noted that, were Alessandra to attributably fail to live up 
to the demands of her role responsibility in her response to the situation, 
she would then additionally be properly subject to appraisal-based attribu-
tional-blame. In this way, we can capture the full force of the intuition that 
if Alessandra were to coldly fail to offer an apology, she would not only 
be failing to deliver something that is owed to her family but she would 
also be revealing a morally bad trait through her behavior. 
Though this sketch of the relationship (or lack thereof) between attrib-
utional-responsibility and accountability-responsibility is admittedly in-
complete, I believe it represents a promising starting point for clearing 
away conceptual confusion regarding ascriptions of moral responsibility, 
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and this is not limited to cases of forgetting. I’ll briefly mention three other 
potentially fruitful applications of distinguishing the concepts in this way. 
Responsibility for implicit bias may be helpfully thought of as involv-
ing accountability without attributability in cases in which an agent does 
not minimally approve of her action that causes the a harm associated 
with acting in accordance with implicit bias. These agents nevertheless 
harm others through their actions, and perhaps in doing so they fail in 
their roles as citizens. As a result they owe something to the recipients of 
these harms. 
Similarly, white people might have role-related responsibilities as citi-
zens to help undo the effects of structural racism, even the effects that they 
personally had no role in bringing about.173 Even though, as an individual, 
a particular white person might not have undertaken any attributable ac-
tions that would reveal objectionably racist traits, it might be that group-
membership generates role-related responsibilities to actively mitigate the 
effects of structural racism. Omitting these actions, then, can make white 
people accountably-responsible for harms to black people. Of course, once 
awareness of this fact is raised for the white person’s consideration, she 
can then become attributionally-blameworthy for actively ignoring it.174 																																																								
173 See Zheng (Forthcoming). 
174 Avia Pasternak makes a similar point when she says that “group members are not 
necessarily blame-responsible when their group acts badly (that would be determined in 
light of their own behaviour). But a group's [collective moral responsibility] affects group 
members in other ways: First, it generates feelings that are associated with moral wrong-
doing, such as 'we shame' and regret for what the group has done, and possibly also a 
sense of personal shame for being associated with the group. Moreover, the [collective 
moral responsibility] of a group grounds certain task-responsibilities for its members, 
such as the duty to change their group's practices and norms, or the duty to share the 
burden of repairing the damage their group caused. When group members end up hav-
ing these forward-looking duties, then a failure to comply with them would amount to a 
personal moral failure” (Pasternak [2011]). 
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Finally, consider also the various agency-impairing conditions that I 
have argued exempt agents from attributional-responsibility: from the 
person with Tourette syndrome who utters slurs to the person with miso-
phonia who verbally lashes out every time someone chews gum. While 
these agents are subject to forces that undermine their agency, this does 
not give them license to harm people without explanation or apology, be-
cause this would be a display of a lack of regard for the role-related re-
sponsibilities they take on in relation to those their behavior affects.  
Again, this sets an important limit on claims of being exempt from re-
sponsibility due to failures to meet the conditions of the Minimal Approv-
al account. While it is crucial for agents to respond to the behavior for 
which they do meet these conditions and so are attributionally-
blameworthy, this does not exhaust the extent of what is required of their 
humanity in terms of responding to the harms they have a duty to amelio-
rate, whether they come about by choice or chance. 
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